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PREFACE 
This work analyses the regulation of commercial banks in 
Zambia and its impact on the role that these institutions are 
playing in national development. The background to this 
analysis is -the conviction that as these institutions control 
enormous amounts of resources, or are capable of doing so, then 
they need certain incentives to make them available for 
investment. These institutions are not using their own money. 
Such incentives or inducements therefore must ensure that those 
resources are safely invested. The incentives e-nvisaged include 
regulations both of the institutions themselves as well as the 
economic system. It is these aspects that this work examines. 
The work is divided into six basic chapters. The first 
chapter is the introduction which makes the case for a role to 
be played by commercial banks in development, under proper 
regulation. The second chapter gives a historical origin of 
banks in Zambia, including the circumstances of existing 
commercial banks. Chapter three deals with the regulations 
affecting commercial banking. This is basically an outline of 
the various statutes enacted in the country since the colonial 
days. Chapter four makes the case for the actual relevctnee or 
need for commercial bank involvement in Zambia's economic 
development. It sketches out the historical shortage of 
resources in investment. Chapter five deals with the actual 
role played by banks in Zambia's development, while chapter six 
appraises the effect of the regulations on that performance. 
(xxii) 
The seventh chapter is a summary of the study and the 
conclusions reached. The law is stated as it stood in 1985, 
although recent developments and laws known to the author are 
included. 
(xxiii) 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1: 0 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
This work looks at theregulation of commercial banks in 
Zambia. Its -aims are basically twofold. First it seeks to 
-III 
establish the impact of statutory and other regulations in 
influencing the behaviour of Zambian banks, particularly in the 
making of decisions relating to branching, dispensing of the 
credit, savings mobilization and other services. Secondly, 
-it 
seeks to discover whether or how the functions and practices of 
commercial banks in Zambia, including the system of regulating 
them / fit in with the overalll strategies and objectives 
for 
economic development in the country. 
Concern about the role of banks in Zambia's general 
economic lif e and the notion that regulations can be employed 
to place banking operations within national developmental 
strategies go back a long way, but can be seen more clearly 
from the government's actions soon after independence. In 
April, 1968, President Kaunda attacked the attitudes of foreign 
owned enterprises, including banksj, saying: 
The banks, the insurance companies, the building 
societies, the hire-purchase companies and the other 
commercial financial institutions ave not been willing 
to assist the Zambian businessman". 
ý 
1. K. D. Kaunda, Zambia's Economic Revolution, Address at 
Mulungushi, 19th April, 1968. Zambia Inf tion services (ZIS); Government Printer Lusaka. P. 27. 
These concerns are covered in more detail in chapter four. 
-1- 
To counter these attitudes his government limited the 
borrowing ability of resident expatriates and their 
I 
enterprises. The exchange control autfiorities were directed to 
treat the borrowing requirements of these groups in the same 
way as they did those of foreign companies. The criteria 
they were to use in determining whether or not expatriates or 
eýpatriate owned enterprises were to obtain loans 
w4arp-to be the 
amount of their investment and the type of the business they 
operated. The authorities were also to take into account the 
amounts of money brought into the country by expatriate 
entrepreneurs before determing the amount they could be allowed 
to borrow. The President explained that the aim of his measures 
was to enable financial institutions to use their excess 
liquidity to assist Zambian entrepreneurs. 
In 1970, while announcing his government's intention to 
take over the country's financial institutions, the President 
again made clear his and his government's disquiet about the 
attitudes and policies of the banks. 2 He was critical of their 
staff policies which prevented Zambian citizens from assuming 
managerial positions, and about the rate at which they opened 
new -branches in-rural areasý, --Including as be-fore, --their 
policies towards' lending to Zambians. Thus, as a follow up to 
the 1968 measures the President added two new ones, namely 
2. K. D. Kaunda, Zambia Completes Economic Reforms: 'Now 
Zambia's ours', An-ATc7ress by the President, 10th N5vember, 
1970. 
-2- 
that, his government was going to acquire 51 per cent of the 
shares of foreign owned banks and to merge some of them. 
3 
But following the failure to agree with the foreign 
banks on the terms of the government's -acquisition of some 
shares, the government's bid to achieve control of the banks 
seemed to be as far away as ever. Reluctant to go ' for an 
outright nationalization, the government chose instead to 
obtain a small measure of control by enacting the Banking Act, 
1971.4 The main terms of the Act were that: 
(i) only companies, locally incorporated and registered) could 
carry on the business of banking. 
(ii) each bank was required to ensure that at least half of its 
directors were Zambian citizens or established residents. 
(iii) all banks could carry on the business of 
merchant banking. 
(iv) every bank in which the government held all or some of the 
shares would be required to maintain a paid-up equity capital 
amounting to not less than K5001000. 
(v) every bank without government participation in its equity 
--would-be required to maintain a paid-up equity capital of not-- 
less than K2 million. 
3. For details-see also Chapter Four. 4. No. 43 of 1971, for more details see Chapter Three. 
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Despite government measures and regulations like those 
outlined in the foregoing paragraphs disillusionment with the 
role of banks in providing financial resources for development 
seems to be rising rather than abating. Thus we see in 1975, 
seven years after the first measures were announced, President 
Kaunda still indicating that more needed to be done., Speaking 
at the ceremony marking the opening of the new Bank of Zambia 
building, the President said of the Zambia National Commercial 
Bank: 
"It is hoped that it will also be able to depart from 
restrictive practices of orthodox banks by spearheading 
the expansion of banking to semi-urban and rural areas 
and relaýing the traditional criteria for business 
credit". 
The implication here is that the non-Zambian owned banks 
continue with their discriminatory and other undesirable 
practises. 
Similarly, the continued creation of new and different 
kinds of financial institutions by the government is also an 
indication that faith in the banking system has not yet been 
established. Starting with the now defunct Credit Organisation 
of Zambia (COZ) a chain of other institutions have come and 
sometimes gone. These include the Development Bank of Zambia, 
the Agricultural Development Bank and the Lima Bank. 6 In 
5. Speech b7-President K. D. Kaunda, opening ceremony, -The Ba 
of Zambia New Building. Associated Printers 17th July 1973, 
P. 12. See also Mbambo Siyanga2 Minister of State for Legal 
Affairs, in Times of Zambia, March 25,1986. ' 
6. See also Chapters two and four for details. 
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addition, the government itself and sometimes the Industrial 
Development Corporation (INDECO) as well as the Bank of Zambia 
have provided credit to needy entrepreneurs and farmers. Other 
deposit taking financial institutions which are Zambian owned 
like the Zambia National Building Society, the Zambia State 
Insurance Corporation, the Zambia National Provident Fund 
(ZNPF) and other superannuation and thrift schemes have equally- 
been persuaded to step up their lending to Zambians. All those 
things are signs of an unsatisfactory credit situation. It is 
clear therefore that several questions must be answered: 
(i) why are the banks still failing to satisfy government 
objectives despite the enactment of legal changes? 
(ii) Are there any flaws in the law? 
(iii) Was the enactment of these laws the only way to achieve 
the governments objectives; and 
(iv) what can be done? 
It is to these questions that this study directs itself. 
1: 1. Hypothesis of the Study. 
The study of banks and banking systems is not a new, 
phenomenon. According to Mints, 7 "attempts in English speaking 
countries to explain the operations of commercial banks and 
other banks began with the inception of the institutions 
,-L. w. m3. nts, A History ot banking TheorX in Great Britainand 
the United States, (Chicago: University ot Chicago Press, 1970Y 
P-9. See also Oluwole Adewunmi Loan_Manasement in Niserian 
Banks, (Ph. D. Dissertation, Unive'r sIty or. Wales, 1961) F. 1. 
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themselves, that is to say, in the second halfý of the 
seventeenth century in Great Britain and in the 1870s in the 
United States". In developing countries, on the other hand, 
particularly those of Africa South of the Sahara and North of 
the Zambezi, research on the functions of these institutions 
was, until recently, minimal. When some literature began to 
appear it dwelt largely on such aspects as the history of 
banking in particular countries, including, "their role in 
financing trading relations between colonies and their mother' 
countries. 8 It was only in the last two decades that the role 
of banks as potential development agents' began to rec'eive 
really active attention by scholars in many less developed 
countries. 9 Arriving as it did at a time when the urgefor 
B. See e. g. W. T. Newlyn and D. C. Rowan, Money and BankinZ in 
British Colonial Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 19J4) 
and R. A. Sowe-l-e-mTowards Financial Independence in a 
Developing Country (London: ArI-e-n- an-2 Unwin, 19b/) se-e-ars-o- 
J. A. Henry,, Sixty Years North of the Limpopo, The Story of the 
Coming of the Standard Bank to Rhodesia and Nyasaland C-SaIlsbury: the Rhodesia Printing and Publishing Company, 
1953), E. E. Jucker-Fleetwood 
) 
Money and Finance in Africa 
54 (London: Allen and Unwin 196 W. F. Crick (Ed) CommonweaItH 
Banking Systems (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965) an-T-Erick-L. 
Furness, Money and Credit in Developing Africa (London: 
Heinemann -Mucational, 1975). 
9. See e. g. C. E. Bourne, 'Commercial Banks and Economics 
Development in Jamaica' (M. Soc. Sc. Dissertation, University 
OF-Birmingham, 1969), - A. B. Taylor, 'The Role of_Financial 
Instiiutions in the Economic Development of Sierra Leone' URT. D. Dissertation, Universi-ty ot Glasgow, 19/Z), R. -I-sTa-m, 'Monetary Management, Commercial Bank Credit Exýansion and 
nomic Development in Pakistan' (M. Sc. Dissertation, U-niversity Ot Lancaster2 1973T9 A. T. Ojo, 'Financial Sector and Economic Development, with Special Reference to the Niger3'An 
Capital -Markets' (Ph. D. Dissertation, UniversitT Ot Wales, 
1974)t and Ali Issa Abdi, Commercial Banks and Economic Development, The Experience of Eastern Africa (New York and ro-ndon: Praeger Publishers,, 1977). See also J. F. Onoh, Money 
and Banking in Africa (London, Lagos and New York: LongTio-rn, 
1982) and Anne Seidman, Money, Banking and Public Finance in Africa. (London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd, 
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fast development occupied the centre stage in many less 
developed countries, 'such academic attention was regrettably 
plagued from the very start by one major flaw; namely, it was 
very wide and therefore tended to be short 'in detail. As a 
result, many of the studies that emerged during that time 
failed to analyse the full extent to which banks were involved 
in national development including the surrounding determinants 
of or deterrents to such involvement. In short, because of 
their nature the early works on the banks in less developed 
countries tended to focus more on the question; How - are the 
banks performing?, rather than on Why ?, they are performing 
that way. 
Given the underlying mood of the day, which was one of 
urgency, it is perhaps understandable why scholars set their 
sights on much wider horizons in research and covered many 
aspects of the business of banking. Many studies covered such 
aspects as the emergence and expansion of banking, including 
savings mobilization, allocation, management and branching. It 
is submitted however, that by over-stretching themselves and 
overshadowing the question why?, many of the earlier, works-fell 
short of achieving a full exposition- -of the roN Of---external 
factors such as law in determining the nature and extent of 
financial mobilization and allocation' - the two main ways in 
which banks perform their function as development agents. 10 
10. See P. 30 below. 
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This study is a less ambitious one. It merely tries, to 
elucidate the part played by one of the factors that determine 
levels of mobilization and allocation of resources, viz, law. 
One of the consequences of a long absence of a tradition 
of research in the field of banking and its role in national 
development can be seen more than anywhere else, in the virtual 
absence of and adequate legal analysis on the subject. 11 In 
its place standard English and other foreign texts are heavily 
relied upon. By and large however, those texts merely enable 
third world lawyers to deal with technical matters such as 
incorporations of banks, banker - customer relations, 
negotiable instruments and other cognate transactions connected 
with them. None of these matters can afford these lawyers an 
adequate ability to comprehend and explain the socio-economic 
impact of banking and banking regulations or their absence on 
the process of development in their respective countries. , 
Clearly this leaves the question; why has there been a 
negligible amount of scholarly activity on the aspect of legal 
control and its impact on the functions of banks as agents for 
development? 
11. Some of the recent works include SA Date-Bah, "The Lega _T Framework of Banking Business in Ghana"; J. Alibert and J. E. 
Sathoud, "The Activities of Commercial Banks in French-Speaking 
African State". G. O. Nwankwo, Bank Lending in A Developing 
Economy; The Nigerian Experience; A. N. Allott; "Credit and the 
Law in Africa: A Special Study of some Legal Aspects of Economic Development"Y and H. J. Tomkins, "Comparative Table of Banking Legislation in Africa", - in 19 Journal of African Law (1975). 
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Two possible explanations can be raised in answer to 
this question. The first one is that legal thought has followed-- 
the same pattern in the less developed countries as it did for 
a very long time in developed countries. This means that, save 
for occasional allusions to legal terms and provisions by non- 
legal scholars, the actual prosecution of legal analysis has 
remained largely in the hands of lawyers. The second 
explanation, and one that takes a bearing from the first is 
that, as opposed to ordinary social science analysis, for 
instance, which looks at the socio-economic, political or other 
implications of, practices, systems, and events, legal thought 
in Anglo-American systems has remained largely a study of 
statutory provisions and cases behind the guidelines of such 
notions as equity, natural justice and the common law doctrine 
of stare decisis; or simply positivism. 
The stranglehold of analytical positivism on legal 
thought came with the advent of the industrial revolution and 
the growth of the doctrine of 
. 
1aisser faire in the latter part 
of the eighteenth century. With the spread of specialization, 
the actions of entrepreneurs came to be dominated by -the 
concept of contract. In correspondence to this developmenti 
the role of lawyers expanded in importance as it was they who 
possessed the ability to answer questions arising from such- 
contracts. But with such concentration of effort on technical' 
prowess and craftsmanship the lawyering process became detached 
from the policy making functions and considerations of the 
-9- 
social reformer or legislator. 
12 Law itself acquired . the 
status of a mere practical science as it dwelt less and less on. 
the fundamental questions of the social, political and economic 
functions of the social order. 
For the lawyer therefore, what became paramount was the 
achievement of legal certainty. Without such certainty, the 
investment decisions of entrepreneurs who employed the lawyers 
would have been considered as vulnerable to risks. It was 
therefore the lawyer's task to advise about which set of legal 
alternatives generated maximum returns at minimum risks. For 
these reasons the 'legalism' which emerged insisted only on two 
things "logicality" and formal "rationality" and the "autonomy" 
and "supremacy" of law. In other words its concern was simply 
with the elegance and consistency of rules. 
13 
It was these demands on the legal profession during ýthe 
rise of capitalism which found powerful support in the 
jurisprudence of positivism in the nineteenth century. Its main 
thrust was that the lawyer's functions were' ' strictly 
instrumental. It was no concern of his to determine what the 
law ought to be, but merely to find out what it wa s. 
14 Even 
12. W. Friedmann, "The Role of Law and The Function ot THe 
Lawyer in Developing Countries"t 17 Vanderbilt Law Review, 196- 
97 at 181. See also Robert Seidmanq The State, Law and 
Development, (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1978) P. R. ýAL 
13. See David Trubek, "Max Weber on Law and Rise of Capitalism" (19721 Wisconsin Law Review 7.20. 
14. Robert B. Seidman, op. cit. 
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today despite huge gains made by social science in legal 
analysis, 15 "a considerable amount of legal study still 
examines only the universe of legal rules, trying merely to 
harmonise and elucidate them so that in detail they should form 
a gapless web". 16 
I 
Positivist Influence in Underdeveloped Countries. 
As positivism considered the criteria for good law to be 
elegance and consistency rather than its consequences 
society, one of its basic theoretical elements therefore became 
the notion that a law that was good in one time and place would 
similarly be good in other times and places. Accordingly, 
English law, and other colonial laws were transferred to the 
colonies almost intact and without much regard to the socio- 
economic circumstances of such colonies. Apart from leaving the 
relations between the native peoples to be governed by their 
own customary rules, the colonial administrations of the 
various territories had no hesitation in transfering replicas 
of the laws and legal philosophies of the mother. countries. For 
this reason today in"Africa'and many other developing 
15. See PP. 15-16 below. 
16. Robert B. Seidman, 
_2p. cit. 
P. 45. 
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countries, it is not uncommon to see laws of the metropolitan 
or colonial countries adopted and enforced despite the 
different or changed socio-economiC conditions prevailing 
there. Robert Seidman 17 gives Professor Rene David's civil 
code for Ethiopia 18 as a good example of such" transferred 
metropolitan laws. That code was largely based on 'the Swiss 
codes and had some Frenýh admixtures. Le'sotho's Highway Act19 
is another case in point. Virtually every aspect of it was 
copied from South Africa's Highway Act. Its drafters did not 
even omit the lorry and bridge weight regulations of its South 
20 African parent even though Lesotho itself has no weight; bridges. 
Other laws like those on taxation, public corporations and 
criminal codes fall into this category. The result of imposing 
metropolitan legal enactments and theories in the F,, peripheral 
countries on a large scale has naturally been that the 
philosophy of positivism was also transferred. Accordingly, 
practical and academic lawyers , in Africa were unknowingly 
apprenticed into the positivist approach and tradition, and 
very little analytical work occurred. 
17. op. SLt. P. 34. 
18. R. David, "A Civil Code for Ethiopia", Considerations on 
the codification of the Civil Law in African Countries, 37 
Tulane Law Review (1962-631 187. 
19. Lesotho: Highway Traffic Act, 1972. See Robert Seidman,. M. 
CIL. 
20. op. SJLt. 
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In the case of academic and other lawyers engaged in 
research, one has also to remember that these were in any, case 
very few in newly independent African countries where, the bulk 
of law graduates were siphoned off into administrative and 
other "urgent" government work. Such shortages of lawyers were 
related to the colonial policy and actions, of the pre- 
independence days. At first the colonial authorities were very 
apprehensive about the consequences of training African 
lawyers, as their experience in India had shown that -lawyers 
tended to lead resistetnce to colonial rule. They therefore took 
steps to prevent the emergence of any significant force, of 
African lawyers. As a result, at independence mostl African 
countries had only a handful of lawyers or -none, at all. 
21 
According to Professor Ghai, there was only one African lawyer 
in Tangangika in 1960 for example, and only 10 out of 300 
qualified lawyers in Kenya were Africans. 22 In Uganda, the 
figures were 20 out of 150. In Zambia on the other hand,, none 
of the country's 100 graduates at independence was a, lawyer. 23 
The only two barristers, Mr. Mainza Chona and Mrl Mwanakatwe, 
21. See William Twining, "Legal Education within East Africa", 
in East African Law Today (London: British Institute of Inter- 
national Comparative 1966) PP. 116-117. 
22. Yash Ghai, Law Development and African scholarship, 50 The 
Modern Law Review t19871 No. 6., 750 at 752. 
23. See Muna Ndulo, "Legal Education in Zambia: Pedagogical 
Issues", 2 Lesotho Law Journal (1986) 75 at P. 79. 
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became Ministers in the first independence government, and 
could not therefore be involved in any' meaningful' research 
work. 24 -ý- 11,1 ý- I'll 
For reasons of inadequate number of researchers and the 
presence of a vast array of - aspect's-to' be covered, it is 
understandable therefore, why very little research"occured. The 
handful or so of lawyers who were engaged in research had to 
set priorities. Naturally, some' areas " such as land tenure and 
planning, constitutional arrangements administration 
assumed the first priority. Research on such ýaspects as the 
Legal order applying to the business of banking; including its 
impact on the role of banks in development obviously took a 
back seat. 
1: 1: 2 The Decline of Positivism 
It was not' until the' emergence of -the : Law and 
Development studies and ý their ý subsequent " rejection and 
replacement by the Underdevelopment and' De'pen I dency ý,, theories 
that legal thought 'began to break, the grip' of ý analytical 
positivism and took an active and prominent,, position in the 
analysis of social, political and economic impact of the legal 
order. Law and Development together with the Dependency and 
Underdevelopment theories were themselves not'a revolutionary 
24. In any event the training of a barrister in an Inn of CourF 
could not seriously equip him with the necessary skills to 
understand African legal systems, legal scholarship and 
research. See e. g. Yash Ghai, op. cit. at P. 752 
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system of analysis. 25 They drew heavily on the then dominant 
social science theory of modernisation. 
A variety-of forces worked to produce the shift. depicted 
above. The initial impact came from the rising influence of 
America's economic and military power which, aside from 
restoring Western Europe's manufacturing and trading industries 
also unleashed a change of attitude towards protectionism, 
colonialism and deprivation through underdevelopment. The 
theory of modernisation which this shift -produced '-sought to 
transform the ýworld's underdeveloped regions into replicas 'of 
the developed *western countries by prescribing a wholesale 
adoption of western social, economic and legal systems. 'The 
failure of that theory 'to take the particular peculiarities of 
these regions into account- however, ' led to its failure and 
challenge. 
Apart from ' the influence of America,, scholars , like 
Francis Snyder'and others have identified, among'other things, 
the rising tide of and influence of the marxist ideology as 
being significant to the appearance of modernisation theory., 26 
25. John H. Merryman, "Comparative - Law -aI nd Social Change: '-On 
the origins, style, decline and revival of Law and 
Development", 25 American Journal of Comparative Law (1977] 
457. 
26. See Francis G. Snyder, "Law and. Development in the light of 
Dependency Theory", 14 Law and Societyt (1980)-723 at 726- 
731. See also David M. Trubek, Towards a social Theory of Law; 
An Essay on the Study of Law and Development"q 82 Yale Law 
Journal, (1972-73), 1 and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capl-tarlr-st 
World Economy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press andý Talr-'117s: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de 1'Homme, (1979) 
P. 154. 
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Other factors were the-adoption of the principles enshrined in 
the United Nations Charter, the recovery of the Soviet Union 
and the success of the Chinese revolution, including the 
ensuing post war international tensions. These latter factors 
provoked af urther f ocus on the condition of . 
the third . world 
countries and also offered an opportunity, 
'and 
possibility of, an 
alternative development process. 
Most importantly however, ' the' inability of positivist 
economic theories to explain the differences among national 
economies led -to a concern for 
"non'-eco'nomic fact'ors" in 
development. It compelled even western' social scientists", to 
draw on other concepts especially those'of classical'sociology 
to explain social change,, evolution and 'progress. In the 
ensuing inferno of analytical research and scholarly activity a 
lot has been revealed about banks, ' banking relations and the 
prudential and legal aspects of' their control't. '27 In-Z'ambia 
however, aside from J. B. Zulu and N. A. Mujumudar's work on 
monetary policy and banking'functions'-'in the country, 28 and 
27. See e. g. G. 0. Nwankwo, "Indijenisation of Nigerian Banking", Bankers' Magazine, July 1972, and, "British Overseas Banks in Developing Countries" I Institute of Bankers' Journal, June 1972. See also supra note 9* 
28. See J. B. Zulu and N. A. Mujumudar ' Money, Banking and Economic Development in Zambia (Lusaka: Bank ot Zambia, 1910). - 
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Situmbeko Musokotwane's recent study on the role of financial 
intermediaries in national growth, 29 virtually nothing else 
has been written about banks generally and especiall y about the 
impact of legal controls over their role as development agents. 
It is against the background of inadequate, attention 
paid to the role of legal factors' in discussing the functions-, 
of commercial banks in development ' that this - study is 
undertaken. As with others who' have studied the functions of 
commercial banks in developed and 'less 'developed -countries, 
this study is a reflection of the significance- of economic 
factors in the development of countries. The relevance of-banks- 
to the economies of less developed countries is-in fact, furtherý 
underscored by these countries',, advocacy of strong -mixedr 
economic systems. 30 When an economic system is mixed the role 
assigned to the private sector and especially to, the financial 
institutions is usually a large one. In addition, the size of 
29. Situmbeko Musokotwane Financial Institutions and Economic 
Development in Zambia eDissertation Zur erlangung des TeMischem Gradeseiness-Doktors de wirstschaf suissenschaft and 
de Universitat Konstanz. June 1985. ) (Written in English). 
30. See K. D. Kaunda, "Humanism in Zambia and a guide to its 
Imýlementation" Part II (Zambia Information bervice, Government 
Printer 1961) see also Oluwole Adewunmiv supra note 7 at P. 5. 
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banking sector in the economies of most developing countries 
places them in a unique- position in relation to the 'other 
sectors or institutions. Thus, as opposed , to developed- 
countries where such institutions as brokers, stock exchanges, - 
merchant bankers, Giro banks, building societies, - insurance 
houses etc, are present on a vast scale, there are not many 
institutions in developing ý countries which ý surpass banks in 
importance. Even if a few of the institutions mentioned above- 
may be present, banks in developing countries constitute the 
single most important mechanism for, transferring resources and 
intermediation. 31 They also account for the biggest portion-of 
the money supply in the form of-demand deposits. In'addition to 
these vital functions, banks in these, countries have to perform 
the traditional functions of implementing national monetary 
policies and conducting foreign exchange payments or simply 
assisting in the administration of their countries' balance of 
payments and reserves. 
In Zambia the immense potential of commercial banks to 
finance development is highlighted by- the large numbers and 
sizes of their portfolios. Although they get competition from a 
few other deposit taking institutions like the National Savings 
and Credit Bank (formerly-the Post-Office. Savings BanQ, the- 
31. U Tan Wai, Financial Intermediaries and National Savings in 
Developin& CourTE-r-les kNew York and London: Piaeger Pu51-1-sTe-rs 
=) P. 71 - also Richard L. Kitchen, Finance for Developing 
Countries (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1986) and Bereket A. 
Ta-5-te Selaissie, "Development Lendin and Institution 
Building", 19 Journal of African Law (197551-118-133 
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Zambia State Insurance Corporation, the Zambia, National 
Building Societyq the Zambia National-Provident Fund and other 
superannuation or thrift schemes,, 32 commercial banks are 
nevertheless still the dominant savings institutions even 
numerically. In 1982, for instance, their assets stood at K2.3 
billion as compared to K136,666,000 for the Zambia National 
Building Society and K35,004,000 for the National Savings and 
Credit Bank. 33 Thus even conc.. eding that their ability to pour 
more and more resources into development. is being challenged by 
these other intermediaries and those mentioned earlier which 
were set up specifically to rectify the unsatisfied credit 
situation, the banks are nevertheless in a far stronger 
position. Therefore in the light of their obvious potential 
ability to provide financial resources for development, the 
failure of the banks to meet expectations requires an 
explanation. This work is an attempt to do so* 
1: 1: 3 Banks as Development Agents I 
Development is a process of change from a state underdevelop- 
32. See Chapter 3. For details on the advantages of,, banking, --- intermediation over other financial institutions see Charles H. 
Schmidt and Eleanor J. Stockwell, "The Changing Importance of 
Institutional Investors in The American Capital Market", 17_Law 
and Contemporary Problems (1952) 3-25 at P. 15. 
33. See Bank of Zambia, Report and Statement of Accounts for 
the Year Ended December 31st 1982. 
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ment to better conditions of life. 34 Although there is no 
universally sanctioned formula , for, solving, the- problem of 
underdevelopment, owing largely to the-different approaches and 
priorities amongst different countries, several guiding'values 
are common to all. These are that nation . al development must 
find expression in increased 'fer capita income, fair 
distribution of resources through, for instance, better health 
and education and increased employment. 
35 
Any development needs institutions - that meet its 
requirements. These can i; ' -- - 'n ý ý" 
be development banks, 
international development agencies such as the World'Bank, IMF 
or foreign investors. They can also be local institutions such 
as commercial banks. Commercial banks perform this function by 
bringing lenders and borrowers together and reconciling their 
conflicting objectives. In other words, they mobilise or 
receive savings from depositors and in turn lend them out to 
investors. They can also invest in projects in their own right. 
The notion that financial intermediation is a necessary 
condition for, at least, the capitalist or mixed forms of 
economic development has been in existence for a lojýg time. 
lIn 
34. For a fuller definition of Deve 
and S. P. Singh (eds) The Economics 
York: Oxford University Press-9-I763T 
(ed), Measurin4 Development, The 
Development Indicators kLondoii: Frank 
35. D. Seers, "The Meaning of Devo 
Development Review", (1969) see also 
P. 5-5. 
lopment See A. N. Agarwala 
of Underdevelopment (New 
and Nancy Buster 
Role and Adequacy of 
Cass, 1972) P. 1-3. 
Blopment, ,2 
International 
Robert Seidman, 
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1934, Joseph Schumpeter, perhaps the earliest advocate of this 
theory, asserted in a seminal work that Jor an economy to 
develop, two conditions need to be present; ' financial 
institutions and entrepreneurship. 36 Although some dissenting 
views have since appeared, many other proponents of 
Schumpeter's views have emerged. The one who came closest to 
Schumpeter was Raymond Goldsmith. In a work involving a study 
of 35 developed and developing countries he compared the 
relative financial development and the relative real (or 
actual) development of each country. He also calculated each 
country's financial interrelations ratio (the ratio of 
financial instruments to real wealth) and found that a high 
financial structure development, defined by a high financial 
interrrelations ratio, tended to correspond to a high real 
development, implying that financial intermediation is, a 
prerequiste for or must go simultaneously-, -with real 
37 development. 
In a different series of studies in 1972 covering 
several developed and developing countries, Rondo Cameron and 
others also concluded that financial institutions are an 
essential corollary of economic development. 38 They postulated 
the functions of a banking system to be (i) intermediation (ii) 
to furnish part or all of the means of payment or. money supplyq__ 
3b. Joseph A. Schumpeterl The Theory of Economic Development - 
(Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 19J4) 
37. R. W. Goldsmith, Financial Structure and De; elopment, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 19697-PP. J9U-4U6. see also 
Oluwole Adewunmi 2o cit. P. 24. 38. Rondo Cameron 
Wd-ý, I- 
Banking and Economic Development- some 
Lessons of History (London: Oxtord University Press, 19725 P. 5. 
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and (iii) the provision of entrepreneurial talent and guidance 
for the economy as a whole. According to Cameron: 
"The way in which banks-perform these functions may well 
determine the degree of success of the development 
effort. As intermediaries they may vigorously seek out 
and attract reservoirs of idle funds which will be 
allocated to entrepreneurs for investment in projects 
with a high rate of social return or they may listlessly 
exploit their quasi-monopolistic position and fritter39-' 
4way investment possibilities with unproductive loans". 
few micro-level studies about the role of banks in the 
developmentý of small communities' similarly yielded much the 
same findings. Two such studies were conduc - t*ed 'in the United 
States in the 1970's. The first one by J. A. Griggs looked at 
the role of banks and bank management strategies in general 
economic growth in Texas. 40 He concluded that active bank 
lending to small scale and new businessmen. was absolutely vital 
in small population business areas. The second study was done 
in Philadelphia during 1975 by C. A. C. Greenberg and reached 
much the same conclusion. 41 
Studies like these, particularly those which were 
published, inspired some people in some third world countries 
to initiate similar research with a view to establishing the 
applicability of the theory-that banks are-development agents 
39. Ibid 
40. -7J -. A. Griggs 'The Commercial Banker and Industrial 
Entrepreneurship: The Lending Officers' Propensity to Make 
Loans to New and Different Companies (Ph. D. Dissertation, 
University of Texas at Austin, 1971) cited in Oluwole Adewunmi, 
Ho. cit. at P. 27. 
. -C. A. C. Greenberg, 'The Role of Commercial Banking in Regional Economic Development - Philadelphia, 1945-1970' (Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1915) Cited in 
Oluwole Adewunmi, op. cit. 
-22- 
to their own countries. Not surprisingly, many of the new 
researchers were postgraduate students who went to school in 
western countries 42 1a pattern which tends to vindicate the. 
earlier contention that interest in -these, studies ý in less 
developed countries is of very recent origin. 43 Virtually all 
the researchers involved in these studies in third- world 
countries urged that there was sufficient, evidence to support 
the theory that financial intermediation was as necessary to 
the development of their countries as it was to that of the 
developed countries. Many of the studies singled out the 
following as being the most appropriate functions of financial 
institutions in third world countries: 
the mobilisation of domestic resources. 
in dealing with the problems of securities for loans and 
the special problem of lending to a large number of 
small operators in the agricultural and small-scale 
industries sector; and 
(iii) in the improvement of the quality, of investment so as to 
increase the productive capacity of the economy. 
42. See e. g. Note 9 above. 
43. See PP. 6-5 above. 
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As indicated already, despite a wide-'acceptance of the 
notion that a correlation exists ' between financial 
intermediation and economic growth, -the'debate over the degree 
to which the relevance of "banks' and 'other' financial 
institutions must be emphasised has not abated. There are 
differences within the camp of the theory's proponents between 
those who see the causal link between intermediation and 
development as direct, and those who see it as indirect. The 
principal proponent of the direct link thesis is Milton 
Friedman, who for many years now has been the leader of the 
Monetarist School. His earliest analysts were largely based on 
the industrial index for the U. S. Time Series . 
44 programme 
The theory that the 'causal" link between financial 
intermediation and gr, owth is indirect, on the other hand, 
arises from Hugh Patrick' s two. track approach., In his 1966 
paper he urged that the role of the financial institutions in 
the process of development is,,, either passive or one of mere 
reaction to the demands 
-of 
the real sector for financial 
services. 45 He called this the "demand-following Finance" 
44. Milton Friedman, 'The Monetary Studies of the National 
Bureau' The Optimum Quality of Money and Other Essaysq Chicago, 
1969. 
45. Hugh T. Patrick, "Financial Development and Economic Growth 
in Underdeveloped Countries", 14 Economic Development and Cultural Change. (1966) 174-189. 
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situation. To support his claim he adduced the evidence of the 
history of financial intermediation in England, which he said 
indicated that a financial system neeý not always be actively 
involved in the country's developmept, process or real growth. 
46 
The rest of Patrick's theme however, was devoted to the 
direct causality theory. He postulated that the financial 
system can be said to be directly responsible for the growth of 
the real sector by positively and actively devising and 
providing financial services for the real sector in 
anticipation of demand for them. He called this the "supply- 
leading demand" situation. For support he pointed to Germany 
and Japan where financial institutions have been involved not 
only as bankers but also as entrepreneurs. 
47 
Apart from the differences among'-those who see-at least 
some causality . between 
financial' intermediation and 
development, there were others who hold -that the financial 
system is not at all a necessary- condition for development. 
The people on this extreme include. J. G'* Gurley, who after a 
study of the development processes of some third 
countries as well as socialist ones'concluded that the.. thesis 
that financial institutions consituted a necessary condition 
46. Ibid at P. 175. 
47. Ibid 176-178. 
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, 48, for development was inaccurate. P6inting to some successes 
in the countries that he ýtudied, tie' contended that there are 
alternatives to financial intermediation, such as planning and 
taxation. His supporters subsequently attacked the mainstream 
theorists for ignoring cultural and political factors in their 
theories about the process of development. 49 Others posited 
that, in reality, capital stocks merely accounted for about a 
third of all the realised increases in output in advanced 
countries such as the United States. The other two thirds, they 
said is accounted for by what they called "residual-factors* 50 
By and large, the advocates of the view that there are 
alternatives to financial intermediation have a point. This 
however, should not conceal the fact that many of them are 
ignoring the fact that credit - as a concept applies to all II 
economic systems; whether capitalist. or socialist, -planned or 
free. 51 The basic difference stems from the aspects of central 
48. J. G. Gurley, "Financial Structure in Developing Economies", 
in David Krivine (ed) Fiscal and Monetary Problems in 
Developing States: Proceedings ot th ird Rehovoth Conterence 
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1967), PP. 99-116. 
49. See L. N. Raj, ' The Role of Saving in Economic Development 
and Alternative Strategies for Raising its Level; In Planning 
Domestic and External Resources for Investment; Report of ýtie 
Second International Seminar on -D e-v-e'l -op ment Planning (Amsterdam, Netherlands) 19-30 September.. 1966 (New York: United 
Nations, 1969) P. 41. 
50. Ibid. 
51. See e. g. Gyula Eorsi and Attila Hamathy (eds) Law and 
Economic Reform in Socialist Countries (Akademiai, KiaTo--, 
Budapest, 1971) P. 2239 0. Kuschipeta, -TFe,, Banking and Credit 
System of the U. S. S. R. (Leiden/Boston: - Martinus Nijhott Soc-15T 
Sciences Division, 1978) and George Garvq I Money, Banking and Credit in Eastern Europe (Federal Reserve Bank ot New York, 
1966) 
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control and planning itself whichfrevail in socialist, countries 
while capitalist systems leave the allocation of credit to the 
markets themselves. Sven Viig put these. facts thus: 
"The basic principles of monetary''and creait policy are 
common to all nations whegýer socialist or capitalist, 
developing or industrial" -" 
Qdding also that: 
"even in a centrally controlled, closed economy the 
general rules governing money and credit policy have to 
be observed. If the supply exceeds the amount necessary 
to transact normal business inflationary pressure 
inevitably develops with disturbing effects on what 
market mechanism there is, and" Vy currency becomes 
unsuited as a yard stick of value 
In the light of these facts, to dismiss. financial 
intermediation as an irrelevant factor for 
_ 
development, is to 
ignore reality. 
In addition, Raj himself has admitted that the notion 
that capital accumulation and financial intermediation are 
important conditions for the development process cannot be 
discounted solely on the ground that large. variations exist in 
the incremental capital output ratio of the different countries 
as some people had done. 
-Nor 
is it adequate to discuss it by 
saying that increases in capital stock account for, only-a part- 
52. Sven Viig,. 
-"Monetary 
Credit Policy and The Commercial 
Banks", in MonetarZ and Credit Policy and The Bankina 
Community, Lectures delivered at the Nineteenth International 
Banking Summer School, Bergen Norway - June 1966 (Oslow: The 
Norwegian Banker's Association, -1966) P. 23. 
53. Ibid P. 24. 
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of the realised increases in output in any one country. Both 
these arguments ignore the fact that there are wide differences 
in the basic resource endowments between countries, which might 
compel countries that are poorly endowed to-'require- higher 
rates of capital formation than others to achieve the same 
rates of growth. Furthermore, there are also differences in the 
degree of utilization of capital owing mainly to differences in 
demand or to the existence of bottlenecks. 54 
Moreover, even if the importance of the "residual- 
factors" is conceded, it might be the case that additions to 
the capital stock are a necessary condition for'their becoming 
effective. Indeed it is impossible to expect that technical 
progress can be attained on its own without some form of 
investment. Even improvements in organisation and skill gained 
through "learning by doing", are often crucially dependent on 
the rate at which, capital is accumulated. 
It is also important to recognise'that even though they 
highlight the importance of the "residual factors" in the 
development process, Gurley and his supporters also admit that 
----complementary -factors, especially capital accumulation are-- 
vital for the process to succeed. Thus as Adewunmi Observes: 
"though dif f ering substantially with the hitherto 
established view, Gurley nevertheless admits that financial institutions might be prominent contributors 
54. This point is discussed further at P. 33 
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to development where there is decentralization of 
decision making, specialization of savings and heavy 
emphasis on external rather than internal financing of 
investmentS, which are factors of capitalist economic 
systems". 
With regard to the use of alternatives-.,. to 
intermediation, it is obvious that governments cannot,, simply,, 
abandon their cherished aims of achieving,, mixed, economic 
systems (which accommodate banks and 
., 
other .. 
financial 
institutions in the manner which Gurley has stated above) 
without losing people's trust. After all alternatives like 
taxation are not only politically explosive, but also humanly 
impossible to achieve given the abysmally low levels of income 
in many developing countries, including those which follow this 
alternative. 56 More over, in the case of corporate' taxation, 
for it to be effective, it requires comprehensive and accurate 
disclosures of financial and operational, information" by"" 
companies to the tax authorities. Such disclosures'will in turn 
enable the authorities to assess the taxable income. But in, 
some developing countries, company codes are deficient on the 
rules of disclosure. 57 The Zambian Companies Act is a typical 
55. Oluwole Adewunmi, op. cit. P. 25. 
56. In Zambia, for instance, only about 391,000 of the 
country's labour force of well over 1,880,400 are in paid 
employment. See Ministry of Labour and Social Services, Annual 
Report for the year 1982 (Lusaka, 1984) and Evance Kalula, The 
Influence of International Labour Standards on Zambian 
Legislation, 124, International Labour Review, (No. 5 September 
- October 1985) 593-. 
57. David A. Ailola ' Foreign Investment: The Law and Policy in Zambia (LL. M Dissertation, University of-Zambia, 1983) P. 92. 
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example. It does not require domestic companies even to submit 
annual returns, profit and loss accounts, , 
balance sheets or 
director's reports. As a result it is obviously impossible for 
the tax department to accurately assess corporate taxes. In the 
case of foreign companies, the only significant requirement. on 
them for tax purpose is that they should submit auoited-balance 
sheets, though these need not include statements of,. profit, and 
loss. 58 It is also well known that the efficiency of any tax 
system is not just a matter of appropriate laws, itdepends on 
the efficiency and integrity of the, tax, administration. 
Unfortunately for many developing countries, by reason of 
their inability to secure skilled and experienced personnel, 
efficiency and inte-1grity are sometimes missing or, compromised. 
In the face of all these obstacles, a banking system, because 
it already exists in most countries,, is better-placed to play, a 
major role in the mobilization and allocationl, of-resources., 
1: 1: 4 Importance of'Savings and Credit 
Of all the numerous functions of commercial banks, 
savings mobilization and lending are, the genesis ý of their 
-operations. In other words, they are the main ways in which the 
59 development process can be affected by the banking system. 
58. CAP 686 Section 226(3). 
59. See e. g. Ali Issa Abdi, -supra note 9. 
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Accordingly, in measuring the impact of legislative and 
prudential regulations2 emphasis should largely be placed on 
these factors. Mobilization is important because without it 
banks cannot have the resources to lend. With regard to loans 
and advances- these are by far the largest single item in the 
asset structures of Zambian commercial banks. Lending also 
deserves the special attention offered by this kind of study 
because commercial banking in Zambia is basically a, successful 
profit making business and loans and advances 'are its most 
essential assets. At the same time these items are the most 
risky of all banking portfolios. Indeed in no facet -of its 
operations can a bank suffer more losses as quickly as it can 
on its commercial lending operations. 60 It is for, this reason 
that this study seeks to examine the role of-the legal order, in 
Zambia in 05-nhencing the* banks' ability to aid, national 
development by offering adequate protection,, to banks on their 
loans. It is important in this respect to remember that banks 
use other people's money to do business and as such they 
require the backing of those people's 'confidence, While other 
factors such as adequate security or collateral and interest 
may help to' create such- confidence, it is - sýbm-it-ted' that' 
knowledge by banks that they also command the- support of legal 
provisions is of added, -if not. primary importance. 
60. R. H. Behnen, Commercial Problem Loans (Boston: Ban-Fr-s- 
Publishing Company, 1979) P. 5. 
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Lending is also important from a different angle. It is 
healthy for the banking business itself as new loans tend to 
generate more deposits. 
61 It also "leads to' closer and 
continuing contacts between banks and their customers which are 
also instrumental in the broadening of the market for other 
bank service S. 
62 Thus from the self interest point of view, 
lending is as important to bankers as it is to economic growth. 
It is not easy in a legal study to measure the 
efficiency of the savings mobilization and credit allocation 
functions of commercial banks. This work will therefore avoid 
dwelling too much on the technical details relating to such 
processes. But wher, Cver feasible, it will adopt the commonly 
used approach of analysing the relations between bank deposits 
and money supply and liabilities and GNP. 
63 It will also 
examine the extent to which bank loans and advances are 
allocated to priority sectors as well as M! rural 
branching. 
61. See e. g. T. M. Robertson, 'Bank Asset Management Model', in 
S. Eslon and T. R. Fowkes, Applications of Management Science in 
Banking and Finance, (EpýI'ngg-Essex: Gower Press, 19/4), -, -a-n7ff 
S. P. Bradley and D. B. Crane Management of Bank Portfolios (London: John Wiley and Sons, 
11975). '- 
62. E. N. Rollssakis, Mana5ing Commercial Bank Funds (New York 
and London: Praeger Publishers, -T977T-. 
63. See Oluwole Adewunmi,. 2p. cit. P. 37, see also Ali Issa Abdi 
op. cit. 
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1: 2 Obstacles to Efficient Intermediation 
Having illustrated the potential of commercial banks and 
the significant role they can play in providing financial 
resources for national development, it is now time to explain 
why these tasks are sometimes not carried out. There are a 
number of obstacles to efficient intermediation, particularly 
in developing countries. Some of these obstacles are that, when 
seeking avenues for the employment of their funds, banks 
generally set their sights and priorities too high. They seek 
mainly those enterprises or persons who can offer the highest 
rates of profit and which are not susceptable to the risks of 
non-payment. They also look for avenues which do not involve 
excessive costs in administration. As stated already, the fact 
that banks deal with other people's money . justifies such 
cautiousness. However, it begins to -raise' concern"when it 
exceeds reasonable business prudence -and begins to. starve 
genuine entrepreneurs constituting one-racial, group of-capital- 
resources. 
Another obstacle to the efficient involvement of banks 
in the development process of developing countries is their 
tendency to borrow some of the practices and 'traditions' -of 
foreign banking systems which have no relevance* to the 
environments they are operating in. In operational, terms this 
involves the practice of preferring only_ those entrepreneurs 
who can offer certain types of security for bank loans. By 
adopting such stringent practices in developing countries, 
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entrepreneurs lack the type of securities that are 
traditionally accepted by foreign banks, third world banks are 
in effect limiting the flow of much, needed- financial 
resources. They'are also engaging in the already mentioned, but 
undesirable practice of discriminating against-indigenous 
persons who need loans to pursue their trades as small scale 
industrial artisans or farmers. 
The discrimination against indigenous small scale 
industrialists and farmers has been explained and justified on 
two grounds. First, the requirements of these groups are 
usually modest. To most bankers, modest requirements are 
unacceptably expensive to monitor. Therefore, where they are 
not rejected outright, the tendency has been to raise the rates 
of interest and administrative costs-relating to them. 
Secondly, banks discriminate 
-against 
indigenous 
entrepreneurs because they perceive them as possessing low 
entrepreneurial abilities. Aside from seeing these 
entrepreneurs as part of a huge group of ignorant people, 
lacking in business acqumen and expertise, the foreign oriented 
bankers of the third world also object to such'practices as the 
extended family system which require's entrepreneurs to use some 
of their profits to support their less fortunate relatives. 
64 
64. See e. g. Ronald Robinsong "Capital and Enterprise", In 
Ronald Robinson (ed) Industrialization in Developing Countries; 
Impressions and Papers of the CambriU-ge conterence on The Role 
of Industrialization in Development, 6-19 Septemberp 1964 at 
Kings College Cambridge at P. 33. 
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In addition banks consider the impact of market imperfections 
which come with price controls and other restrictive trade 
policies on people's ability to repay their loans before they 
make any commitments. 65 As a result of all these factors the 
flow of credit in many third world countries is severely 
flawed, as loans tend to go mainly to large scale industries 
and expatriate or immigrant entrepreneurs. No doubt, these 
considerations by banks which look at groups not individuals 
are themselves flawed and need to be revised., 
Aside from the foregoing, the- biggest obstacles to 
efficient bank lending or savings mobilization, however, may 
arise from certain inadequacies in the legal system itself. A 
legal system may be inadequate in so far, as, it fails to create 
the conditions necessary for a meaningful involvement of the 
banking system in the development process. In other words,,, it 
may fail to integrate the banking system into the national, 
economy, either by systematicallý ignoring to acquire a degree y 
of national ownership or control over banks or their 
management, or by providing a dubious one'. It may'also fail to' 
provide the necessary incentives for efficient lending such as 
a clear and proper machinery for enforcing repayments without 
delay or extra expense, a functioning system of land 
65. R. J. Bhatia and D. R. Khatkhate, "Financial. Intermediation 
and Savings mobilization and Entrepreneurial Development: The 
African Experience" 22 IMF Staff Papers (1975) 132 at . 135. 
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registration and tenure, plus an improvisation of other forms 
of security relative to the Pnvironment and' conditions 
prevailing in 'a particular country. 
Alternatively, the legal system may introduce conditions 
which are repressive and not conducive to proper savings 
mobilization and lending. As Schmidt and Stockwell postulated 
in 1952: 
"investment or capital market activities of 
institutional investors are largely. determined by their 
functions, the statutory and supervisory restriction to 
which they subject and the extent ot --EF-eir-r- 
'71ag'ili ties". 
More recently Edward Shaw 67 and Ronald Mckinnon 68 1 
have argued that some government regulations have a repressive 
effect on the ability of banks and other institutions to 
mobilise and allocate savings. They do this by disrupting the 
mechanisms used to fix prices and interest rates. As a result 
66. See "The Changing Importance of Institutional Investors in 
The American Capital Markets" Supra note 32; at P. 10 (emphasis 
not in originalý. 
67. Edward S. Shaw, Financial Deepening in Economic Development 
(New York: Oxford University ress, 19/3). 
68. Ronald I. Mckinnon, "Financial Policies"l in John Codyq 
Helen Hughes and David Wall (Eds); Policies for Industrial 
Progress in Developing Countries (World Bank: Oxford University 
Press, 1980), see also RonalT I-Mckinnon, Moneý and Capital in 
Economic Development, (Washington D. C.: Brookings Institutev 
IM), see also Anthony S. Courakis, "Constraints on Bank 
Choices and Financial Repression in Less Developed Countries" 
46. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics (Vol. 4 1984) 341 
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the levels of savings generated and loans given tend to be very 
limited. Such measures may also lead't'o certain sectors being 
deprived of the much needed banking services as well as to the 
entrenchment of a subsistence economy which now exists. side by 
side with a modern industrial economy, or simply to a 
situation of "financial dualism". 
Some of the repressive measures come in' 'the form of 
ceilings on the rates of interest for loans as well as 
deposits. In some countries religious teachings and political 
philosophies have led directly to the repression of usury. In 
others it is considered immoral to charge public enterprises 
the same rates of interest as private investors. In the absence 
of ceilings, repressions may take the form of mandatory 
preferential inter iest rates which favour certain groups or 
industries over others. ' The use of repressive reserve 
requirements as a form of monetary control is another method. 
This has the effect of withholding potentially investible or 
loanable funds from the market and locking them up in central 
banks where they may be used for government budgetary purposes* 
Apart from these effects, some regulations lead to credit 
------rationing, nepotism in credit allocations and black 
marketeering. 69 They also inhibit economic flexibility by 
69. Ronald I Mckinnon, "Financial Policies" Ibid P. 104. see 
also Susan Hickok and Clive A. Gray, "Capital --Market Controls 
and Credit Rationing in Mali and Senegal" 19 Journal of Modern 
African Studies (1981) P. 59. 
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favouring large firms over small and new firms, including those 
introducing new technologies or management systems. 
The thesis of Shaw and Mckinnon has been attacked for 
several reasons. First it is seen as a thesis based entirely on 
d-mpirical evidence from advanced countries which the authors 
have attempted to import into the operations of third world 
economies without any qualification or consideration for the 
different circumstances obtaining there. According to Oluwole 
Adewunmi the main criticism of that thesis is that, "it fails 
to recognise that financial environments of the third world 
70 countries are far from being perfectly competitive"a In fact 
one can go so far as to argue that, in so far as it states that 
the re-alignment of interest rates alone can wipe out financial 
dualism, the thesis is a misconception of the framework and 
conditions under which both intermediation and investment take 
place in developing countries. Many other things, including the 
types of industries which are promoted or capable of being 
promoted and the grounds for promoting them cannot be over 
looked. 
70. op. cit. P. 34. Suffice it to add that in the 1980 work 
Mckinnon did in fact include evidence from some developing 
countries. In addition it would be wrong to assume that any 
market can be perfectly competitive. 
11 
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It can also be argued that it is unrealistic to dismiss 
the use of government regulations to control financial 
institutions in the developing countries as even in the more 
developed market economy countries such regulations are 
undertaken from time to time. Furthermore, as credit is central 
to economic activity 71 and therefore to political stability, 
no government can be expected to leave it entirely to the whims 
of the market forces which may favour only a few entreprenWrs. 
In developing countries where imperfections in financial and 
other markets are more pronounced, the need f or government 
regulations of some sort is therefore even greater. 72 
Therefore aside from these weaknesses the financial repression 
theory is undoubtedly relevant to the study of the role of 
legal controls in the banking systems of developing countries. 
With leaderships that tend to be far less competent and 
generally repressive in every manner, a focus on the 
rationality and practicability of some or all of the 
regulations is indeed necessary. 
71. See P. 26 above. 
72. - -S-ee Also A. N. ' -Allott, "Legal Development and Economic 
Growth in Africa", in J. N. D. Anderson (ed) Changing Law in 
Developin& Countries (London: George Allen andUnwin Ltd, 19bJ) 
P. 20b. and A. N. Alliht, credit and The Law in Africa: A special 
study of some Legal Aspects of Economic Development 19 Journal 
of African Law [1975] 73 at P. 78. See also Margaret Rog-er-s-alnu 
A. N. Allott, Introduction and Report of proceedings; International conference on Banking Law and Development in 
Africa, 19 Journal of African Law P. 7. 
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1: 3 Objectives of this Study. 
The primary aim of this study is to answer the question 
whether Zambia's legal order, in so far as it applies to 
commercial banks, is in accord with - the thesis that these 
institutions - constitute one of the necessary conditions for 
economic change and development. The decision to focus 
principally on the regulatory aspects of the legal order in 
relation to the role of commercial'banks in Zambia is motivated 
by two reasons. The first one is to lend support to the theme 
that regulations, as well as other factors. can create obstacles 
to the efficient mobilization and allocation of resources by 
banks and other financial intermediaries. As seen there is now 
wide spread support for the Orgument that legal controls and 
regulations of the commercial banks have a bearing on the 
exercise of their functions as development agents. The second 
motivation is to establish how Zambian law relating to banks is 
capable of leading to a realisation of the government's 
objectives. It has become settled 
., 
that law has a social 
engineering function which transcends the bounds of conflict 
ameLioration to become a vehicle through which social policies 
become social actions. 73 Its -p-ower to create - stability and 
predictability is equally crucial for development. As Rostov 
notes: 
73. See Robert B. Seidman, "Law and Economic Development in 
Independent English-Speaking, Sub-Sahara Africa", (19661 
Wisconsin Law Review, 999,1027. 
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"That law and economics interpenetrate each other is 
apparent ... if only from the fact that much of the very 
vocabulary of economics (property, corporations, credit, 
taxation, patents, etc) is essentially legal in nature. 
More basically however, law penetrates the very 
foundations of economics for it is by means of legal 
institutions that prices are in fact agreed upon, wages 
in fact set, business organisations in fact joined and 
so forth. A theory of perfect competition assumes the 
existence of a system of contract law. A theory of 
socialist economics a umes the existence of a system of 
administrative law". 
94 
Nyhart adds to this by asserting that if government activity in 
economic planning and implementation is to increase more 
reliance must be placed on law and legislation. 
75 In more 
recent years the role of law in development has began to be 
perceived in a variety of other ways. Paul Brietzke, for 
instance, expresses the same idea as follows: , "An examination of law's effect on development is 
hindered by an inability to trace the caUsal 
relationship between existing laws and society, owing to 
a lack of administrative data. We do know however, that 
individual choice is legally regulated by positive and 
negative sanctions, the former rewqgds, encouraging more 
creative pursuit of development". 
He adds: 
74. See Rostove, The Sovereign Prerogative, -PP. 13-14 and Bernerman, The Nature and Functions ot Law -PP. 8-9, Cited by 
J. D. Nyhart, The Role of Law in Economic Development, The Sudan 
Law Journal and Reports [19621 PP. 394 at P. 395. 
-75. See Nyhart, "The Role of Law in Economic Development", 
The Sudan Law Journal and Reports, (1962) 394 at 396. For the 
notion that government vigilance or action is necessary to 
development in underdeveloped countries see A. A. Fatouros, 
Government Guarantees to Private Foreign Investors (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1962) P. J! ). See also Charles Harvey. 
The Economy of Sub-Saharan Africa: A Critique of The World 
Bank's Report, in Africa Contemporary Record (Annual Survey and 
Documents Vol. KVI 1981-82. ) 
76. "Law and Rural Development in Africa with Emphasis on 
Malawi"q 5 Zambia Law Journal (1973) 1 at P-9. 
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"Since law can be used to define rights and duties, it 
can be used to influence bel; 4viour and indirectly the 
content of social structure". " 
Allott also outlines a few other ways in which law can induce 
economic development. These are: 78 
in the introduction of new economic arrangements. 
(ii) in the stimulation or inhibition of economic activity as 
where the absence of legislation on bankruptcy restricts the 
supply of credit. 
Quite clearly the theme of this study emanates from the 
conviction that banks have a large role to play in the economic 
development of a country like Zambia which operates a mixed 
economic system, and that this role can be retarded by among 
other things repressive regulations or non-regulations. It is 
possible for a critic to say that the study assumes that law is 
the basis of economic development. The answer to such a 
criticism is that there can be no denying that the content of 
the legal system is dictated by its function, which is to help 
sustain an economy of a particular kind. This is a truism which 
even socialist scholars openly accept. Thus as Cohen asserts: 
"Montaux's remarks nicely complement Marx's thesis that 
although economic changes have usually to be registered 
77. Ibid. P. 10. 
78. Supra note 72 at P. 73. 
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juridically, the law does not explain the economic 
changes. Revolutions are not made by laws. But it is 
essential thaýqthey make laws, since... bases need super 
structures". 
He adds at Page 231 that: 
"In human society might frequently requires right in 
order to operate or even to be conatuted. Might without 
right. may be impossible, inefficient, or unstable. 
Powers over productive forces are a case in point. Their 
exercise is less secure when it is not legal. So, for 
efficiency and good order, production relations require 
the sanction of property relations. Hence men fight, 
successfully, to change the law so- that it will 
legitimate powers they either have or perceive to be 
within their grasp, and law makers alter the law to 
relieve actual or potential strain between it and the 
economy". 
This study therefore will examine the regulative 
mechanisms available in Zambia over commercial banks to assess 
their suitabAlity for minimising any obstacles to efficient 
mobilisation and allocation of financial resources. To achieve 
this purpose it has to diverge from the old style positivist 
approach which emphasised traditional areas such as banker- 
customer relations and negotiable instruments over ownership, 
management and policy. It is rather to these later areas and to 
prudential regulation, capitalisation and securities that this 
study will look. 
1: 4, Scope and Limitations of the Study 
This study is divided into seven chapters. After this 
introductory chapter, chapter two gives a historical outline of 
79. G. A. Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of History; A defence. 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978) P. 230. 
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the emergence and growth of the banking industry in Zambia from 
the colonial times to the present. It also touches on the 
factors of capitalisation and branching. In chapter three, the 
study looks at the methods and apparatus of regulating the 
banking industry in Zambia. 
In chapter four, the study will look at the economic 
framework and direction of the country. The chapter like the 
rest of the study outlines a long sequence of policies and 
actions aimed at promoting credit and investment in the country 
during the pre-indepehdence days as well as the post- 
independence period. It is due to the absence of similar 
research in the field of banking regulation, and in the role of 
banking in development, and because some of the policies and 
regulations that shape today's banking business are themselves 
a carry over from the colonial past, that the study takes this 
historical approach. The chapter in addition highlights the 
need for vigorous intermediation by banks. 
Chapter five is concerned with the analysis of the 
actual role played by banks in intermediating between savers 
and investors. It also refers to some of the changes cause in 
this role caused by changes in policy and regulations. In 
chapter six the study appraises the statutory and prudential 
regulations and their impact on intermediation and development, 
in particular. The chapter also recommends, certain changes and 
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improvements that ought to be made. The work ends with a 
summary and concluding remarks. 
1: 5 Data Collection and Methodology 
The orientation of this study is both positive and 
normative. It is positive in the sense that it attempts to 
identify exist'Mg and old savings mobilization and lending 
practices of commercial banks in Zambia and the regulative 
mechanisms by which those practices are controlled. This 
approach is motivated by the need to answer the question 
whether the levels of mobilization and lending as well as the 
manner in which banks are regulated are adequate to induce a 
developmental impact. In other words, it provides the answer to 
the question how and why the commercial banks are functioning 
in Zambia? 
The study is normative to the extent that it is also 
policy oriented, that is it attempts to answer the question 
what ought to be? 
Several ways were used to acquire the materials and data 
that brought this study into shape: 
(i) use of primary materials. This involved a search for and in 
official publications such as Statutes2 Statutory instruments, 
commands, Registers, Circulars, government plans, ministerial 
reports and reviews. Others are royal commission reports, 
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reports of commissions of inquiry, United Nations, World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund (IMF) I 
(ii) Research in secondary sources such as National Archives in 
Lusaka, published books and unpublished dissertations, articles 
in journals and monographs. 
(iii) Personal observations and interviews with experts and 
officials in banks and government officers. Many of these 
observations and interviews may not be reflected in the actual, 
body of this study but their assistance in helping me to 
understand the subject and the workings of the banking system 
and its regulation is invaluable. 
Finally, this work represents a scheme of analysis that 
involves references to historical, politicalp social and 
economic factors in all the important segments of this study 
namely, mobilisation, allocation of resources by commercial 
banks and in their regulation. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
EMERGENCE AND EXPANSION OF THE-BANKING-BUSINESS 
IN PRE AND POST INDEPENDENCE ZAMBIA 
2: 0 INTRODUCTION 
It is not known whether there existed any kind of 
traditional or customary institutions in Zambia (or Northern 
Rhodesia as it was known during colonial rule) before the 
introduction of modern banking. In West Africa, the concept of 
banking was not entirely unknown. Before formal banking 
institutions were introduced, mutual aid and credit schemes of 
various types existed there. Some of those schemes were known 
as associations of men or women. Others were associations of 
friends. Through those associations traditional currencies like 
cowries, beads and other durable commodities were transferred 
from surplus to deficit economic units. What brought them 
closest to modern banking was the practice of charging 
interest. 1 When the colonial system Was introduced in West 
Africa the significance of the traditional credit schemes began 
to wane_ and__ their main function shifted largely to supplying 
funds for the education of family or group members' children 
and agricultural requirements. The other -ones soon became the 
responsibility of ordinary commercial banks which came with 
1. J. K. Onoh, Money and BankinR in Africa (London2 Lagos and 
New York: Longhorn, 1962) P. 26. 
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colonial rule. 
In Zambia , on the other hand ,it seems that 
intermediation only appeared when -commercial banks were 
introduced. The history of commercial banking in the country 
however, formed a part of the general movement of the industry 
into the Southern and Central African region as a whole. In 
particular, the emergence of banks in Zambia was directly 
linked with their appearance in Southern Rhodesia (now 
Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (now Malawi), the two countries with 
which Zambia formed the federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 
1953. One leading characteristic of the early banks in the 
region was that nearly all were connected in one way or another 
with-the London banks. 2 For this reason these early banks were 
strongly influenced -by 
English principles and considerations 
with respect to banker-customer relations and lending. The 
greatest and most immediate influence however, -came from nearby 
South Africa where most of the banks had their regional 
headquarters. It was from there that many banks moved to open 
branches in the neighbouring territories. The usual starting 
point for new branches was Southern Rhodesia as it was the 
nearest to South Africa. In addition Southern Rhodesia's big 
European settler population and relative development made it a 
2. The Barclays Bank DCO, for instance, was incorporated in 
London, Standard Bank of South Africa had common directors with 
Lloyds, the Midland Bank and Westminster Bank. The Netherlands 
Bank of South Africa and the Grindlays Bank were also connected 
to London through shareholding and directorships. see W. T. 
Newlyn and D. C. Rowan, Money and Banking, in British Colonial 
Africa, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, -177; ý PP. 744-1b. 
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a natural choice for opening up the rest of the region to 
banking and other businesses. 
2: 1 Some Reasons for the Growth of Pre- Independence Banking 
Several reasons can be cited to explain the emergence 
and expansion of commercial banking in Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
during the colonial era. Most of those reasons were in, fact 
common to the industry's expansion in all the other colonies. 
Basically, they were that banking was an essential element in 
the success of the whole colonisation programme. Banks financed 
plantations, railways, harbours and even missionary activities. 
They were also necessary conduits for the transmission of 
capital resources between the colonies and the metropolitan 
powers. 3 Their expansion into colonial territories was there- 
fore encouraged and supported by the colonial authorities 
themselves to help induce trade and stronger administrative 
organisations. 4 Newlyn and Rowan ably demonstrated the inter- 
connection between colonial and banking expansion during the 
1950s. 5 On the particular aspect of official inducements 
3. Mirghani M. El. Hassan, The Role of Insurance and -T-ts 
Regulation in Development: Sudan and Tanzania (Ph. D. 
Dissertation, University otParwick, 1981) P. 7. 
4. The suggestion that Standard Bank of South Africa should set 
up a branch in Southern Rhodesia, for example, came from Cecil 
Rhodes himself; see James A. Henry, SixtX Years North of the 
Limpopo; The story of the coming ot the Standard Ban-F-to 
RhoaMa and Nyasaland (Salisbury: The Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Company, 1953) P. 29. 'For other initiatives b 
colonial administrators, see Standard Chartered Bank (Zambia5 
Ltd P. 52 below, regarding actions of Coryndon and the B. S. A. Company. 
5. T. W. Newlyn and D. C. Rowan, op. cit. P. 74. 
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towards increased bankingp they point to the establishment of 
the Bank of West Africa as an example. That bank was 
established in 1894 with the active support of the authorities 
to provide services for the British trading enterprises and 
colonial administrators. From instances like this, it can be 
concluded that the earliest banks in the colonies were 
encouraged to set up so that they could continue to-serve their 
clientele of officers, colonial bureaucrats -and 
traders or 
trading enterprises that followed the Union Jack. In other 
words, banking served the dual purposes of enabling the 
colonies to perform their functions as markets and suppliers of 
raw materials on the-one hand, and to be homes, sources of 
livelihood for the settlers' and 'targets of British Sovereign 
rule and majestic exploits on the other. 
While the establishment of banks served the objectives 
outlined in the prece. ding paragraph and confirmed the purpose 
and function of colonialism in the first place, it nevertheless 
set in motion a habit or tradition which has had very 
undesirable consequences. Those consequences are that, even 
under today's different' conditions and circumstances, banking 
has remained a service industry whose horizons are narrow and 
consist largely of handling and accepting financial resources 
rather than making a conscious effort to inject them into more 
productive investments. In other words, banks in today's 
independent countries tend to pursue the very goals and 
precedents set for them by the colonial authorities many years 
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ago. They are not keen to lend towards long term investments or 
small scale businesses belonging to indigenous persons even 
though the circumstances under which they operate indicate that 
these are the most appropriate and needy sectors so far as 
national growth and development are concerned. Banks rather 
look for profitable customers like governments themselves, 
parastatals companies whose requirements are guaranteed by 
governments, and foreign or immigrant owned enterprises which 
deal largely in imported luxuries and exports of primary 
commodities. To bankers dealings with these customers are cheap 
to monitor or administer. These customers also constitute a 
group that poses little or no risk of non-repayment and owns 
traditionally favoured types of security. 
Profits for banks therefore seem to be more important 
than any expansion in the gross domestic product and 
employment. For this and other foregoing reasons the expansion 
of banks should be seen not as a response to obvious increases 
in the demands for investment resources, but as one aimed 
largely at providing mere handling and transitory facilities. ' 
In Northern Rhodesia the inter-connection between 
expanded banking facilities and increased European settlement 
was amply confirmed by the events that followed the creation of 
the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. These included the 
arrival of large teams of civil servants who were recruited to 
run the amalgamated and territorial governments. These were 
followed by increases in the number of immigrants from South 
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Africa and the United Kingdom who came to take up opportunities 
in farming and trading in the big market created by the merger. 
The subsequent expansion in the number of banks and level of 
their services was said to be a natural consequence of these 
events. 6 
It was only afterwards that the expansion in banking 
services began to be sustained by the growth in primary 
production and retail trade, and to a small measure, commercial 
farming; all of' which were carried out by settlers and 
increased with injections of new settlements. These activities 
were supplemented, especially in the case of Southern Rhodesia, 
by an increase in manufacturing. 7 According to Sowelem 8 the 
gross national income of all three territories (at factor cost) 
increased by 73 per cent during the ten years of Federation. It 
is important though, to remember that as with the actual 
enjoyment of the country's growth or wealth, 9 this relatively 
high rate of income was not shared equally among the three 
territories. According to the actual pattern of distribution of 
the gross national product among the territories, 90 per cent 
went to Southern Rhodesia, 60 per cent to Northern Rhodesia and 
55 per cent to Nyasaland. In reality it was largely these 
specific territorial rates of income which controlled the 
actual determinants of the expansion of banking in each 
6. R. I. Grant-Suttie, "The Rhodesias and Nyasaland"2 irnW. F. 
Crick (ed) Commonwealth Banking Systems (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1965)-T4T. - 
7. See Chapter 4. 
8. R. A. Sowelem, Towards Financial Independence in a Developing 
Economy (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 19bi) P. 58. 
9. See Chapter 4. 
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territory. They also influenced the character and composition 
of the population in each territory which in turn played a part 
in those factors that determined the growth of the gross 
national product. Thus in Nyasaland where there was less 
European settlement and commercial farming, and where 
production for own consumption played a decisive' part in the 
economic life of the territory, only a few banks established 
branches. On the other hand, in Southern Rhodesia a 
predominantly industrial, commercial f arming . and retail 
trading territory there was more need for banking services and 
therefore an expanded service appeared. These opportunities 
were further enhanced by that territory's position as seat of 
the federal government and its ability to draw resources from 
the other territories and apply them to its own purposes. 
Northern Rhodesia, though a big primary producer, merely 
occupied an intermediate position in the equation. -, 
In all, there were five banks operating 109'branches, 6 
sub-branches and 134 agencies throughout the Federal' territory 
by the end of 1962.10 These were the Standard Bank of 'South 
Africa and the Bank of South Africa which was subsequently 
absorbed by the National Bank of South Africa.. This latter bank 
was itself changed in 1925 into what is today the Barclays Bank 
DCO. The other banks were the National and Gridlays Bank, the 
Netherlands Bank of South Africa and the Ottoman Bank. In 
addition two merchant banks operated offices in the Federation. 
10. R. I. Grant--Suttie, 2p. cit. 
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2: 2 Post-Independence Banking Expansion in Zambia 
At independence, three of the Federation's banks; that 
is The Standard Bank, Barclays Bank DCO and the Netherlands 
Bank of South Africa operated in Zambia. In additiong one 
merchant bank - The Merchant Bank of Central Africa operated a 
branch in the country. The post independence entrants include 
the Grindlays Bank International (Zambia) Limited and' the 
Commercial Bank of Zambia Limited which took over the business 
of the Netherlands Bank of South Africa in 1965, and was itself 
later absorbed by the Zambia National Commercial Bank Limited 
(ZNCB) when it was formed in 1969. Other's are the Citibank, The 
Bank of Credit and Commerce, the Indo-Zambian Bank, The 
Meridien Bank, the African Commercial Bank, and the Union Bank 
(Zambia) Limited. 11 
Clearly, many more banks have been incorporated in the 
country after independence than there had been during the 
country's colonisation which lasted seventy years. This surge 
in new incorporations has caused some people to feel that for a 
country of less than seven million people, Zambia has more 
banks than-it needs. 12 Their-worry is compounded by the fact 
that all the banks involved are competing for a tiny group of 
11. It has been learnt that two more banks have een 
registered; The Finance Bank and The Capital Bank: Source: 
private communication. see also Zambia Daily Mail, 26 October, 
1987. 
12. See e. g. Dominic Chipeta, African Technical Review cited in 
Times of Zambia, 3 December, 179777- 
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wage earners.,, ---, --ýt, private and public sectors along the line of 
rail as well as in provincial centres. 
The increase in the number of banks registered after 
independence suggests two things. First it suggests that the 
business of banking in Zambia is a highly profitable one. 
Indeed a review of the annual statements of most banks shows 
that they are making impressive profits on their investments. 
Table 1. illustrates some of those reported profits. 
ý -T " 
Bank Profits 1982-85 
YEAR BANK PROFIT 
1982 Barclays Bank -K 4 million 
1984 Barclays Bank K, 11 million 
1984 Zambia National Commercial Bank K 8 million 
1985 Standard Chartered Bank (Zambia) Ltd K 3291139892 
Sources: Annual Reports and Accounts. 
The profits shown in Table 1 would in f act have been 
higher but for tax and reserve requirements of the Central 
Bank. 
The increases in the number of banks registered in 
recent years also suggests that there- has -been -a' growing 
awareness on the part of politicians and licencing authorities 
that a great need exists to mobilise more financial resources 
and that banks are seen as a useful tool for such a task. This 
implication is seen from the fact that there have been more 
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incorporations in the last six years than before the period of 
reform in 1970. A further implication is that 
Ithe 
authorities 
have realised that national ownership of banks may not be an 
answer in itself to the need for banks to assume a more 
generous attitude towards development lending. Encouraging new 
banks to set up, including those owned by outside investors 
under this new thinking therefore reflects the importance 
which competition has assumed. 13 . 
It is now believed that 
placing all the banks under the ownership of the government 
will not lead to the necessary competition involving the 
offering of different terms to depositors as well as investors. 
It is also believed that without such competition further 
expansion into rural and semi-rural areas may not be possible. 
Thus, in reference to the successful establishment of the 
Zambia National Commercial Bank, for instance, President Kaunda 
said: 
"While the enlarged state bank will serve to introduce 
an element of healthy -competition among commercial, banks, it's hoped that it will also depart from 
restrictive practices of orthodox banking by 
spearheading the expansion of banking to semi-urban and 
rural areas and relaxing the traditional criteria for 
business credit". -14 
On the part of the banks themselves, their enthusiasm 
13. see e. g. Reference to Ten Year UNIP Hanife-sto in R. Weiss 
"Rationalisation says UNIP, What Next for the Banks??, 
Enterprise Magazine No. 3,1973. 
14. Speech by President Kaunda at the opening ceremony of The 
Bank of Zambia New Building, Associated Printers 17th July 
1975, P. 12. 
15. See Chapter Four. 
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for setting up in business now can also be interpreted as 
reflection of a sense of satisfaction that the threat of 
nationalisation or state acquisition of their shares along the 
1970 lines 15 has receded. In other words, they are aware of 
their strong negotiating position vis-a-vis the government and 
are also confident that the authorities need them more now than 
ever before. In chapter six it will be seen how the enactment 
of a new law relating to the procedure and conditions of 
incorporation may have relaxed the sense of apprehension among 
bankers and those intending to venture into that business and 
thus fostered the rapid increases in new banks that has been 
witnessed. 
The order of emergence of banks in Zambia was as follows: 
2: 2: 1 The Standard Chartered Bank (Zamýia) Limited 
This is the oldest operating bank in Zambia. 
Incorporated as the Standard Bank of South Africa', "it opened a 
branch in Southern Rhodesia in 1892 and thereafter m'Oýed on to' 
Nyasaland and then Northern Rhodesia where it established 
branches at Blantyre in 1901 and Kalomo (Then the. capital of 
Northern Rhodesia) in 1906 respectively. 16 The first 
suggestion that a branch should be opened in what was then' 
15. See Chapter Four. 
16. James A. Henry supra note 4. 
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North Western Rhodesia 17 came in 1903 from Coryndon, the 
territory's commissioner at that time. 
The matter was raised again in 1904 by the B. S. A. 
Company itself as the overall administrative authority of the 
territory. At that time however, save for a skeleton 
administration there was no development whatever to justify the 
opening of a bank. The railway only reached the Zambezi River 
in June 1904, and did not reach the zinc and lead mines at 
Broken Hill (now Kabwe) until 1906. In addition there was the 
intention to combine the administrative 'authorities of North 
Western and North Eastern Rhodesia into one,, 'and therefore 
there was uncertainty as to where the capital of the territory, 
and therefore the first branch of the bank, would ultimately be 
situated. This situation was resolved when Kalomo became 
capital in 1906. Accordingly the first branch of the. bank was 
established there. 
Before the establishment of the Central Bank of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland in 1956, the Standard Bank also handled the 
administration of all inter-bank clearing arrangements in the 
federation. At the end of each working day the net position of 
each bank was calculated against the Standard Bank and the settlements 
were done daily in London through appropriate 
17. The territory was at first administered in two seperate 
portions; North Eastern and North Western Rhodesia. The former 
was administered from Blantyre in Nyasaland until the B. S. A. 
Company set up its own administration at Fort Jameson in 1895. 
See James Henry, op. cit. P. 34. 
I 
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transfers between the London offices of the banks involved. 
When the sums involved were relatively small, settlements were 
carried out locally by transfers of currency. 
18 
In 1962 the bank's name was changed from Standard Bank 
of South Africa to Standard Bank only. Since then it has 
changed again to its present form. 
19 Following the , 1970 
economic reforms and the subsequent enactment of the Banking 
Act, 1971, which provided for the incorporation of all the 
banks wishing to operate in Zambia locally, the bank was 
accordingly incorporated on 11th November, 1971.. 
20 It. however, 
remains a subsidiary of an international banking group. Under 
the arrangement worked out during incorporation, Standard Bank 
Limited simply sold its business undertaking, properties and 
assets to the new bank in exchange for a majority shareholding. 
211\ 
18. L. A. Sowelem op. cit. 
19. See certificate of incorporation and letter dated 16th May, 
1985 on file No. 6525 at the Companies Registry, Lusaka. 
20. Letter No. L. co. 6525 of 11th November, 1971 on file at the 
Companies Registry, Ministry of., Trade and Commerce, Lusaka. 
21. Agreement dated 22nd November, 1971 between Standard Bank 
Limited and Standard Bank (Zambia) Limited on file at the 
Companies Registry, Lusaka. 
I 
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The company has a nominal capital of K30 million and operates 
23 branches and 15 agencies and services in various I parts of 
the country, but especially along the line of rail and in 
provincial centres. 22 
2: 2: 2 Barclays Bank Zambia Limited 
The origins of this bank date to 1918 when Barclays Bank 
DCO, a company incorporated' -in the United Kingdom, opened a 
branch in Northern Rhodesia. The bank, even though it remains a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Barclays Bank International Limited; 
was incorporated locally in 1971 under the present name with a-, 
paid up capital of K2 million. Today it has a nominal, capital 
of K50 million and operates 32 branches and, 26 agencies mainly. 
concentrated, in the copperbelt and central provinces. 
2: 2: 3 Grindlays Bank International (Zambia) Limi'ted 
This bank took over the business formerly transacted by- 
the National and Grindlays Bank Limited - of the United Kingdom. 
It is a wholly -owned -subsidiary of the Grindlays Bank 
International; a United Kingdom'bank. Its first branch was 
22. See Standard Chartered Bank- Zambia Limited, Annual Report 
1985. P. 24. 
23. Now known as Barclays Bank PLC in accordance with- the 
Barclays Bank, Act 1984 of the U. K. see Barclays Bank Zambia 
Limited, Report and Accounts, 1984 P. 13. Barclays Bank PLC 
(Still appearing as Barclays Bank International on registration,, 
records in Zambia) holds 27,699,993 of the Banks 30,000,000 
shares. see form II of the Companies Act, Section 47; filed on 
No. 6444 and dated 26/3/85 at the Companies Registry. 
-60- 
opened in Zambia in 1965.24 The bank became locally 
incorporated on 1st December, 1971.25 It operates 11 branches, 
mainly in the line,,, of rail towns. In addition, Grindlays 
Leasing, its wholly owned subsidiary, started operations in 
1973 to service commercial organisations. 
2: 2: 4 The Zambia National Commercial'Bank Limited- 
This bank, incorporated on August 21st, 1969 was the 
first Zambian owned, though not the first Zambian incorporated 
commercial bank. The first Zambian incorporated bank was The 
Commercial Bank Zambia Limited, whose history 
'has 
now been 
buried within the ZNCB limited. That bank (the Commercial Bank 
Zambia limited) was incorporated on 1st May, 1965 to take over 
the business of the now defunct Netherlands Bank of South 
Africa. It was then one of the smallest banks in the country 
with an authorised share capital of only_, K2 million of which 
only K500,000 was paid up. 26 During the economic reforms of 
the financial sec tor in 1970, the government 'took over'-60 per 
cent of its equity, increasing it to 100 per cent in 1973 when 
it was merged with the ZNCB Limted. 
24. Ten Years of Banking in Zambia, a Bank of Zambia 
Publication, (1-u-s-aFT-Associated Printers, - 1975, P. 15) 
25. See Letter L. CO. 6559 of 1st December, 1971, written by 
Assistant Registrar of Companies, file No. 6559,, Lusaka. 
26. S. Musokotwane, ' Financial Institutions - and Economic 
Develument in Zambia kDissertation Zur Erlangung d 
Akademischen' grades e'lnes Doktors de wirtschaf suissenschaf t 
and de Universitat Konstanz. June 1985). 1 
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At the time of its incorporation the ZNCB Limited, had a 
nominal capital of K5 million. This -has now been increased to 
K30 million of which 99 per cent of the paid up capital is held 
on behalf of the government by ZIMCO, which replaced FINDECO. 
The rest of the shares are held by private Zambian individuals 
and parastatals. The, bank having started from scratch has since 
managed to open 30 branches throughout the country and on May 
202 1974 opened its first overseas branch in London. 27 
2: 2: 5 Citibank (Zambia) Limited 
This bank was incorporated in Zambia on 8th June, 1979. It is a 
subsidiary of the Citibank of New York, which is itself a 
subsidiary of the holding company, Citicorp. The bank operates 
only one branch and has a nominal share capital of K12 
million. 28 Three characteristics make this bank different from 
all the other commercial banks in the country: 
(a) Until 1987,29 it' was 'the only American 1. bank in tI he 
country. Earlier the business of banking as ' in' Zambia w' 
dominated by British and South African banks, with the 
exception of the ZNCB which is wholly Zambian owned. ' 
27. Ten Years of Banking in Zambiaý 
28. See file No. 9697, Comapnies Registry, Lusaka. 
29. The Union Bank (Zambia) Limited was incorporated early in 
1987 with the Union Bank of Africa, a U. S. company as a major 
shareholder. See Zambia Daily Mail, 29th January 1987. Before 
it the Meridien Bank of Zambia Limited which appeared in 1984 
had some American connections. see 2: 2: 7 below. 
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Musokotwane 30 explains the absence of American banks on the. 
Zambian scene as a result of the hitherto prevailing notion 
among Zambian officialdom that American banks knew more about 
Latin America than Central Africa. Overtures by the bank to 
come to Zambia were therefore resisted until a change in 
official perception was attained in 1979. 
(b) It is the only bank in Zambia which operates a Wholesale 
Service. 31 Only companies, embassies and international 
organisations may open accounts with it. The only individuals 
who may open accounts with it are those from embassies or 
diplomatic institutions which do business with it, 32 
(c) It is the only commercial bank which offers both morning 
and afternoon services, a characteristic no doubt imported from 
America. 
2: 2: 6 The Bank of Credit and Commerce (Zambia) Limited 
This bank was incorporated in Zambia on 27th May, 1980. 
It is a subsidiary of the Middle Eastern owned Bank of Credit 
and Commerce International Holdings (Luxembourg) S. A.; which, 
with the help of nominees owns virtually all the 10,000 shares 
in the bank. The bank has a nominal share capital of K10 
million 33 and operates five branches in the country. 
30. S. Musokotwane op. cit. 
31. D. Banda, Public Relations Officer, written reply to 
Questionnaire. 
32. Ibid. 
33. See Notice of increase of capital pursuant section 58 of 
the Companies Act, on file No. 10208: dated 16th April 1985. 
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2: 2: 7 The Meridien Bank (Zambia) Limited 
Incorporated in September, 1984, this bank is a 
subsidiary of Meridien International Bank Limited, an American 
holding company, with Amax (Zambia) Limited and one or two 
Zambian nationals holding minority shares. 34 'It has a share 
capital of K30 million and runs two branches in Zambia. 
2: 2: 8 The African Commercial Bank Limited 
This is the only bank in Zambia which is wholly owned by 
private Zambian citizens. It was incorporated on June 5th-f 1984 
and has a nominal capital of K3 million divided into 20,000 
shares of K50 each. 35 Being one of the youngest banks, it has 
only one branch in Lusaka. 
2: 2: 9 The Indo-Zambia Bank Limited 
Until recently this was the youngest bank to be set up 
in the country. It was incorporated on October 19th, 1984.36 
It was formed by the Bank of Baroda with the participation of 
the Central Bank of India and the Bank of India. The bank has a 
share capital of K10 million divided into 10,000 shares of 
--- K1,000 each and runs only one branch. 
34. See form 8, Section 79, dated 26th September, 1984 on file 
No. 12856, Companies Registry, Lusaka. 
35. See certificate of Acting Deputy Registrar of Companiest dated 21st January, 1985 on file No. LCO 13148, Companies 
Registry, Lusaka. 
36. See file 13460, Companies Registry, Lusaka. 
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2: 3 Expansion of Assets and Business 
Alongside the physical expansion of the commercial 
banking industry went the banks' growth in terms of volume of 
business. At the end of the Federation in 1963, the total 
assets of all commercial banks in the Federation was found to 
be E106.8 million. 37 This was an increase of approximately 30 
t 
per cent over the L86.6 million level of 1952. By 1985, and 
owing to the establishment of more banks these assets had risen 
to over K4.0 billion or Z2 billion. 38 Tables 2,2(a) and 2(b) 
show a summary of the asset structure of Zambian banks from the 
colonial days to September 1985. 
TABLE 2 
(SHOWN OVERLEAF) 
37. R. A. Sowelem op. cit. 
38. Bank of Zambia , quarterly Financial and Statistical Review, Vol. 17. September 1965. 
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Reasons for this impressive growth in the volume of 
assets and business enjoyed by Zambian 'banks are varied. They 
include , the ending of the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland, with which came the ability to retain,, the nation's 
resources within its borders. Hitherto the bulk of the 
country's earnings and resources had been siphoned off to 
Southern Rhodesia and London. 39 To this must be added the 
restrictions imposed on expatriate companies and businessmen 
during the Mulungushi Economic Reforms 40 in connection with 
the remission of profits abroad. Other grounds were the 
economic boom which was experienced soon after independence 
during high demand and good prices for copper; as well as the 
diminishing levels of foreign exchange which followed the drop 
in copper sales and prices in the 1970's and '80s. This latter 
factor forced many businesses which rely on imported materials 
to operate below capacity and to keep the rest of their money 
in interest yielding accounts pending allocation of foreign 
exchange. 41 
Despite the increase in the volume of their business 
post independence banks in Zambia have maintained virtually the 
same balance sheet items as their colonial counterparts. Indeed 
compared with banks operating in developed countries, some of 
39. See Chapter Four. 
40. refered to in Chapters One and Four. 
41. See e. g. Chapter Five P. 236 
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which are parent companies of Zambian Banks, the types and 
patterns of management of their assets are stagnant and 
unsophisticated. Such innovations as credit cards, stock 
dealings, house loans or simply new corporate and retail 
financial instruments have yet to be introduced. Zambian banks 
have also yet to be introduced to the system of operating in 
non traditional areas of the 
iinancial 
market, such as 
financial consultancy for such ventures as take-overs, business 
expansion programmes, share purchasing, and so on. 
One notable departure from the pre-independence banking 
situation is the tendency by Zambian banks to keep high levels 
of liquid assets. Table 3 illustrates this. 
TABLE 3. 
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TABLE 3. 
ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS' 
LIQUIDITY (a) W000) 
End of 
period 
Actual (C) 
liquidity 
Formal (c) 
liquidity 
Total 
liquidity 
Liabilities 
to the 
public -ActuaL 
Liquidity ratio 
Formal Total 
1970 45.401 71.883 117.284 267.650 17.0 26.9 43.9 
1971 33.711 73.724 107.435 287.137 11.7 25.7 37.4 
1972 64.193 81.101 145.294 308.311 20.8 23.3 47.1 
1973 92.561 106.902 199.463 373.627 24.8 28.6 53.4 
1974 17.359 126.987 144.341 413.296 4.0 40.7 34.7 
1975 114.997 113.975 228.972 434.971 26.4 26.2 52.7 
1976 158.292 156.860 415.151 533.956 48.4 29.4 77.7 
1977 566.923 120.915 687.838 640.722 88.5 18.9 102.4 
1978 114.029 193.835 307.864 575.531 19.8 33.7 53.5 
1979 264.840 214.659 479.499 780.795 33.9 27.5 61.4 
1980 259.169 220.570 479.739 824.582 34.4 26.7 58.1 
1981 115.453 295.982 411.435 688.689 13.3 34.1 47.4 
1982 117.284 245.396 362.680 546.073 13.9 29.0 42.9 
January 117.284 245.396 362-680 546.073 13.9 29.0 42.9 
February 127.222 251.737 378.959 850.492 15.0 29.6 44.6 
March 133.554 254.143 387.697 895.360 14.9 28.4 43.3 
April 171.044 266.263 437.307 926.207 18.5 28.7 47.2 
May 182.759 244.491 427.250 937.048 19.5 26.1 45.6 
June 231.628 261.369 492.997 984.3ag 23.5 26.6 50.1 
July 191.389 241.821 433.210 965.141 19.8 25.1 44.9 
August 187.335 290.027 477.362 1.031.051 18.2 28.1 46.3 
September 288.279 254.557 542.836 1.085.705 26.6 23.4 50.0 
October 179.270 346.143 525.413 1.071.904 16.7 32.3 49.0 
November 305.556 257.874 563.430 1.117.289 27.3 23.1 50.4 
December 337.024 306.344 643.368 1.195.907 28.2 25.6 53; 8 
1983 
January 417.118 258.433 675.551 1.180.689 35.3 21.9 57.2 
February 437.715 256.100 693.185 1.164.882 37.6 22.0 59.6 
March 424.523 246.376 670.899 1.165.505 36.4 21.1 57.5 
April 392.185 267.380 659.565 1.159.473 33.8 23.0 56.8 
May 461.742 278.684 740.426 1.183.676 39.0 23.5 62.5 
June 432.738 315.373 748.111 1.218.752 35.5 25.9 61.4 
July 448.397 306.687 755.084 1.200.211 37.4 25.6 63.0 
August 402.784 309.742 712.526 1.208.008 33.3 25.6 58.9 
September 364.233 349.769 714.002 1.250.176 29.1 28.0 57.1 
October 351.666 352.089 703.755 1.235.252 28.5 26.5 57.0 
November 373.528 344.539 718.067 1.246.375 30.0 27.6 . 
57.6 
December 333.150 392.921 727.071 1.319.717 25.2 29.8 55.8 
1984 
January 387.773 346.831 734.604 1.286.168 30.1 27.0 57.1 
February 388.063 330.944 719.007 1.286.169 30.2 25.7 55.9 
March 426.615 315.420 742.035 1.269.172 33.6 24.8 58.4 
April 392.185 267.380 659.565 1.159.473 33.8 23.0 56.8 
May 473.453 306.298 779.751 1.301.126 36.4 23.5 59.9 
June 459.765 339.551 799.316 1.359.387 33. ff 25.0 58.8 
July 431.877 347.053 778.930 1.249.641 34.6 27.7 62.3 
August 437.129 372.411 809.540 1.412.939 30.9 26.4 57.3 
September 430.489 452.973 883.462 1.486.929 28.9 30.4 59.4 
October 475.030 422.661 897.691 1.483.469 32.0 '28.4 60.5 
November 485.371 453.785 939.156 1.521.000 31.9 29.8 61.7 
December 498.184 474.798 972.982 1.542.420 32.3 30.8 63.1 
1985 
January 555.254 422.435 977.689 1.514-925 36.6 -27-8 64.5 
February 539.756 429.868 969.624 1.520: 480 35.4 28: 2 63.7 
March 549.778 449.589 999.367 1.549.134 35.5 29.0 64.5 
April 540.219 425.948 966.167 1.507.306 35.8 28.3 64.1 
May 554.389 473.288 1.007.677 1.571.558 35.3 30.1 65.4 
June 573.159 498.080 1.071.839 1.562.803 36.7 31.8 68.5 
July 613.588 460.884 1.073.922 1.597.044 38.4 28.8 64.2 
August 595. S29 480.846 1.076.375 1.597.392 39.3 30.1 67.4 
September 661.887 528.639 1.190.476 1.682.473 39.3 31.4 70.7 
October 716.307 486.223 1.202.530 1.781.730 40.2 27.3 67.5 
November 835.576 454.179 1.289.756 1.843.387 45.3 24.6 69.9 
December 899.857 452.208 1.352.065 1.914.134 47.0 23.6 70.6 
1986 
Jainuary 792.364 477.641 1.270.005 1.976.549 40.1 24.2 64.3 
February 802.251 432.257 1.234.508 2.079.834 38.6 20.8 59.4 
893.530 591.471 1.484.039 2.350.796 38.0 25.2 63.1 
April 921.327 630.000 1.550.327 2.187.830 42.1 28.8 70.7 
May 844.096 705.180 1.549.276 2.385.351 35.4 29.5 64.9 
June 930.456 836.125 1.767.181 2.540.342 36.6 32.9 - 69.5 
July 880.226 846.056 1.726.282 2.560.697 34.4 33.0 67.4 
SOURCEs Bank of Zambia. Research Department 
(a) Includ ing Merchant Bank up to December 1971 
(b) Actual liquidity note and coins other cash balances. Treasury billas external liquid assets up to April 1972 
(c) Formal liquidity. miniwum reserve requirementst bills of exchange and promissory notess local registered stocks 
Money at Calls items in transits special items authorized by the Minister of Finance. 
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The tendency to keep high levels of liquidity came about 
in part due to the vigorous exercise, by the Bank of Zambia, ýof 
its power to determine the minimum liquidity ratio. 
42 There 
has also been a vigorous enforcement of the ratio levels as and 
when they came, which was quite often as Table 3 shows. 
Another explanation for the high levels of liquidity is 
that there is a large amount of funds in the banks which are 
awaiting externalisation as payments for goods received or 
services rendered by individuals and foreign -companies. These 
deposits are maintained in accordance with the prevailing 
exchange control regulations in what is called a "pipeline". 
43 
Once funds are placed in the pipeline they remain there until 
42. Section 20 of the now repealed Bank of Zambia Act provided 
that all banks must maintain a minimum liquidity ratio 
determined by the Bank of Zambia. Today section 21 and 22 of 
the Banking Act CAP700 perform much the same function. The 
ratio between 1965 and 1970 was 25 per cent see Statutory 
instrument No. 7 of 1965. 
43. See e. g. Regulation IX(E) Bank of Zambia, modification to 
Foreign Exchange Arrangements. Guidelines to Parties invo lved 
in the Buying and Selling Foreign Exchange. 1985. 
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foreign exchange becomes available for their externalisation. 
Presently the pipeline has grown longer and is almost blocked 
due to shortages of foreign exchange, and hence the high levels 
of liquidity in the banking system. 
In addition to the funds retained in the banking system 
as part of the liquidity ratio and pipeline for outgoing funds, 
balances held with the Bank of Zambia such as clearing 
accounts, current accounts, and Reserve accounts are also 
liquid for the purposes of the Banking Act. 44 Others are 
treasury bills, bills of exchange, promisory notes eligible 
for discount at the Bank of Zambia and local registered stocks 
issued by the Government of Zambia. In terms of Aocal 
registered stocks, they must have a maturity age of less than 
six years to be eligible. 
Aside from these causes of liquidity, some theorists 
see its presence- as an indication that other forces are at 
play. Firstly, high liquidity is treated as a consequence of 
substantial amounts of primary liquidity 45 'entering the 
economy. The main source of primary liquidity before the 
collapse of the copper prices and demand was , as ind icated 
earlier, the high earning of foreign exchange. During their 
absence since 1974 other sources must have contributed to the 
44. Supra note-42. 
45. Defined to include net foreign assets of the Bank of 
Zambia, The Bank of Zambia's net claims on the Government and 
the Private Sector, and treasury bills outside The Bank of 
Zambia, see Musokotwane op. cit. P. 35. 
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growth in liquidity. These sources according to Musokotwane 
46 
are heavy borrowing both by the government and- the mining 
companies particularly from the Bank of Zambia. Another source 
could be the failure of other uses of primary liquidity, such 
as the minimum reserves, currency in circulation out- side the 
banks and treasury bills held by the non-bank public, to absorb 
a significant portion of the liquidity. 
The holding of excess liquidity above all else is a 
reflection of the nature of the market for commercial bank 
credit in Zambia. Firstly, it confirms that economic activity 
in the country's highly vul--nerable to movements in the flow of 
foreign exchange. Any appearance of a shortage in the 
availability of foreign exchange is matched by a corresponding 
decline in the demand for credit by the traditýonal borrowers in 
the country. In addition, it also compels liquid importers to 
transfer their liquidity on to the banks. Secondly, it 
indicates to some degree, that commercial banks are rather 
conservative in the making of loans and advances. Thirdly, it 
indicates the inappropriateness of some of the financial 
policies and regulations that have been pursued to date by the 
government, including excessive borrowing and controls on such 
things as interest rates and foreign exchange. 
On the liabilities'side, these have consisted mainly of 
the overnight advances from the central bank and deposits of 
members of the public as well as businesses since the colonial 
days. The only other notable items are the amounts owed by the 
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banks to each other and to banks abroad. Taken against the some- 
what remarkable growth in banking services and assets that has 
been seen, deposits have shown a relatively moderate increase. 
They rose from E82.4 million in 1952 to Z103.6 million in 1963, 
an increase of 25.7 per cent only. Their present level is K3.6 
billion 47 or Z1.5 to 12 billion, dependinp- on the 
fluctuations in the rate of exchange. 
Deposits have traditionally consisted of three types of 
accounts, both prior to and after independence. 48 These are 
deposits payable on demand which are commonly known as demand 
deposits or current accounts; savings deposits and fixed 
deposits. Savings deposits are interest paying deposits on 
which banks require intervals of at least seven days between 
drawings . During the Federation it was normal for commercial 
banks to require prior notice of seven days before withdrawil, 5 
of amounts exceeding L50 could be made on these'ýeposits. The 
fixed deposits also pay interest, and only differ from savings 
deposits in so far as they require thirty days notice or a 
lapse of a fixed period of between three and twelve months 
before any withdrawals can be authorised. 
Two observations can be made about the behaviour of 
commercial bank deposits during the period.. under consideration. 
Firstly, in terms of size, demand deposits originally tended to 
47. As at September, 1985; see Bank of Zambia Quarterly 
Financial and Statistical Review, Volume, 17, No. 3. P. 29 
48. See Bank of Rhodesia and, Nyasaland Act, 1956. see also Banking Act7 CAP700y Subsidiary Legislation, Banking 
Regulations, Regulation 6. 
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Firstly, in terms of size, demand deposits originally tended to 
constitute the largest component of the total deposit 
liabilities of the banks. In recent years however, they have 
gradually declined in relative importance as time deposits have 
become more preferable. This is because time deposits are 
interest paying, and in view of the uncertain nature of the 
foreign exchange situation, depositors who are mainly importers 
prefer to earn interest on their accounts than to place them in 
non yielding demand deposits which also charge handling fees. 
Secondly, although deposits generally declined somewhat during 
the Federal era, owing largely to the transfer of most 
government deposits from commercial banks to the central bank, 
their rise after the copper price drop has been remarkable. 
This as already seen is attributable to the shortage of 
foreign exchange and the absence of alternative uses for 
liquidity. Government securities which ought to have provided 
one such alternative have not been highly attractive due-to the 
low rates of interest on them. 
Although the actual role of commercial banks in granting 
commercial credit and the volume of their involvement will be 
examined in chapter five, it suffices to mention-here that if 
the banks acted in accordance with existing liquidity levels, 
that role ought to be very significant., The public's preference 
currently for savings and time deposits which are long-term 
savings ought to have been an added incentive for the purpose 
of lending. This is because such deposits, when they exist in 
large numbers, can act as a cushion against the potential- 
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danger of over exposure to sudden demands by customers. In 
other words, the defence which is generally raised by 
commercial banks that they fear to lend long-term when the bulk 
of their liabilities are short-term ought to fall. 
Finally, it is important to mention that, despite 
impressive increases in banking business and savings,. more 
could have been achieved if some other factors had not occured. 
Some of these factors have already been seen and they include 
the universal syndrome of low income levels which afflicts most 
developing countries. The other is the now notorious 
commercial bank habit of shunning rural areas where most of 
the people reside. The latter factor has kept the majority of 
the people ignorant about banking with the consequence that 
funds in rural areas continue to be kept in roofs and tins 
instead of being introduced into the circulation system. 
_It may 
also be urged that even in the exceptional instances where 
rural people have access. 
-to urban or semi-urban 
banks, the 
minimum deposit levels of K50 or more may be too high for them 
to start accounts as average earnings are just about K2,000 per 
annum or K106.00 per month. 49 Needless to add that- by not 
venturing into the rural-areas and tapping their''resources, 
commercial banks diminish, their intake of savings and'other 
deposits even further as' 'they have to compete with each other 
for what remains of the urban workers' income, which largely 
49. See Republic of Zambia, Monthly Digest of' Statistics 
Supplement to Vol. XXI No. 8 to 9 August/September 196J (Lusaka: 
Central Statistical Office) P. 6. These figures do not include domestic services. 
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goes on consumption. Other competitors as seen are the urban 
based deposit taking institutions such as the Zambia State 
Insurance Corporation and the Zambia National Building Society. 
2: 4 Conclusion 
The introduction of commercial banking in Zambia formed 
part of the industry's overall penetration of the whole 
Southern and Central African region during the early 1900s. 
Banks were encouraged by the colonial authorities to set up 
mainly because they were needed for transactions between the 
metropoles and the colonies. They were also necessary conduits 
for the conduct of local trade, payment of officers and 
settlers as well as financing important colonial 
infrastruptures like harbours and railways. Before independence 
the banking system in Zambia formed part of an inter-connected 
political and business system which was ultimately joined 
together in the form of the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland. Five banks operated in the Federation, with three of 
them running offices in Northern Rhodesia. 
After independence, few changes appeared. A few of the 
banks were taken over by others while many more were 
introduced. Several reasons can be advanced to explain the 
sudden increase in the number of banks following independence 
and despite a near nationalisation of the industry in 1970. 
These reasons range from profitability of the industry as well 
as a sense of satisfaction on the part of the banks that 
future nationalisations are unlikely. The increase also appears 
to be an acceptance of some of the government's inducements 
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intended to get banks to mobilise more resources. In the 
process of this build up of the banking business impressive 
assets have been accumulated. By 1985 these had reached K4 
billion, most of them being liquid assets. The banks also had a 
sizable amount of deposit liabilities; some of which were in 
the form of savings accounts and long term holdings of outward 
bound funds held in a pipeline. These holdings indicate a very 
favourable situation for increased bank lending, including long 
term credit. In the next chapter it will be seen how this 
opportunity has operated in reality and how the legal order 
facilitates its operation. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
REGULATION OF COMMERCIAL BANKS IN PRE 
AND POST INDEPENDENCE ZAMBIA.. 
3: 0 Introduction 
Commercial banks like other entities are subject to 
legal and other forms of control. The requirement to exercise 
control over commercial banks is induced by various 
considerations. 1 The most important consideration is to ensure 
that only people who satisfy certain national objectives or 
other criteria qualify to engage in the business of, banking.. 
Some of the criteria may be the possession of adequate 
financial capital or ability to run a bank. Another 
consideration is to provide a system of ensuring that banks are 
accountable in the way they deal with other people's money. 
This is because if it is lef t to their own prudence, some 
individual banks or bankers may deal. in risky, transactions 
which may lead to their collapse and thus erode public 
confidence in the banking system as a whole. As Boehmler 
asserts: 
"The-basis for regulation is-found partly in the desire 
of government to protect the clients of every bank and 
partly to promote efficiency of operations of individual 
banks and the structure as a whole. Present is also the 
desire to exercise. control over the volume of purchasing 
power existing in the form, of bank deposits derived from 
loans. This control bears most directly upon the amount 
1. See some philosophical insights on the subject 7T 
regulation, by Jack Ravell; in Jack Ravell (General Editor), 
Solvency and Regulation of Banks (Bangor Occasional Papers in 
Economics, No. 5 University of--Wailes Press, 1975) PP. 129-131. 
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of liquid reserve required behind deposits as it serves 
to limit the tot11 volume of loans and investments the 
banks may make". 
The achievement of public confidence is therefore a 
principal factor in the determination of the form and type of 
regulations the authorities may impose. Without such confidence 
the functioning of banks becomes a difficult one as their 
source of funds may begin to dwindle. Furthermore, banks which 
have no public support become vulnerable to sudden upheavals 
such as spontaneous withdrawals of cash and 'cancellations of 
accounts by members of the public acting sometimes on the basis 
of mere rumours of wrong doing, indiscreet behaviour or other 
forms of wrong judgment attributed to managers of banks. But 
with the belief that their funds are in proper and capable 
hands aided by the presence of an efficient system of 
regulation the public's confidence comes naturally and with it 
the growth of the business. 
The exercise of control over banks is also an aspect of 
a national economic management system. As banks handle the bulk 
of national financial resources, control over them and co- 
ordination of their authorised activities becomes crucial. 
Accordingly regulatory authorities have to ensure that-only 
necessary levels of money are released at a time. They also 
have to outline the legitimate or urgent purposes for which it 
may be applied. In the absence of this kind of monitoring and 
permanent control the activities of commercial banks may lead 
2. E. W. Boehmler et al; Financial Institutions (Homewood 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, inc. 1956) P. 146. 
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to unacceptable inflationary pressure which can cause acute 
unemployment and a high cost of living. 
3: 1 Sources and Types of Regulations 
There are various sources and forms of Regulations 
affecting banks. Regulations may be legislative or judicial and 
relate to the form and structure of operating banks as well as 
to their relations with customers. Regulations may also be 
fiscal and consist of instructions from the -authorities 
prescribing how commercial banks should go about their loans, 
interest rates, reserves and foreign payments or even opening 
hours. In other words they can be strictly risk aversion 
regulations. On the other hand regulations can be 
administrative and consist of guidelines and procedures on the 
creation, management and disposal of securities and other 
instruments that banks deal in. Strictly however, the 
distinction is really between the legislative and judicial or 
common law sources, as the exercise of administrative control 
almost always stems from some enabling statute, local 
government legislation or statutory instrument. 
In recent years the distinctions between the various 
types of control have been narrowed down even further as all 
regulations have come to be seen as parts of the unit called 
3 "prudential supervision" of the banking system. One of the 
most comprehensive and recent works on this subject is R. M 
3. See Jack Ravell, 22. cit. 
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Pechioli's "prudential supervision in Banking" 'which focuses on 
the OECD countries. 4 In this work Pechioli shows how the 
regulations, the modalities of their- implementation and the 
criteria upon which implementation decisions are based form 
part of a whole unit whose guiding the6e-is to' protect 
customers, national economies and international cooperation. He, 
breaks down the various components of the supervision into the' 
following: 
(1) the institutional aspects of the supervision. At least 
three aspects are involved here: 
(a) there are the bodies which are responsible for the 
actual implementation of the regulations or supervising the 
banks. These may be central banks,, government Ministries, - 
commissions or institutions. 
(b) the course of . 
the supervision and . the types of 
institutions which - may be supervised or co-opted , 
into the 
framework. 
(c) Methods of supervision and the criteria to be used 
(2) Control over the structures of the banking system, 
including licensing, branching, attitudes'and policies. 
(3) Scope and_framew-ork-of banking-activity. 
(4) Concentration of risks. 
(5) Liquidity requirements. 
(6) Capital adequacy and profitability and 
(7) market displine, crisis management and deposit protection. 
4. R. M. Pechioli , Prudenti - al-ýervision in Bankiný; Trends in Banking Structure and Regulation in OECD Countries kOECD, 1987) 
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It is not necessary to go into the details of how these 
aspects form a core of the regulatory system, as doing so will, 
amount to an unnecessary review of the whole book. It can only 
be said that these aspects are basic and nearly representative 
of the regulations or regulated areas of commercial banking in 
most capitalist and mixed economy countries. For this reason, 
it is significant to observe' that Ravel, 5 and a few otherswho 
have examined the subject of regulation of banks also discuss 
6 many of them. By no means however, are they the only ones. In 
some countries even such subjects as the nationality of the 
managers and directors 7 or the location of branches within a 
town, county, or state are regulated. 8 
Furthermore, it is possible that while in some countries 
all of Pechioli's items may be subjected to regulation in 
others only a few of them may be regulated' or stressed as the 
level of development, internationalizationý innovation or 
sophistication may still be low. No uniform or universal method 
of setting priorities in the regulation of banks can therefore, 
5. pp. cit. 
6. See e. g. Kerry Cooper and Donald R. Fraser, BanKing Banki 
Dere5ulation and The New Competition in Financial Services 
Tcambridge Massachusetts: Balinger Publishing Company, 1986). 
7. See e. g. Banking Act, CAP700 of the Laws of Zambia (No. 43 of 
1971) Section 4. 
8. See John Jay Knox, A History of Bankiný in the United States (New York: Augustus M. Kelly Publishers, 19b9) P. 11. 
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be attained. Different countries adopt different controls and 
methods of control depending on their circumstances and 
priorities. Thus in some countries the licensing of banks and 
the supervision of their operations are functions performed by 
the monetary authorities or central banks. 
9 In other 
government ministries or departments perform these functions. 
In yet other countries, these functions are performed by more 
than one body. In these last countries, the general tendency is 
that the licencing and incorporation functions are performed by 
a government ministry or department such as,, a registrar of 
companies, while the financial aspects of commercial banking 
are overseen by the central bank. This separation of functions 
is seen in some quarters as essential for enhancing efficiency 
and avoiding the corrupt tendencies that may attend 
concentrated respon sibilities. 10 It can however, be speculated 
that such separations of functions are also a result of the 
multiplication of positions which is characteristic and typical 
of bureaucratic establishments. In other words2 because various 
bureaucrats seek to be seen to be in charge of one portfolio 
or another, the tendency has been to split functions to satisfy 
them. This as will be seen in the case of the various 
registration points, some times creates administrative 
nightmares and can be expensive. 
Furthermore, for the reason that the items in Pechioli's 
9. See e. g. The Bank of-Ghana Act, No. 182 of 1963 Section 3215a7 
and the Ghana Banking Act, 1970. Section 3(1). 
10. Margaret Rogers and A. N. Allott, "Introduction and Report 
of Proceedings , International Conference on Banking and Development in Africa, 19 Journal of African Law [1975] at P-6 
-85- 
list are not necessarily applied at all times in all countries, 
this work will not examine them in similar sequence. In other 
words, this work will not take each item, like institutions, 
liquidity or crisis avoidance and discuss how it is regulated 
in Zambia. After all in the case of banking in colonial as well 
as in independent Zambia, many statutes are involved and they 
don't all cover the same issues. The approach therefore will be 
to take each statute and highlight its salient features vis-a- 
vis national requirements or priorities. As seen in Chapter One 
the main priorities set by the government fall under section 4 
of the Banking Act 1971. These relate to the formation and 
incorporation of banks as well as management and personnel. 
Before this the policy declarations of the Mulungushi and'1970 
reforms emphasised lending to Zambians, restricted borrowing by 
foreigners, externalisation of profits and called for 
Zambianization of positions. More recently, the Bank of Zambia 
Act, 1985 11 laid stress on fiscal control especially in the 
light of prevailing balance of payments difficulties and 
inadequate investment. It also stresses securities, going by 
its inclusion of a credit guarantee scheme. In between will be 
discussed the criteria employed in the implementation 
regulations. 
In addition, it is not intended in this work t6 spend a 
lot of time discussing the rules relating to the banker and 
customer relations. These are common law aspects which are 
adequately covered by standard English texts and need not be 
No. 24 of 1985. 
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reproduced here. In line with this study's theme therefore, 
which is to look at those aspects of regulation of banking 
which have a bearing on the ability of-commercial banks to play 
a positive role in development, this chapter will concentrate 
on legislative and administrative regulations. Underlying 
policies or 'policy implications of these regulations will be 
treated within the context of each statute or regulation as and 
when it comes up, and will not necessarily receive-a separate 
treatment. The first step looks at regulation of, banks during 
the colonial period. 
3: 2 Regulation of Banks in Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
Prior to the passage 'of the Bank of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland Act in 1956 12, there existed neither in Northern 
Rhodesia nor for that matter in any of her partners in the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, any specific laws 
providing for the formal regulation of the establishment and 
conduct of the business of commercial banking. The question 
whether English law applied to the banks there remains shrouded 
in the confusion surrounding the terminologies and references 
of the reception statutes. 13 According to the. -Northern 
14 Rhodesia order-in council of 1911, for instance, 
12. Federal Act No. 2 of 1956. 
13. See e. g. Robert Seidman, "A note on the construction of the 
Gold Coast Reception Statutes" 13 Journal, of African Law (1969] 
P. 49 
14. ýhis order- in-counci 1 revoked the North-Eastern and North 
Western Rhodesia orders-in-council and merged the two 
territories into one jurisdiction on 17th August, 1911. 
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English common law, doctrines of equity and statutes of general 
application which were in force in England on August 17th, 
19,115 were to continue to apply in the territory. There is 
doubt however, over the significance of the reception date, 
especially in determining the applicable principles of the 
common law or doctrines of equity. This doubt'is not helped by 
the absence of a settled climate over the meaning of the terms 
"common law" and "doctrines of equity" themselves. There is 
also doubt about precisely which pre-1911 English statutes are 
statutes of general application. 16 In a Nigerian case of B. A. 
Lawal and others V. Messrs A. Younan and Sons and Royal 
Exchange Assurance Company Limited, 17 Brett F. J. said for 
instance, that one group of enactments of the Parliament of 
England, Great Britain or the United Kingdom which may be 
applicable in a dependent or formerly dependent territory are 
those governing commercial dealings. 18 He cites for this 
purpose the Statute of Frauds, the Infant Relief Act, 1874 and 
the Sale of Goods Act, 1893. But he cautions that in the case 
of some statutes such as the Statute of Frauds or the Infant 
Relief Act, they 
15. This is the date when the order-in-council became effeFtive 
in terms of the Northern Rhodesia proclamation No. 5 of 1911. 
-See also P. 121 below. 
16. William, L. Chruch, "The Common Law and Zambia", in Muna 
Ndulo (Ed) Law in Zambia (East African Publishing House, 1984) 
P. 17. 
17. (1961) 1 ALL. N. L. R. 245. 
18. at P. 255. In Zambia this as5ect is now catered f or by 
English Law (Extent of Application Act, and the British Acts 
Extension Act. See P. 122 Below. 
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may be excluded if the transaction is one properly governed by 
native law and custom. Surely if a statute can be excluded by 
an unwritten native law or custom- without any specific 
provision to that end then its hold in that particular 
jurisdiction is tenuous and it may be unsafe to rely on it. 
Furthermore it is clear that what constitutes a transaction 
properly governed by native law or custom can be a 
controversial matter. 
The controversy is not helped by what the judge says 
later on that; "with few exceptions statutes which are 
applicable have this in common, that grave inconvenience would 
follow if they are held totally inapplicable". The decision 
whether or not there will be inconvenience is sometimes an 
emotional and subjective one, which again shakes the hold of 
any English statute on dependent colonies. Even the court's 
attempt, in that particular case, to set certain criteria which 
should be considered in applying English statutes does not 
however, remove the whole controversy. Some of those criteria 
are that a court should consider whether the statute in issue 
was designed to regulate a certain procedure or class of the 
community without any contemplation for the colonies, and 
whether there are any local circumstances which might'make the 
statute inapplicable or which can lead to results which are 
manifestly unreasonable aýd unintended. 19 Again, it is clear 
that the determination of such issues is an entirely 
19. at P. 255 
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subjective matter. Subjectivity can also be seen in respect of 
decisions relating to the doctrines of equity, especially those 
involving alleged conflicts between customary law and rules of 
natural justice. As Ajayi argues in reference to the 
supervisory role of colonial officials over native courts: 
"the most important of all, as the views of 
individual officers as to what is or is 
not repugnant to natural justice, equity and 
good conscience necessarily vary, one outstanding 
consequence of their supervisory functions has 
been the introduction of an element of instability 
and u28ertainty into the development of customary 
law" 
In addition Ajayi points to the numerous contradictions 
in the perceptions of "English" courts on the impact of certain 
customary matters on 
- 
natural 
-justice, 
equity and good 
conscience. 21 Similarly the issue of the "reasonable man" test 
which may have to be considered in applying some of the English 
statutes is another indication of the subjectivity and 
therefore the difficulty of - applying these statutes in 
traditional African conditions. -In one case- for- -instance, a 
court went so far as to suggest that a belief in witchcraft by 
20. F. A. Ajayij "The Failure--of Customary Law in Nigeria", --in 
British Territories in Africa, The Future of CustomarX Law in 
Africa, Symposium Collogne - Amsterdam 1955, organised T-y-EK-e 
Afri Instituut - Studiencentrum Leiden, in collaboration with 
The Royal Tropical Institute - Amsterdam (Leiden: Universitaire 
Pers Leiden, 1956)-P. 48. 
21. Ibid. P. 50. See also Bamgbose V Daniel (1954], 3'Weekly Law 
Reports- 561. 
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an African is not reasonable, and that the test of a reasonable 
man should be that of an ordinary man in the streets of London. 
Although this opinion has since been overruled, 23 that it was 
ever expressed shows, together with the dilemmas of the 
repugnancy clauses, that even if it was possible to indicate 
precisely which statutes applied to the Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland, it would still be hard to apply them. Perhaps 
the only consolation for a practioner who needed to apply. 
English statutes or the common law and principles of equity in 
1911 was that Africans were largely excluded from the banking 
business and as such he was unlikely to encounter a conflict of 
laws situation. 
As far as the situation before the reception statutues 
were promulgated was concerned, W. Forsyth's assertion that "an 
English man takes the common law with him to places acquired by 
treaty or grant, but that when the crown has once granted a 
legislature to a conquered or ceded colony, it cannot 
afterwards exercise with respect to such a colony its former 
powers of legislation"; seems to be generally accepted. 24 
Even without the problem of the terminology of reception 
statutes, the question of sorting out which English laws or 
22.3-ee-C-F-abi Jana V The King, 12 East African C. A. 96. 
23. See e. g. Rex V. Fabiano Kinene 8 E. A. C. A. 96. (Uganda 
1941). See also R. V. Matengula L175IT5 N. R. L. R. 148. 
? 4j, W. 
S 
Ffor3p Cases and Opinion on Constitutional Laws and ythj a ou . ts of English - Jurisprudence (London: Stevens a-n7 
Hayes, 18b9) P'. 1b. 
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statutes applied in Rhodesia and Nyasaland would still be a 
difficult one. This is because as far as banking is concerned 
there was never in England a single -specific or consolidated 
legislation addressed to it before 1979.25 There were instead, 
numerous statutory enactments and provisions which had a 
bearing on the subject such as the Bank Charter Act, 1844. The 
Stamp Act, 1853 26 was the first statute to introduce the word 
"banker" in relation to instruments not drawn payable to bearer 
on demand. As far as the credit relations between the banker 
and his customer were concerned, the relevant, Act was the 
Debtor's Act 1869. Other aspects came under the provisions of 
the Crossed Cheques Act, 1876, the Banker's Books Evidence Act, 
1879 and the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882., The-Revenue Act, 1883 
and the Moneylenzke-iý-e--*. Actj 1900 were also relevant in 
considerations about whether a given entity or per I son was a 
bank or not. 
Other statutes that applied to Banks in England before 
1911 were the Draft on Banker's Act, 1856 
27, the Bills of Sale 
Actq 1878 28, the Infant Relief Act, 1885, the Partnership Act, 
1890 and the various companies acts that were enacted. In 
addition, banks were subjected to the common law principles of 
25. This changed with the enactment of the Banking Actq 1979. 
C. 37. This Act established a two-tier system, dividing deposit 
taking institutions into recognised banks and licensed deposit- 
takers, and set out broad principles for the authorisation and 
continuing supervision of both groups by the Bank of England. 
See R. M. Pechioli op. cit. P. 23. 
26. Re-enacted in 1891. See Maurice Megrah and F. R. Ryder, 
Paget's Law 
- 
of Banking (London: Butterworths, 1966)P. 1 
Z/. Re-enacteFTH 1858. 
28. Re-enacted in 1882. 
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bailment, contract, agency, negligence and doctrines of equity. 
As stated earlier, it is not clear whether all the 
statutes outlined in the proceding paragraphs were statutes of 
"general application" or not. Consequently it is not possible 
to determine whether all of them or just a few of them applied 
in Northern Rhodesia. Even after 1911 no specific legislation 
on the subject of banking appears to have been enacted. The 
reason for this could have been that, only two branches, 
belonging to the Standard Bank and Barclays Bank respectively, 
operated in the territory. As such there was not enough 
pressure to compell the authorities to enact legislation to 
control their operations. Even after federation with Southern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland administrative control by the parent 
offices in South Africa and London seems to have been viewed as 
sufficient. In terms of licensing, because the branches 
involved were not companies in their own right, it seems that 
simple methods of administrative approval were used instead of 
incorporation. 29 The only requirement seems to have been that 
new branches had to comply with the provisions of the Business 
Names Registration Ordinance of each territory. 30 While most 
of the branches appointed local boards of directors, these 
acted mainly as advisors and did not effect the day-to-day 
29. bee James A. Henry SixtY Years North of the Limp o (Salisbury: The Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Company, 
1953) 
30. In the case of Northern Rhodesia. This was No. 29 of 1931, 
revised by No. 5 13 of 1932,2 of 1938.19 of 19509 19 of 1954 
and 24 of 1955. See also government Notices 279 of 1964 and 497 
of 1964. 
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operations of the branches. 31 Local managers maintained direct 
relations with their immediate regional supervisors and the 
main ones in London. Thus, although these local managers had 
some discretionary delegated authority, it was only to a point. 
Their authority applied, for example, to matters of advances, 
staff appointments and administrative expenditure. On matters 
of general policy, such as investments in local registered 
stock and changes in interest rates paid on deposits or charged 
on advances, local managers sought the guidance of head office 
managers, albeit with recommendations of their own in some 
cases. 
By virtue of operating on the same ground, guided by the 
same principles and objectives such as observing sound banking 
practices and achieving profitability, the various head offices 
of the banks operating in Rhodesia and Nyasaland provided 
remarkably uniform guidelines. They were helped in this by the 
fact that their employees were members of the same settler 
group with identical attitudes and training, sharing the same 
social amenities and dealing with the same customers or 
customers who shared similar needs. Other sources of uniformity 
were--created by the existence-of a detailed agreement amongst 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland's banks which harmonised their charges 
31. R. A. Sowelem, Towards Financial Independence in a 
Developing Economy (London: George Allen and unwin Ltd. --ITOT 
P. 0 
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and therefore prevented run-away price competitionl- from 
arising. The co-ordination and administration of inter-bank 
arrangements by one of the banks, vis, _ the Standard Bank, also 
offered another source of order. 
3: 3 Registration and Commencement Requirements After 1956 
The seemingly ýdequate arrangements outlined above were 
not without short comings. In his report, Mr Mynors - an 
official of the Bank of England who had been invited in 1948 to 
investigate the suitability of a central bank in Southern 
Rhodesia, referred to some of the anomalies presented by the 
situation which existed then. 32 The report which was relevant 
to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland by virtue of the connections 
which their banks had with those of Southern Rhodesia, and by 
reason of the approaching federation of the three territories, 
recommended that "consideration should be given to the taking 
of statutory powers to licence banks operating in Southern 
Rhodesia". The author further advised that such licencing 
measures would ensure that new comers were not able to open 
business without first satisfying the government that they were 
likely to be adequately capitalised and soundly conducted. 
Although the report did not expressly say so, it implied that 
statutory measures would also achieve the desired regulation of 
32. The Report of H. C. B. Mynors, entitled "Southern Rhodesia 
Report on the Question of a Central Bank" was unpublished; See 
R. A. Sowelem op. cit. P. 31. 
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the use of the word "bank" itself. Such regulation would ensure 
the continuation of an aura of respectability and trust that 
banks ought to maintain. 33 It would also be in line with the 
prevailing notion that a degree of control over banks was 
necessary to achieve control over the economic destiny and 
activity of the country. 34 Mr. Mynors did not however, think 
that a central bank was needed to achieve these goals, -although 
the Federal Government in deciding to establish one attributed 
this to him. 35 
3: 3: 1 The Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Act, 1956 
The Central Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was 
established by a Federal Act of parliament in 1956.36 Its 
establishment provided a more comprehensive, mechanism of 
regulation as opposed to the, hitherto. informal, system provided 
by the rather distant, regio'nal and head, offices. Under section 
22 of the Act the establishment of banksjýýother, than the four 
33. Margaret Rogers and A. N. Allot, supra note - 
10 P. 3. Mr 
Mynors' recommendations could also not have been for, f rom 
the official colonial attitude which sought, in the long run, 
to protect unsophisticated colonial people who might lalt. -er 
have business deal 
-s 
with banks. 
- 
These people might have 
wrongfully believed that they were depositing their money in banks when the repositories were not banks at all. 
34. See commission on Money ýand Creditt The Commercial Banking 
Industry (Eaglewood Cliffs N. J.: Prentic(iHaIl Inc., 1962) P. 6. ý 
9-ee also R. A. Sowelem op. cit. PP. 30-46. 
35. Federal Assembly Debates, July 1959 Col. 2152-3. 
36. No. 2 of 1956. 
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commercial banks which were already in operatiorf at the time, 
37 
became subject to prior permission by the Federal -Minister of 
Finance and to any conditions that he might have imposed. The 
Act defined a bank widely as "any person or institution which 
carried on a business of which any' part consisted- of the 
acceptance of deposits of money withdrawable on demand or on a 
fixed or determinable date". Building , societies, Land and 
Agricultural banks, post office savings banks and local 
authorities were howeverl exempted from this definition , and 
from the provisions of the Act. 
The Act assigned responsibility for regulating the 
monetary system to the bank. The bank became the sole issuing 
authority of legal tender. It fixed and announced the minimum 
rates of discount and rediscount. 38 The external value of the 
currency was however, determined by the Govemec-General of the 
Federation. 39 For the purpose of controlling the banking 
system, the bank was equipped with a wide, variety of powers. 
Under Section 23 of the Act, every commercial bank-was required 
to maintain with it a minimum cash reserve balance against its 
37. See Chapter Two. 
38. Section 9 under section 10 bills of exchange or promisory 
notes eligible for discount at the central bank were to have a 
maximum maturity of four months if drawn for commercial 
purposes, or six months if drawn for agricultural purposes. . 
39. R. A. Sowelem op. cit. 
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demand and time liabilities to the public in the Federation. 
The actual volume of these required reserves was to. -be 
calculated in respect of each bank on the twenty first day of 
each month. In terms of criteria, the calculations were based 
on the liabilities of each bank at the end of the proceding 
month. The Act also empowered the bank to vary the minimum cash 
reserve requirements between 6 and 25 per cent of demand 
liabilities and 3 and 10 per cent of time liabilities, subject 
to the provision of reasonable notice to the commercial banks 
before the coming into effect of such variations. 40 Under the 
Act, demand liabilities were defined as those which were 
payable within thirty-days, while time liabilities were defined 
as those made payable or subject to not less than thirty days 
notice. 
The Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Act was amended 'in 
1959.41 Under the amendment, demand deposit subject to -the 
cash reserve requirements became a net of deposits. secured, by a 
pledge of securities issued by the Government of the Federation 
or of any territory which had a final maturity date of not more 
than twelve months. The amendment also empowered the bank to 
vary the minimum liquidity ratio of 25 per cent which 
commercial banks were required to maintain under the old 
40. Section 24. 
41. By the Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Amendment) Act, 
Federal Act No. 24 of 1959 which came into effect on July 1, 
1960. 
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provision. The Bank however, could not increase such ratio 
without the permission of the Minister. Rather curiously, no 
specific limit was imposed. A variation lower than 25 per cent 
was however prohibited unless the bank satisfied the Minister 
that it would be in the public interest to do so. Under such a 
circumstance, the Minister was empowered to fix a lower per 
centage, to be effective for such a period as he specified. 
Finally under section 6 of the amendment the bank was 
authorised, if it thought it necessary in the public interest, 
to request information from banks. It could also make 
recommendations to them, and pursuant to the permission of the 
Minister, issue directions to any banker for the purposes of 
securing compliance with such request or recommendation. This 
exercise of power by the bank was also limited by the proviso 
that the making of such requests or recommendations was not to 
be in respect of the affairs of any particular customer. It was 
also required that before issuing directives to any bankert 
such banker was to be given an opportunity to make 
representations to the Minister. Stiff penalties were provided 
for under the Act in the case of non compliqnce with its 
provisions. 
3: 3: 2 The Banking Act, 1959 
I 
The placing of provisions laying down procedures and 
requirements relating to the registration of banks in 'the 
statute of the central bank was viewed with some misgivings. On 
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the one hand it was felt that it deprived the politicians and 
the government of any power over the functions of commercial 
banks. On the other, it was considered that the requirement to 
have ministerial approval in connection with registration and 
other regulations governing banks could be used for political 
ends and was onerous and impracticable. 42 Accordingly a 
separate but more specific and detailed Act known as the 
Banking Act, 1959 43 was enacted. It required the Minister to 
appoint a Registrar of banks and financial institutions who 
would administer the Act's registration provisions and fulfil 
certain other responsibilities specified in the Act. With 
regard to registration itself, the Act required any persons 
engaged in the business of banking in the federation to 
register in one of four classes of institutions; that is; as a 
commercial bank, acceptance house, discount house or financial 
institution. Following this categorisation, the Act defined 
banking business as being one: 
42. For instance, refering to section 22 of the Bank 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland Act during debate on the Banking Bill, 
the Minister of Finance argued that it gave him wide powers to 
impose conditions on any institution which accepted deposits 
from the general public, These conditions, he pointed out, 
could not be followed up to see if they were fulfilled. See 
Federal Assembly Debates, July 27,1959. Col. 2146-7. 
43. No. 23 of 1959. 
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"of accepting deposits of money withdrawable or 
repayable on demand or after a fixed period or 
after notice and the employment of those deposits,, 
in whole or in part, by lending or any other means 
for the account and at the risk-of the person 
accepting such deposits. " 
A person was deemed to be accepting deposiis'not 
withstanding that he accepted desposits which were limited to 
fixed amounts or that certificates or oiher' 
'ins trume'nts' were 
issued in respect of those deposits. As with the central bank's 
statute the acceptance of money by building societies, co- 
operatives, land and agricultural banks, local authorities and 
post-office savings banks- was exempted from the provisions., of 
this Act. Also exempted was the acceptance of money,. against 
debentures. I 
Eight institutions which were in operation at the time 
of the Act's enactment were obliged to register immediately 
upon its coming into force. These included the five commercial 
banks; two acceptance houses 44 and one discount house. 45 
There was also provision for other institutions to apply for 
registration within a specified period. In the exercise of, his 
powers the Registrar was required to, satify himself that 
applicants complied-with the legal provisions relating to their', 
business. These included, in-. the case of a registered bank 
whose head office was situated outside the federation, a 
requirement to maintain a'local capital and unimpaired reserve 
44. The Merchant Bank of Central Africa, and The Rhodesian 
Acceptances. 
45. The Discount Company of Rhodesia. 
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funds not exceeding E250,000. In that of a registered bank or 
acceptance house whose head office was situated within the 
Federation, the requirement was to maintain a paid up capital 
and unimpaired reserve funds amounting to no less than 
L250,000. The Registrar's powers on these matters were however, 
discretionary and were never exercised during the period under 
discussion. Furthermore, in the case of the latter requirement, 
it only applied to acceptance houses, as all the commercial 
banks operating in the Federation were merely branches of 
foreign banks. The other powers of the Registrar were that in 
the case of applicants whose head offices were situated outside 
the Federation or more than half in nominal value of whose 
equity share capital was held directly or indirectly by persons 
outside the federation, he would, subject to -the approval, of 
the Minister, reject their applications if he was of the 
opinion that it was in the- public interest to do so. With 
respect to any person already registered the Registrar was also 
empowered to cancel the registration if that person contravened 
any of the existing regulations or misrepresented the 
facilities which he offered to the public. Registration could 
also be cancelled if any registered person engaged in 
undesirable methods of conducting business. 46 
For the purposes of enabling the Registrar to perform 
46. See footnotes 62 below for observations. 
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his duties, the Act required registered institutionsIto submit 
a number of returns showing their assets and facilities 
regularly on prescribed forms. Additional documents or 
information deemed relevant could also be demanded by the 
Registrar and registered institutions were obliged to furnish 
them. The Registrar was also empowered, subject to the approval 
of the Minister, to appoint inspectors to investigate the 
affairs of any registered institution. Before or during any 
such investigation, the Minister could require the institution 
concerned to deposit with the Registrar such approved 
securities as the Minister deemed sufficient to meet the 
liabilities of the institution. 
The Act also specified a number of transactions which 
registered banks and institutions were forbidden to undertake. 
These included a stipulation that no registered bank 
- or 
institution was to purchase shares in its own banking business 
or make any loans or advances on the security of such shares. 
Obviously the underlying philosophy behind this provision was 
to prevent any diminishment in the level of a bank's capital 
that might have jeopardised the interests of its shareholders 
and customers. But nowadays with extra forms of security, 
including reserves and insurance a provision like this may no 
longer be relevant . But even at that time, it was something 
of a duplication as the Companies Ordinance already delt with 
it. 
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purposes of conducting their business or providing housing 
amenities for their staff. This again was aimed at preventing 
risks as land speculation was risky ana could tie down a bank's 
resources to the detriment of its customers. Under today's 
highly profitable real estate business and more predictable 
housing prices, it may be unrealistic to prevent banks from 
engaging in this socially desirable function of providing 
housing. However, even then the Act provided that the securing 
of debts on immovable property and, in the event of default in 
payment, the holding of such immovable property until 
realisation at a suitable time, was permissible. 
Finally, other notable aspects included the provision 
that only commercial banks or acceptance houses were allowed to 
accept deposits of money withdrawable by cheýue, draft or order 
payable on demand. An amendment to the Act stipulated that 
except with the consent of the Minister of Finance, no 
registered institution. other than a, bank, acceptance or 
discount house was permitted to accept deposits of money 
withdrawable on notice of. less than seven days. 48 
48. Banking (Amendment) Act, 1961. Section 4. 
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3: 3: 3 Other Legislative Regulations 
3: 3: 3(a) The Southern Rhodesia Currency Board 
There were a few other enactments which had to be taken 
note of or complied with by banks before independence. The most 
significant was that controlling the issuance, treatment and 
employment in various ways of currency. Before 1938, the banks 
were free to issue their own notes. They also dealt in English 
and South African money. Between 1938 and 1954 the issuing of 
currency was a responsibility of the Southern Rhodesia Currency 
Board. Established under the provisions of the Southern 
Rhodesia Coinage and Currency Actv 49 the board's 
responsibilities were extended to both Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland by a monetary agreement of the three governments. 
Although it was not a monetary authority in the conventional 
sense, i. e. in the sense- of a central bank with statutory 
powers to regulate the monetary and fiscal operations of 
financial intermediaries, the board was empowered by the Act to 
be the sole supplier of Southern Rhodesia legal tender. This 
power obliged the commercial banks to look to it alone for all 
their currency requirements. On March 12,1954 the board became 
--a federal institution following the izreation of the rederation 
and its title was changed so that it became the Central African 
Currency Board. 
49. Southern Rhodesia Act 32,1938. 
, 
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3: 3: 3(b) The Constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland 
The other form of regulation emanated from the 
constitution of the rederation itself under Article 19, for 
instance, the Federal Parliament was given exclusive 
responsibility for, among other things, coinage, currency and 
legal tender. It was also responsible altimately for the 
control of banks and banking, other than land - banks. , The 
passing of the Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Act, which has 
already been referred to in 3: 3: 1 above constituted an example 
of the exercise of that control. 
3: 3: 3(c) The Bank of Northern Rhodesia Ordinance 
The Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Act was superSeded in 
1963 by the Bank of Northern Rhodesia Ordinance. 
50 That 
ordinance created a separate central bank for Northern Rhodesia 
following the dissolution of the Federation. The decision to 
set up a separate Central Bank in the territory was based on 
the expert advir-e of a senior Bank of England official who was 
invited to advise the territorial government on monetary 
control after rederation. 
51 The details of the officiaVs 
report are unavailable, but it was revealed in ,- 
50. No. 24 of 1964. 
51. See Mr Wina, Minister of Finance in Northern Rhodesiav 
Hansard No. 3,9th July to 27th August 1964 PP. 111-127. 
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Parliament that the report recommended the setting up of a 
Central Bank in the territory to issue currency and perform all 
the other functions of a central bank. - 
3: 4 Regulation of Banks After Independence 
3: 4: 1 The Bank of Zambia Act, 1964 
Following the attainment of independence, the Bank of 
Zambia replaced the Bank of Northern Rhodesia in accordance 
with the provisions of the Bank of Zambia Act. 
52 The Act, 
however, merely incorporated new Zambian terms and 
denominations while the basic content of its provisions 
remained the same as those of the repealed Act. 
3: 4: 2 The Banking Act, 1965 
The Banking Act, 1959 was repealed by the Banking Act, 
1965 53 following the attainment of independence. But' apart 
from incorporating a few new Zambian terms, denominations and 
requirements, this new Act retained virtually all of the 
outgoing Act's provisions. Some of the new requirements were 
that no person other than a company was to be registered as a 
bank 
-in 
Zambia. In addition, any person registered as a bank 
was required to maintain a principal administrative office in 
Zambia and to appoint a chief executive officer. 
52. No. 37 of 1964. 
53. No. No. 1 of 1965. 
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A few new restrictions were imposed to curtail 
interference by foreign based head offices involving the 
change of names, business or memorandd of association of their 
Zambian branches without the consent of the Registrar. Neither 
could such head offices amalgamate nor transfer local branches 
without the approval of the Minister. This was politically 
important as some removals could leave some important electoral 
areas without banking facilities. Banks whose head offices were 
situated in Zambia were required to maintain a paid up equity 
capital and unimpaired reserve funds amounting to not less than 
K300,000. Those whose head offices were situated outside the 
country, on the other hand, had to maintain capital and 
unimpaired reserve funds determined at the discretion of the 
-Registrar but not exceeding K500,000.54 Provisions relating to 
the maintainance of minimum specified liquid assets and the 
submission of statements and limitation of the scope of 
business transactions were similarly included. 
3: 4: 3 The Banking Act, 1971 
In 1971, following the failure by the government to 
implement its previous year's reforms of the financial sector, 
a new banking Act 55 was enacted. The Act 's principal 
provisions have already been refercek to in chapter one and they 
include the following: 
54. Section 18. 
55. The Banking Act, 1971, No. 43 of 1971. ' 
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(i) No person shall carry on banking or 'financial business 
unless he is locally incorporated and registered. 
(ii) No bank shall remain registered unless at least half of 
its directors are citizens of Zambia or established residents. 
(iii) Any commercial bank can carry on the business of merchant 
banking. 
(iv) Every bank in which the government holds all or some of 
the shares is required to maintain a paid up equity capital 
amounting to not less than K500,000. 
(v) Every bank without government participation is required to 
maintain a paid up equity capital amounting to not less than K2 
million. 
To command public confidence and facilitate recovery in 
the event of a winding up or insolvency_ all financial 
institutions, including banksl are required to maintain, in 
addition to equity, specified reserve funds. 56 These reserves 
may amount to either 20 per cent or 50 per cent of a bank's 
equity capital depending on the size of its paid up equity 
capital. -57-- 
The other important provisions of the Act are that: 
56. These are prescrib-eTly the Bank of Zambia under Sectio (1)(b) of the Bank of Zambia Act, 1985. 
57. Section 19(a) and (b). 
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(i) if the Registrar is not satisfied by an applicant' for 
registration, he shall by notice sent by registered post inform 
the applicant that he proposes to reject the application, and of 
his reasons for doing so. 
58 
(ii) Where more than half in nominal value of the equity share 
capital is held directly or indirectly by persons outside 
Zambia, and where the registrar is of the opinion that it would 
not be in the public interest to approve the application, he 
shall, with the approval of the Minister, reject the 
application, and shall by notice sent by Registered post inform 
the applicant. 59 
(iii) Where registration is obtained by fraud or mistake or 
where a bank has, after notice from the Registrar, contravened 
any provision of the Acto or that of the Bank of Zambia Act and 
or is engaging in undesirable methods of conducting business, 
the Registrar shall by notice inform that bank that he proposes 
to cancel its registration. 60 
The only check on the Registrar's discretion is that his 
actions are subject to review provided the applicant lodges a 
complaint within a stipulated number of-days. 
61 The--reviewing 
authority is the Minister and his determination is-final. Here 
58. Section 5(3). 
59. Section 5(4). 
60. Section 6. 
61. Section 7. 
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it can be observed that there may be occasions for judi'cial' 
contestation. Such occasions as where a malicious and 
unjustified campaign may lead to ZL cancellation or its 
confirmation can surely not be barred from judicial eyes. 
However, without engaging in too much detail, one might hasten 
to add that on a similar provision in a Nigerian Banking 
Ordinance, a court ruled that the right to appeal or a mere 
possession of a licence as a bank, are not civil rights. 
62 In 
other words where the Registrar and later on the Minister, 
follow a proper procedure a suffering banker can not afterwards 
go to court and claim that his civil rights within the terms of 
the constitution have been infringed. He can only do so if some 
other kind of injustice has been inflicted. 
Other general provisions of the Act stipulate the terms 
of operation of banks and financial institutions. 63 These are 
that every bank must maintain a principal office and appoint a 
chief executive officer and chief accounting officer. Every 
bank is required to display its name and statement of its 
registration as a bank. Such name may not be altered without 
the consent of the Registrar. Except with 'the consent of the 
Minister no person other than a bank shall use the term "bank" 
in its name or title. No alterations to the memorandum of 
association or other const. itution of a bank's business may be 
62. See MerchantsBank Ltd V. Federal Minister of Finance (1961) 
All. N. t. R. 559. 
63. See Sections 11,12,13,14,15,16 and 17. 
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undertaken without the consent of the Registrar. Similarly no 
amalgamations or transfers of business may be undertaken in the 
absence of a written approval by the Minister. 
With regard to other financial requirements, the Act 
stipulates that every bank shall maintain a minimum amount of 
liquid assets prescribed by the Bank of Zambia Act. 64 The 
Registrar is required to specify the method of valuating such 
minimum liquid assets. The Act proceeds to describe - what 
amounts to liabilities to - -the public as well as what 
constitutes liquid assets. In terms of Section 21 (2) (b) 
liabilities to the public shall not include liabilities to an 
equity shareholder of a bank who resides outside Zambia. Those 
liabilities do not also include a bank's acceptance liabilities 
or liabilities which are incurred in the business of merchant 
banking. Liquid assets on the other hand are comprised of all 
or any of the following: 6-5- 
(a) Gold coin or bullion 
(b) notes and coin which are current legal tender 
(c) balances at the Bank of Zambia including minimum reserve 
balances 
(d) money at call with any other bank 
64. Formerly section 29 of Bank of Zambia Actp CAP 699 - now Section 42 of Bank of Zambia Actf 1985. 
65. Section 21(3). 
-112- 
(e) treasury bills issued by the Government 
(f) bills of exchange and promisory notes eligible for discount 
at the Bank of Zambia 
(g) local registered securities issued or guaranteed- by the 
Government which have a final maturity date, of not more than 
six years and such other*securities as the minister'may approve 
(h) items in transit between banks, between branches of banks 
and between branches and head offices of banks; 
(i) such other assets as the Minister may from time to time 
approve. 
No- portion of the assets constituting the liquidity 
assets which a bank is required to hold under the minimum ratio 
provision may be pledged or otherwise encumbered except with 
the approval of the Registrar. Failure to maintain minimum 
liquid assets as specified by the Act at the end`oE each 
business day is punishable by a fine of four hundred Kwacha in 
a court of competent jurisdiction, 
Other provisions are that only banks may advertise or 
solicit deposits of money from the general public. And as in 
the other statutes already referred to, no bank or financial 
institution may purchase ýany of its own shares or make loans or 
advances on the security of such shares. This again is a 
duplication as the Companies Act already prohibits such 
matters. Banks are simiarly prohibited from engaging in the 
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wholesale or retail trade, including the import or export 
trade, except where these services are undertaken as part of 
satisfying a debt due to the bank concerned. Indeed even then, 
such services may be undertaken only for so long as is 
necessary. As will be seen in chapter six, this provision 
introduces a* restriction which may be unnecessary in modern 
times as banks elsewhere are free to participate in their 
customer&'- businesses both as shareholders and managers. 
I Banks in Zambia are also not allowed to purchase, 
acquire or take on lease or hold immovable property as an 
investment or by way of trade. There are however some 
exceptions to this last provision. These are that where the 
immovable property is acquired or held as security for a debt, ' 
this is completely legitimate. Similarly, it is legitimate-for 
a bank to hold or acquire. immovable property as a result of a 
default of repayment of a debt for which it is permitted to 
sell the property as soon as possible. A bank-may also let any, 
immovable property or part of it, for purposes of conducting its 
business. It may also hold immovable property for the purposes 
of providing housing or amenities for its -staff. As said 
--earlier 
in these--days -of- rising 
- property prices it is in fact 
doubtful whether there is any wisdom in putting restrictions 
on banks to invest in immovable property. 
Every bank is required to prepare and submit in a 
prescribed manner a number of statements. These include 
statements of its assets and liabilities to the public, liquid 
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assets held as part of the minimum liquidity requirements, 
balance sheets and profit and loss accoun ts certif ied by an 
auditor. The existence of this latter provision helps seal off 
the loophole left by the silence of the Companies Act on these 
matters. 66 In addition, the Act provides that, where a bank 
wilfully fails to comply with the provisions of the Act the 
Registrar may require it to do so. Furthermore, the Registrar 
may carry out investigations into the affairs of any bank 
whenever and as he sees it necessary to do so. Alternatively, 
an inspector or inspectors may be appointed by the Registrar, 
with the approval- of the Minister, to carry out such 
investigations. 67 When carrying out the investigations, the 
investigators enjoy the same powers, rights and privileges as 
those conferred upon a commissioner by the Inquiries Act. 
68 
For this reason the mode of holding an inquiry which is 
specified under that Act shall apply. At the end of any 
investigation, the investigators are required to supply the 
Minister with a report. The Minister may recover the cost of 
the investigation from the bank concerned. The Minister may 
require erring banks to rectify their errors. He may also 
instruct the Registrar to cancel the registration of the bank 
and to notify the bank in writing of such cancellation 
including the reasons therefore. 
66. See chapter one P. 29. 
67. Section 36. 
68. CAP 181. 
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The Minister has also got powers to require every bank 
to deposit with the Registrar such approved securities as he 
may deem sufficient to meet its liabilities to the public 
before or during the course of an investigation or during 
cancellation. 
Finally, the Act requires all banks to enga-ge' the 
services of an auditor who shall be approved by the Registrar. 
It also specifies a number of characteristics which may 
disqualify any person from becoming a director' of a bank. The 
Act also specifies a number of penalties for failure to comply 
with the provisions of the*Act or making false statements. The 
Registrar is required to submit a report to the Minister on the 
operations of all the banks within six months from the first of 
January each year. 
3: 4: 4 The Bank of Zambia (Amendment) Act, 1971 
This Act was enacted to incorporate some of the policy 
changes that were initiated following the failed'attempt to 
take over the financial sector in 1970. The Act amended the 
Bank of Zambia Act, 1964' to provide that the granting of 
acceptance facilities -could 
be undertaken by all registered 
commercial banks. This decision was based on the notion that 
Zambia's stage of development was such that it did not justify 
I 
the existence of a separate acceptance house. 69 
69. See Mr. Chona (Vice-President), The Bank ot Ma-mFia (Amendment) Bill 1971; Na tio nal Assembly Debates 26th November, 
1971. P. 195. 
-116- 
3: 4: 5 The Bank of Zambia Act, 1985 70 
This Act replaced the Bank of Zambia Act, 1964 and by 
implication the amendment of 1971. It also replaced the 
Currency Act 71 which was enacted after ind 
. 
ependence to cater 
for the administration of currency in the country. 
This Act is a consequence of the grave economic hardship 
that have beset the country during the present period. 
72 Its 
enactment was aimed mostly at improving the country's balance 
of payments situation. It was also aimed at liberalising the 
control of credit and money supply so as to provoke a more 
dynamic investment in production. This concern with the 
country's economic crisis has made itself more evident in the 
area of monetary management. Thus, for the first time in the 
country's history, an Act of Parliament has required that the 
Governor of the Bank and. his deputy must possess recognised 
professional qualifications and experience in . 
financial 
matters. It is also for the purpose of enabling the 'Bank to 
possess enough latitude in the management of the monetary 
system that the Act leaves the exercise of many of the Bank's 
powers to discretion. The Act, for instanceg provides from time 
to time that the Bank may act. in.. -one way or another. without 
necessarily having to consult any other authority for approval. 
70. No. 24 of 1985. 
71. CAP 598. 
72. See L. J. Mwananshiku (Minister of Finance and National 
Commission for Development Planning) Daily Debates No. 697,10th 
December 1985 P. 384. 
73. See e. g. Sections 42,43,44, (2) and 45 etc, (emphasis 
added). 
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One of the Act's major innovations is the Introduction 
of a Credit Guarantee Scheme to be administered by the bank. 
The aim of the scheme is to provide -protection to financial 
institutions and banks against -losses incurred by them when 
providing loans or making, advances 'to small enterprises'. 
Hitherto banks and. other financial institutions have' been 
reluctant to give loans freely to small enýerprises because of 
the high risks involved. In most cases these enterprises are 
not managed by properly qualified-- persons and they are often 
unable to, provide the necessary securities as they lack fixed 
properties and other traditional securities. Their ability, tO 
pledge products ahead of actual production is unfortunately 
diminished by the absence of-any guaranteed access to markets.,, 
The Act provides that the Bank of Zambia may operate the 
scheme and it may establish for that purpose a fund. Financial 
institutions claiming benefits under the scheme are however, 
required to act in good faith in the making of their advances 
and subsequent claims. They are also required to act in 
accordance with prudent banking practice. For this reason they 
are expected to ensure that the projects they lend to are, in 
the first place, technically feasible and -economically viable. 
The Minister is entitled to impose conditions in relation to 
the operations of the scheme. 
Unlike the previous statutest the 1985 Act also 
authorises the bank to etet as banker for parastatal 
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organisations or any other person as the Minister may 
approve. 74 There is no justification 
for extending the bank's 
facilities to parastatals and individuals. The only explanation 
is that this provision is perhaps aimed at extracting bigger 
resources for financing the government's AeficittkO- is 
apparently the case. Those liabilities'can also be empl'oyed to 
alleviate the hardships experienced by vital industries'such as 
the Mining Companies and agricultural co-operatives in 
obtaining funds by lending out some of the excess funds. 
The Act has also made modifications to the exchange 
control regulations and the administration of interest rates. 
75 
Commercial banks can now fix both the deposit and lending rates 
in accordance with their liquidity levels. According to African 
76 the motivation for this change is the belief that by 
offering attractive returns on deposits, commercial banks will 
be able to contribute to the raising of the savings ratio to 
GDP in the domestic economy and by charging realistic rates to 
borrowers, they will improve the quality of private" investment 
as scarce resources will get channelled 'to the most deserving 
uses. To supplement these efforts the legislation encourages 
74. See e. g. Sections 4(2) (f) and 43(l). 
75. In fact the bank has. authorised banks to impose their own 
rates, so as to encourage competitive lending. See Bank of 
Zambia Quarterly Finance, and Statistical Review, Vol. 17 No. 3, 
September, 1985 P. 7. 
76. African (An International Business Economic -and Political 
Monthly) Published by African Journal. London No. 173 January, 
1986. 
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the central bank to set up a more attractive financial market 
in domestic economy to sell and buy treasury bills. 
Apart from the foregoing innovations, the Act contains 
the usual provisions specifying the functions of a central 
bank. The first parts deal with the establishment of the bank, 
its functions, capital, profits the general reserve fund and 
other funds. These are followed by the administration of the 
bank, its role as the sole issuer of currency and powers to 
manage the country's foreign exchange reserves, balance of 
payments, minimum liquidity ratios and reserve requirements. 
Then comes the bank's functions as supervisor of banks and 
financial institutions. The Act empowers the Bank to act as 
banker, fiscal agent and advisor to the government, including 
government boards and agences. The last parts deal with the 
Credit Guarantee Scheme, the bank's permitted and prohibited 
business activities and the bank's power to call for 
information from any person or financial institution as well as 
to appoint inspectors to carry out inspections of the accounts 
of financial institutions. Following every inspection the 
inspectors are required to make a written report to the 
Minister. Finally the Minister is authorised to issue further 
regulations by statutory instruments as and when appropriate. 
It can only be observed that by restricting the power of 
inspection to accounts only and not to establishing whether 
banks are complying with government objectives in maki-Igans 
the Bank of Zambia's regulatory authority is of very 
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limited value. The other inspections that may be instigated by 
the Registrar of banks have, as has been seen, no bearing on 
the subject of ensuring that loans are made with Government 
policies and objectives in mind. These latter inspections are 
largely concerned with ensuring that the provisions of the 
Banking Act relating to registration, capitalisation and other 
administrative requirements are complied with. Thus where a 
bank observes all these requirements and keeps its books in 
order, but witholds funds from those who would put it to 
productive use, there is absolutely nothing that can. be- done, 
except for the authorities to come upiwith the securities and 
guarantees that would satify that bank's security requirements 
before it can lend out money-to the most needy. In other words, 
the authorities, have no power to require that the bank must 
initiate steps to meet government objectives while ensuring 
that prudent banking is observed. 
3: 5 Other Legislative Enactments 
Aside from the foregoing enactments, there are a few 
other statutes whose provisions have a bearing on banking. Some 
of these enactments may in factv be British Acts which have 
been extended or applied to Zambia by virtue of the English Law 
(Extent of Application) Act 78 - and the British Acts Extension 
Act. 79 Under the former'Act, it is provided that: 
78. Chapter 4 of the Laws of Zambia. 
79. Chapter 5 of the Laws of Zambia cf. note 13 above. 
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"Subject to the provisions of the Zambia Independence 
order, 1964 and to any other-written law-- 
(a) the common law, and 
(b) the doctrines of equity; and 
(c) the statutes which were in force in England on the 
17th August, 1911 (Being the commencement of the 
Northern Rhodesia 'order-in-c'ouncil, 1911); and 
(d) any statutes of latter date than that mentioned in 
paragraph (c) in force in England, now applied to the 
Republic or which hereafter shall be applied there to by 
any Act or otherwise shall be in force in the 
Republic". 
The problems of identifying which statutes or principles 
of common law and equity applied have already'beenalluded to. 
However, with regard to the common law, it can only be said 
that it applies largely to the banker and, customer - relations 
and negotiable instruments. 
The British Acts Extension Act, on the other hand 
provides for the inclusion of Zambian terms in the place of 
British terms in specified British Acts which' it extends to 
Zambia. These statutes arýe: 
(1) The Conveyancing Act, 1 911, 
(2) The Forgery Act, 1913t 
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(3) The Industrial and Provident Societies (Amendment) Act, 
19130 
(4) The Larceny Act, 1916p 
(5) The Prevention of Corrupt Practices Act, 1916 
802 
(6) The Bills of Exchange (Time of Noting) Actq 1917, 
(7) The Married Women (Maintenance) Act, 19209 
(8) The Gaming Act, 1922, 
(9) The Industrial and Provident Societies (Amendment) Act, 
1928, 
(10) The Inheritence (Family Provision) Act, 1938, 
(11) The Limitations Actl 1939; and 
(12) The Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act, 1954. 
The other enactments which bankers may invoke or be 
required to observe include The Companies Act. 
81 This Act 
governs banks in their capacity as companies. It stipulates 
requirements relating to incorporation, management, 
80. Superceded by the Corrupt Pratices Act No. 14 of 19 0. 
81. CAP 686, with particular relevance to banking activities 
are section 89 - 105. See also In the Matter of the Companies 
Ordinance CAP 216 of The Laws of ZambiF-V-. Airtlex Limited, 
Selected Judgments of Zambia No. 4 of 1971 (1970 HK-1334) -a 
case involving the requirement to registrar documents creating 
interest or credit such as deeds or changes. The Judgment 
explains registration procedures and conditions involving 
secured and unsecured creditors. 
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capitalisation, operations and winding up of companies. It also 
provides for the registration of mortgages, ýcharges and 
enforcement of securities as well as -the rights of debenture 
holders, creditors and holders of floating charges. All these 
matters apply to the business of banking. But as will be seen, 
in chapter six, in the light of the Companies Act, many of the 
provisions in other statutes such as the Banking Act, the Bank 
of Zambia Act, the Agricultural Credits Act and The Trade 
Charges Act (The last two will be discussed below) are really a 
mere duplication of functions. 
The Registration, of Business Names Act 82 is another 
statute which banks may not ignore. It controls the choice and 
use of business names. In view of its existence, the inclusion 
of provisions affecting business names in the Banking Act, can 
also be treated as a duplication. Where personal properties 
such as life policies or accounts in the case of banks, are 
submitted as a form of lien or security for credit, the 
provisions of the Disposal of Uncollected Goods Act 83 may be 
invoked. The relevant provisions in the Act, are those 
requiring a Creditor who has not received satisfaction to 
refrain from exercising his right of lien for at least -si-x 
months. If the debtor persists in defaulting the creditor is 
82. CAP. 687. 
83. CAP 703 of the Laws of Zambia. 
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thereafter at liberty to exercise his rights under the lien in 
accordance with the procedures laid down inýthe Act. Similarly, 
the Debtors' Act 84 is relevant to banks. The most significant 
provision is section 10 which provides that: 
"Where the plaintiff in any action before the-high court 
or any subordinate court proves at any time before the 
final judgment by evidence on oath to the satisfaction 
of the court that he has good cause of action against 
the deýfendant to the amount of twenty kwacha or upwards, 
and that there is a probable cause for believing that 
the defendant is -about to quit Zambia unless he be 
apprehended, and that 
(a) the absence of the defendant from Zambia will 
materially prejudice the plaintiff in the prosecution of 
his action or in his obtaining satisfaction therein; or 
(b) the defendant has disposed of or removed out of 
Zambia his property or any part thereof and the 
execution of any judgment or order -will be thereby 
obstructed or delayed: 
such court may, in the prescribed manner, order such 
defendant to be arrested and imprisoned for a period not 
exceeding six months unless and until he has sooner 
given the prescribed security not exceeding the amount 
claimed in the action, that he will not leave Zambia 
without leave of the court". 
In view of the Mulungushi economic reforms which reduced 
the eligibility of foreigners to acquire loans, in Zambia, the 
significance of this provision is somewhat diminished. Its 
usefulness in respect of fraudulent Zambians is - howeýer', 
undiminished, although the -choice of going-- to court may, in 
some cases, be more costly than even the amount claimed. 
Another Act whiýh banks cannot avoid especially in 
dealing with securities is the_Stamp Act. 85 This Act deals 
84. CAP 664-- 
85. CAP 8ý of the Laws of Zambia. See Loto Petroleum 
Distributors V. Francesco Arduin. Supreme Court of Z-a-m=aj 
Appeal No. HP/839 of 1973. 
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with the payment of registration duty on instruments offered as 
security or mortgage. 86 Similarly, the Bankruptcy Act 87 may 
from time to time be invoked in relat-ion to the activities of 
banks. The Act covers the procedures and requirements to be 
observed in the event of insolvency. It defines the rights of 
bankers and other creditors, secured or not, and their 
successors in title in respect of a bankrupt debtor. It also 
outlines the banker's rights and obligations' with 'respect to 
payment by himself of a bankrupt's cheque before and after 
notice of the bankruptcy. 
The Cheques Act 88 also applies , tol., banking. It deals 
generally with the ordinary relations - of a, banker --and his 
customers, but with special reference to-the negligent payment 
of cheques. The Act. amends the common law rules, governing such 
payments. Originally a banker who negligently paid out an 
unendorsed or 'irregularly endorsed cheque was liable for 
conversion. 89 Under this Act, which is based on the English 
Cheques Act, 1957 no liability accrues to the banker who pays 
86. See e. g. Bank of Zambia V. Registrar of Lands, -and Deeds and 
The Stamp Duty Act CAP 664 of-the Laws of Zambia L1979J ZR 22. 
See also The Stamp Duty Commissioners V. The African Farmina 
Equipment -Company Limited, Selected Judgments olf-7-a-m-Fia No. 1Z) 
of 19b9 ýCivil Appeal No. 5 of 1968). _. 87. CAP 190. 
88. CAP 589. 
89. See Fine Art Society V Union Bank of . London, (1886) 17 G. B. D. 705, Gordon _VLondon City and Midland Bank L19021 IK. B. 
242 at 265. See also W. V. H., - Rogers, Winfield 
97nd Jolowicz on 
Tort (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1979) P. 450. 
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out such a cheque in good faith and in the ordinary' 'course of 
business. The Act also excludes from application: certain 
provisions of British Acts otherwise applicable in the country. 
These are section 17 of the Revenue Act, 1883, all provisions 
of the Bills of Exchange (Crossed Cheques) Act, 1906 and all 
provisions of the Bills of Exchange Act (1882) (amendment), 
Act, 1932.90 Finally, the provisions of the Evidence (Bankerts 
Books) Act 91 affects banks. That Act provides that, in any 
legal proceedings a copy of any entry in banker's books shall 
be received as prima facie evidence of such entry, and of the 
matters, transactions, and accounts therein recorded. 
The only other statutes that can be said to be remotely 
relevant to the business of banking' are those' statutes applying 
to all citizens and nationals of the countryv'such as-'the penal 
code. 92 
3: 6 Regulation of Securities and Lending 
There are in addition to the foregoing "legislative 
enactments a few others that apply specifically to the lending 
aspect, and in particular to the creation of securities; their 
registration or otherwise' administrafton ' and exchange. The 
significance of securities to a' bank "ha's already been 
illustrated in Chapter One and cannot be'doubted. Not all 
90. CAP 174. 
91. CAP 171. 
92. See e. g. --Anort -Sondoyi V The PeoEle (1977] ZR 148 and Attorney Generar' -V. Bank ot Zambia L19/1J ZR also cited in 
Zambanker, a Journal of the Ban-F-ZoT Zambia, Vol. 49 Dee; P. 121 
case was about negligent payment of a cheque belonging to 
the Ministry of Health to a fictitious person* 
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lending however, is secured. An advance may be granted - to a, 
reliable customer for an approved purpose for which the., 
customer has adequate experience and skill without security. 
Similarly if a project is sound a bank may lend to it without 
security. As Ruth Weiss asserts: 
"Contary to popular belief it is the project 'ýnd 'its 
viability which is of first importance. A man who brings 
along, say, insurance policies, a house unburdened by 
mortgage, a guarantee and an impossible scheme will have 
less chance of raising an overdraft than the man without 
security but a new and obviously splendid idea which 
will work. After all, the bank's future profits are, tied 
up with their customers fortunes. To simply liquidate a 
man's securities and take Wk a loan is bad business in 
the short and long term". 
On the whole howeverp the provision of security is an 
integral aspect of modern lending. There are many kinds of 
security that may be submitted to support a customer's 
application for a loan or advance. Some borrowers tender 
stocks, shares, title deeds, life insurance policiest, bills of 
exchange and promissory notes. Others offer guarantees made-by 
responsible and respectable parties. Customers- who-are less 
fortunate may have nothing better to offer than. second or even 
third mortgages, shares partly -paid upt undeveloped 
building 
lands, bills of sale, mortgages on mines, brickfields and other 
wasting properties and reversions. Bankers usually look askance 
at these latter kinds of securities since they lack one or 
other of the requisites necessary to make them attractive as 
93. Ruth Weiss, "Nationalisation" says UNIP: ' What Next for the 
Banks?, Enterprise Magazine, Decemberp 193 P. 33. 
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cover for -an advance 
94. Whatever class, of security- a-banker 
agrees to accept there are usually three ways in which he may 
avail himself- of it. These are as -a lien,, a pledge, or a 
mortgage. It is, not proposed to define-or describe these forms 
of security here as doing so would not add to the subject under 
discussion. It is nevertheless important to note that, -other 
kinds of terminology may be used, to describe and, denote them; 
such as charge, debenture, covenant or hypothecation, etc. ', It- 
is also important to note that the.: use of any kind - or form -of 
description depends upon whether the- security offered As a' 
personal and trading property or agricultural stocks and land. 
In Zambia in addition to the Companies Act, and the Bank of 
Zambia Act, other statutes which regulate securities are: 
3: 6: 1 The Agricultural Credits Act95 
This Act facilitates the borrowing of -money ., by- farmers 
using the security of charges created upon farming stocks and 
other agricultural assets. It also provides for the appointment 
of a Registrar of Agricultural charges and for the registration 
of all such charges. Agricultural charges under the Act are 
instruments in writing created by a farmer in favour of any 
person in respect of that person! s, money advanced to the farmer 
concerned. These charges may- consist -of ý all or, any -of the 
94. H. P. Sheldon and C. B. Drover The Practice and Law of Banking, (London: MacDonald and Evans, 1962) P. 336. 
95. CAP 349. 
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farming stocks or other agricultural assets -'belonging - to a 
farmer seeking credit. Farming stocks are defined as and 
include crops, horticultural products (whether growing or 
severed from the land and whether processed, manufactured, 
treated or not), and livestock such as poultry or bees. They 
also include the produce and progeny of such livestock. ' 
Similarly, seeds, manures, fertilizers, insecticides, oils, 
fuels, agricultural fixtures which a tenant is by law 
authorised to remove also fall under this definition. They can 
therefore be charged as security for advances or loans of 
money. 
I 
The Act divides agriculturaI charges into f ixed and 
f loating charges. Af ixed charge may be created - on -f arming 
stock and other agricultural assets including: 
(a) in the case of livestock, any progeny'thereof which may be 
born after the date of the charge; and 
(b) in the case of agricultural plant, any plant which may, 
whilst the charge is in force, be substituted for the plant 
specified in the charge. 96 
The parties to 'a fixed charge are free to agree on any 
terms they wish to observe. In addition the Act provides 
96. S. 3(3). 
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that the holder of a fixed charge may, on the happening of any 
specified event: 
(a) seize the property subject to the charge and take 
possession of it. 
(b) Sell such a property af ter an interval of five clear days 
or such less time as may have been agreed by the parties. 
In the absence of an agreement to sale by private 
treaty, the charge holder must dispose of the property by 
public auction. After the sale, the charge holder is required 
to apply the proceeds towards the discharge of the loan, 
including the costs incurred during seiZure and disposal of the 
property in question. The surplus moneys must be returned to 
the farmer. 
On the part of the farmer, subject to an agreement to 
the contrary, he is entitled to sell the property which is the 
object of the charge. He is however, required to pay to the 
holder of the charge such moneys as are required to discharge 
the loan. 97 ýi Although the farmer is under no obligation to 
insure his property, the parties can agree that where the 
property is insured any monies received under the policy of 
insurance may be applied to discharge the loan. 98 
97. S. 4 (2) 
98. S. 4 (2) 
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Where the insurer pays money under the policy directly to the 
holder of the charge such payment is a valid discharge Of the 
loan. 
The holder of a fixed charge enjoys priority over all 
the other creditors. According to Section 4(3) however: 
"Where any proceeds of ý sale which, in pursuance of' the 
obligations imposed by subsection (2), ought to be paid 
to the holder are paid to some other person, nothing in 
this Act shall confer on the holder a right to recover 
such proceeds from that other person unless the holder 
proves that such other person knew that such proceeds 
were paid to him in breach of such obligation, but such 
other person shall not be deemed to have such kno 4; edge 
by reason only that he has notice of the charge". 
With regard to the floating charge this is similar to a 
company debenture. 100 A floating charge however may only be 
created in favour of a bank otherwise it is null and void. Such 
a charge may be placed on farming stocks and other-agricultural 
assets but should not include tobacco; maize, potatoesq-, milk or 
vegatables, which are perishable products. 101 
In general a farmer who has granted a floating charge is 
under the same obligations as the one who has exe'cutedý a fixed 
charge. This means that he is obliged to pay over to the holder 
of the charge such proceeds of any sale of the'agricultural I 
99. S. 4 (3) 
100. i. e. a document which creates or acknowledges a debt. 
101. S. 3(4) 
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asset or compensation under a policy of insurance as are 
necessary to discharge the loan. Most significantly however, 
the floating charge may have the effect of a fixed charge under 
certain circumstances such as during the bankruptcy of the 
farmer or his death, the dissolution of the partnership in the 
case where the property charged is partnership property, and in 
cases where the parties haýe agreed that upon the happening of 
certain events, the holder may serve notice, the actual service 
of such notice. 102 
The farmer is only exempt from his obligations under a 
floating charge if he has applied the monies realised out of a 
sale or policy of insurance to purchase farming stocks. In such 
a situation, the newly acquired stocks immediately become 
subject to the charge. 103 Where a charge is executed over 
certain farming stocks, the farmer is obliged to give a written 
notice of this fact including the ranking of such charges in 
terms of priority, to all purchasers of those stocks. The 
stocks on which this is required are cattle, tobacco, milk, 
maize, agricultural vehicles, machinery or other plant. Receipt 
of the notice obliges the purchaser or the person effecting 
the sale on behalf of the farmer as the case may be to pay-the- 
proceeds of the sale to the holder of the charge to the amount 
specified in the notice. Such payment to the holder amounts to 
a complete discharge of the loan. 
102. S. 5. 
103. S. 5. 
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3: 6: 2 The Trade Charges Act 
Apart from farmers, many other groups of people and 
sectors require credit to establish or expand their existing 
businesses. These include traders or merchants engaged in 
commercial businesses. A well known method by which a trader 
can acquire credit is by offering his merchandise or other item 
related to his business or planned business as 'security., This 
security is normally referred to as a trade charge. In essence 
a trade charge is a trader's bill of sale. 
In Zambia, the creation and administration of trade 
charges by law only received new impetus in 1973 when the Trade 
Charges Act, 104 was enacted. This Act was enacted -purely to 
ameliorate the harshness of the Bills of Sale 'Acts which- were 
in f orce before its passage. A prelude to the 'Act 'was " the 
economic reforms of 1968. Following 'thýose reforms, ' "it"was 
anticipated that Zambians would take over the' businesses left 
by aliens or open up new ones on their'own. " As"'it turned 'out, 
this was easier said than done. Many' Zamblans were 'simply 
unable to provide acceptable forms O*f's , ýcurity-for the purposes 
of obtaining loans with whicht'io purchase' the businesses of 
outgoing expatriates or start new ones. The enactment of this 
legislation was in another sense, therefore m6ant*to alleviate 
that situation. 
104. NO. 49 of 1973 
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The object of the Act is thus to enable traders to 
obtain loans or advances from banks and other financial 
institutions by using their personal property'or stocks-in- 
trade as security for such loans. 
105 Accordingly, "'Section' '3 
provides that: 
"A trader can seek credit from a financial institution 
on the production of adequate proof of ownership of such' 
personal property and stock-in-trade as is being 
tendered as security. Upon such proof a 'financial 
institution or parastatal corporation may take a charge, 
of the stock-in-trade and personal property which the 
trader owns or of which he may subsequently become the 
owner, whether or not such property is in existence at 
the time of such delivery". 
A charge created in this manner can either be a fixed or 
floating charge. The Act also enhances the debtor's security by 
offering a further chance for him to assess the value or worth 
of the securities, including their freedom from overriding 
encumbrances. The Act however, omitted most of the requirement's 
of the Bills of Sale Act, such as the use of compulsory 
statutory forms and provision;; of inventories by the debtor. 
These were viewed as cumbersomerequirements in the light of the 
simplicity of some of the credit seekers. Therefore, in order 
to meet the main objective of creating conditions for increased 
credit facilities it was felt that-the Act'should'av-oid-onerous 
and expensive requirements for which expert assistance would 
have to be hired. 
105. Simbi - V. Mubako , "The Trade Charges Act", Zambra-Law Journal [1973] P. 163. 
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The Act also contains sanctions against default by 
borrowers. One of these relates to, the appointment of a 
Registrar of Trade Charges, whose res&nsibilities include the 
registration of all trade charges, specifying the various items 
upon which they are based. 106 The register is open for public 
inspection, thus offering advance notice to lenders against 
deception. 107 In other words, it is assumed that all lenders 
will inspect the register to ensure that the stocks-in-trade 
involved in their particular transactionshave not been offered 
to a previous lender before they part with their money. 
Under section 5(2) (a) creditor-' in'stitutions' are 
authorised to seize the goods covered under a charge after five 
clear days of default in payment by the trader. In the case of 
perishable goods however, creditors can assume possession 
immediately and disposal by sale may f ollow as soon as the 
following circumstances occur: 
M if the debtor becomes insolvent; 
(ii) when a receiving order in bankruptcy against the debtor is 
obtained; 
- . --(iii) where there is a dissolution of a partnership (i. e. where 
the debtor is a partnership or-member of a partnership); 
(iv) the death of the, traýer or person giving the security; 
(v) on default of any payment due on the money lent; and 
106. Section 4(2). 
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(vi) on the happening of any event as may be provided -in the 
charge. 
.-X, 
Before taking possession or disposing of the charged 
items creditors are required to give adequate notice of their 
intentions. 
One of the most remarkable provisions of the' Trade 
Charges Act is Section 5(3) which exempts the 'credit 
transactions created under the terms of the Act 'from , the 
requirements of Section 41 of the Bankruptcy Act. Without-such 
exemption the secured property would constitute a part of - the,, 
property of the bankrupt and may be dealt with to the detriment 
of the secured creditor if he has no preferred status. 108"It 
is not clear why the Trade Charges Act does not expressly state 
that the provisions of the Preferential Claims in Bankruptcy 
Acto 109 are not similarly exempted from applying to trade' 
charges. Under this latter Act, the wages-- or salaries of 
employees and taxes payable to the government are accorded a 
higher priority than any other claims on the estate-of the 
bankrupt. The implication of this provision is that trade 
charges under the Trade Charges Act occupy a secondary position 
vis-a-vis those creditors mentioned in the Preferential Claims 
in Bankruptcy Act. It also implies that even if they have 
108. See e. g. Mphanza P. Mvunga, "Zambia", in Neville RubiF-9 
and Eugene Cotran (editors), Annual Survey of African LaW, 
Volume VII - 1973 (Rex Collins, London 1977)t 185 at P. 199 
109. CAP 191. 
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concluded a private preferential claims covenant, with a, trader, 
holders of trade charges may still lag. behind_employees and the 
government in recovering their dues -from the estate of I 
the 
bankrupt. Clearly such a situation makes, trade charges 
, 
less 
attractive as incentives to increase credit in the, country. 
Perhaps exemption from the Preferential Claims in 
Bankruptcy Act should be implied as it is impossible to see how 
the government could have intended that its policy of, promoting 
trade charges as an inducement to lenders should be defeated by 
another piece of legislation,, particularly one related to the 
one under exemption. Without such implication,, the government's 
position becomes absurd as it was alert enough to ensure that 
funeral costs and other administrative costs are discharged 
first before employees' and government claims take. effect. 
The idea that the government intended to make trade 
charges an attractive form of security and perhaps one with 
priority over other claims is confirmed immediately after 
Section 5(3) by Section 5(4). This latter section provides that 
any trade charge created in accordance with the terms of the 
Act will enjoy priority over all other rights subsequently 
acquired in, on or over the property under charge. Sadly, this 
priority does not supersede the rights acquired in a property 
that happens to be stock-in-trade by a subsequent purchaser-for 
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value in good faith. 110 Why only stocks-in-trade are excluded 
from priority is not clear. It can only be speculated that it 
is aimed at avoiding conflict with an established legal 
precedence which gives a blanket cover toý transactions 
concluded under market overt As will be seen in chapter 
six the requirement for registration of trade charges becomes 
4 superfluous in view of these situations. 
The priority accorded to a holder of a trade charge may 
also be removed where such a party consents : in, writing to 
accord priority to another person who - obtains- rights in the 
property concerned afterwards. 112 In terms of remedies, the 
debtor is required to refrain from interfering with the right 
of possession of the creditor through fraud. The penalty for 
the offence on conviction is a fine or imprisonment, or 
- 
bo th. 
The trader is equally under obligation not , 
to, make false 
declarations which would otherwise materially affect the 
charge, and in particularg he should not fail to disclose to 
the person from whom credit is obtained the fact that the 
property, being offered as security has already been committed 
to another creditor. The penalty, for disobedience is a fine or 
a prison term of two years. with-hard labour or-bothi-114, - 
110. Section 5(4) (a) 
111. See e. g Bishoýs&ate Motor Finance Corporation Ltd V. 
Transport BrNes Ltd L1949J I. K. B. 322. 
112. Section 5(4) (b) 
113. Section 6 
114. Section 7 
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3: 6: 3 Land as Security 
It has already been stated that one of the forms of 
security which can be used to obtain credit 
I 
is land. Land is 
made available as security by way of mortgage. A mortgage is a 
conveyance of an interest in property supplying security for 
the repayment of a debt. 115 A mortgage transaction presents 
two essential features. The first is that the mortgagor or 
debtor undertakes to transfer proprietary rights in his land to 
the mortgagee. The mortgagee is accordingly proýided 'with some 
security to ensure the performance by the mortgagor of his 
obligation to repay the loan. The mortgagee also has a personal 
action against the mortgagor in default, in addition to a 
number of other rights over the security which he enjoys. 
With regard to the use of land as security in Zambia, 
the most relevant statutes are the Land (Conversion of Titles) 
Actv 116 and the Lands and Deeds Registry Act. 117 
3: 6: 3 (a) The Land (Conversion of Titles) Act, 1975 
This Act provides that all land in Zambia is vested in 
the President who holds it in perpetuity for and on behalf of 
the people of Zambia. 118., Section 5 abolishes all, freehold and 
115. See Stanley V. Wilde (1899) 2 Ch. 414 Per Lindley M. R. 
116. CAP 289. 
117. CAP 287. 
118. Section 4. 
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fee simple land in the country. The only legal way , of 
land 
holding in the country is by statutory lease lasting 100 years. 
Bare land cannot be sold in Zambia. It follows that such 
land cannot be valued for the purposes of obtaining a loan. 
According to Section 10,, "Any mortgage, charge, or, ,, trust 
subsisting over land immediately., before the, commenement [sic] 
of this Act shall, on such commencement, operate only on and 
against the unexhausted improvements on the land and,, so far as 
regards land apart from the unexhausted improvements, shallýbe 
deemed to be extinguished". 
The President through the commissioner' of lands is 
authorised to exercise control over all transactions concerning 
land. This means that the' President 'is emp'owe , red t'o determine 
the pace of credits which concern the securi't'y of'ýthe land. He 
is also empowered to impose any terms and conait'l'ons' 'which he 
may think fit. Thus he may inter alia fix the maximum amount of 
loan money that may correspond to any given land. Similarly the 
president may fix the maximum amount of money as price for any 
piece of land. According to Section 13(l): 
"not withstanding anything contained in any other law or 
deed, instrument or document, but subject, to other 
provisions of this Act, no person shall subdivide, sell, 
transfer, assign, -sublet, mortgage, charge or 
in any 
manner whatsoever encumber, or part with the possession 
of his land or any part thereof or interest- therein 
without prior consent in writing of the president. 
Unexhausted improvements are defined in the Act as: 
flanything resulting from the expenditure of capital or labour and excludes carrying out of any buildingv 
engineering or other operations in, on, over or under 
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land, or the making of jy4 material change in the use of 
any building or land". 
The provision that mere ground apart from unexhausted 
improvements cannot be sold naturally diminishes the value of 
the mortgageý as an instrument of obtaining credit. This is 
true especially in the rural areas where the only improvements 
such as Kraals, huts and wells may be worthless and incapable 
of attracting the interest and attention of financial 
institutions. The best possible explanation for the Act's 
provisions in this regard may be, that it was-not enacted with 
the objective of creating conditions for improved and increased 
outflow of credit. The main aim of the Act was rather, to 
enable the government to repossess-the land of absentee land 
lords and curb the rampant speculation in urban land which was 
going on. The immediate'spark was made by the sale of aývacant 
plot of land opposite the city library in Lusaka. By a 
conveyance dated 3rd April 1975, one George Louis Lipschild of 
Lusaka sold to Solar Investment Limited the following 
properties: 
(a) Subdivision 1 of subdivision A of subdivision No. 29 size 
0.100 of an acre. 
(b) the remaining extent of subdivision A of subdivision Noý29, 
size 0.177 of an icre; and 
(c) the remaining extent of plot No. 29, size 0.229 of an acre. 
119. Section 3. 
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These three plots each less than a quarter of an acre 
cost Solar Investments K150,000., On the same, day, 3rd, April, by 
another conveyance made between Solar Investment (Z) Ltd, and 
the Development Bank of Zambia, the third plot, that is the 
remaining extent of plot No. 29, size 0.229 of an acre was sold 
for the sum of K100,000 to the said Bank. 
The President reacted very angrily to this sale. He 
termed it not only profiteering but also insanity which he 
vowed to stop. He directed Solar Investments to pay back the 
money to the bank. He also announced that the plot in question 
was immediately taken over by the state. Further changes to the 
law immediately followed. These were as follows: 
(a) All freehold titles to land were abolished and existing 
interests abridged to statutory leaseholds of, hund red 
years duration. 
(b) All unutilised tracts of farmland were immedi ately ta ken 
over by the state. 
(c) No individuals or groups of individuals were to be free to 
occupy any piece of land without the authority of the state or 
its legal agency. 
(d) The sale of 'land in urban areas was abolished save for 
developments on the land. These could be sold if prior consent 
of the President was obtained. 
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(e) All vacant and undeveloped land in and around urban centres 
was municipalised; and 
(f) Real estate agencies were closed down immediately as they 
were largely responsible for the inflated prices on land and 
housing. Their functions were taken over by The Zambia National 
Building Society. The Land (Conversion of Titles) Act merely 
gave legislative backing to these measures. 0-0 
It can only be observed that in view of the degree of 
sensitivity shown in that particular case, there can be 
legitimate concern on the part of lenders and even land holders 
(i. e. borrowers) about the objectivity of -certain price 
determinations. Naturally such f ears may get in the way of 
desired benefits such as increased credit. 
In respect of lending to rural areas this ý 
is largely 
inhibited by the absence of title to land and other customary 
traditions. The only way in which mortgages can be taken 
advantage of in those areas is through Section 3 which provides 
that the price of labour or any other expenditure on the land 
may be used to execute a mortgage. 
3: 6: 3 (b) The Lands and Deeds Registry Act 
Another requiremen, t which banks may require to deal with 
in their operations is the registration of the lands and deeds 
120. Cited in Melvin Leslie Mbaoq Legal Pluralism an-T-7-ts 
Implications for Land Ownership and the Control of LanU--U-se-irn- 
Zambia (M. Phil. Dissertation, Cambridge University, 199277-77FG 
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offered to them as security for the loans and advances 
'they 
made. Registration enables title to land or any other interest 
in it to be ascertained as a fact instead of leaving such 
ascertainment to investigation. 121 This Act provides machinery 
for the registration of titles and deeds affecting land in 
Zambia. It applies in principle to all land in the country, but 
in practice it is restricted in application by inadequate 
surveying facilities. Section 4 of the Act provides that any 
document purporting to grant or transfer land or an interest 
therein for a period longer than one year must be registered. 
The effect of non-registration is to make the document void, 
though not without effect whatsoever. If one of the parties has 
benefited by reason of a void transaction, the courts may still 
require him to provide satisfaction or grant equitable remedy 
to the suffering party. 122 Similarly, a fraudulent attempt to 
avoid registration may also be remedied by the -courfsý and 
registration out of time may be permitted. 
Section 29 of the Act, makes it compulsory to register a 
certificate of title. Registration applies also to any document 
purporting to grant, convey or transfer land or an interest in 
land for a term of not less than 14 years. Only an original 
lease or subsequent transferee of a state lease may obtain a 
121. S. R. Simpson, Land Law and Registration (CaR'5-r-17g`e. * 
Cambridge University rress,. 1976). 
122. See e. g. Walsh V. Lonsdale (1882) 2 Ch. D. 9. and Sundi V. 
Ravalia 5 N. R. E. R. at P. =-. 
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provisional certificate of title by application to 'the 
Regis'. trar. 123 The production of a registered certificate under 
the hand and seal of the Registrar -is' an absolute bar and 
estoppel to any action against the registered proprietor, 
unless such action is exempted. 124 
The importance of registration in all cases is to ensure 
that the borrower or seller has evidence of this title. In the 
case of borrowers especially, it also ensures that they do not 
use the same property again as security to obtain credit from 
another person unless there are unexhausted rights _ 
or 
reversions in the property. The Housing (Statutory and 
Improvement Areas) Act 125 which caters for the creation of 
improvement areas and statutory housing areas within 
municipalities or local councils also provides machinery for 
registration of interests - held in land in such areas. The 
holders o4i title in these areas can mortgage their properties 
with financial institutions. In chapter six it will be seen how 
some of the requirements relating to registration are in fact 
obstructing the desired improvement in the provision of credit 
by banks and other financial - institutions through - the 
imposition of ---length*. ', y and -technical procedures 'and by 
declaring that bare land has no value* 
123. See Section 30. See also Section 5 of Land (Conversion 
of Titles) Act, 1975. 
124. Section 34(2). 
125. No. 30 of 1974. 
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Finally, in the next chapter, it will be seen how the 
economic conditions in the country have, since the colonial 
days required a boost through incre-ased bank lending. The 
chapter will expose some of the avenues and opportunities to 
which such bank lending would have been directed and thereby 
they could have made an,, improvement in the economic well being 
of the country as a whole. 
3: 7 Conclusion 
The Northern-Rhodesia Order-in-Council,,,, provided 
, 
that 
statutes of general application, the. common law and doctrines 
of equity applied to the territory of. Northern ., Rhodesia. All 
these are controversial, items and it is not all too clear which 
of their particular aspects applied. to., banks and how. It was 
not until the Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Act which appeared 
after amalgation of the territories of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
that the situation relating to 'regulation of banks became 
clear. That statute created a c'entral'bank and empowered it to 
regulate the business Of banking in all'the three'territories. 
The Banking Act of 1959 took away the licensing powers 
of -the central, bank. and placed them in the hands of a Registrar 
of banks. Both Acts stipulated, a variety of requirements, and 
conditions for operating banking in the country. After 
dissolution and 
'particularly 
following the attainment of 
independence, new legislation was enacted. Most of it however, 
contained the same provisions as the out going statutes. The 
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only changes consisted of Zambian terms and denominations. It 
was not until 1971, following the Mulungushi reforms of 1968 
and the failed take over of the financial sector in 1970 that a 
far reaching Act, the Banking Act, 1971 was enacted. That Act 
made a number of changes to the requirements of registration 
and licensing, capitalization, nationality and management. Save 
for a minor amendment in 1971 the Bank of Zambia Act, on the 
other hand, remained virtually the same. Change came in 1985 
when it underwent a comprehensive revision to cater for the 
worsening economic situation, particularly the deterioration in 
the balance of payments situation and the drying up of credit 
opportunities. In respect of the latter, the Act devised a 
novel scheme - The Credit Guarantee Scheme to assure banks and 
other creditors that their loans to small enterprises will be 
repaid. 
Other changes relate to the prudential supervision of 
banks for which the 1985 Act deregulated interest rates, while 
leaving reserve requirements, minimum liquidity ratios, 
exchange control, "pipe line" management and other risk 
aversion processes to discretionary control by the central 
bank. Alongside these enactments come those dealing with 
absconding debtors, evidentiary functions of banker's books, 
uncollected goods, banks- as companies per se, business names, 
bankruptcy, cheques and duty on business instruments. 
With regard to securities, these fall into three 
categories; viz agricultural, trade or personal and j -and. The 
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agricultural securities fall under Agricultural. Charges Act, 
while the Trade Charges Act deals with Stocks-in-Trade and 
other personal securities. When land-is offered as security, 
the terms of the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act and the Lands 
and Deeds Registry Act must be satisfied. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN PRE AND POST INDEPENDENCE ZAMBIA 
AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR HIGHER BANK LENDING 
4: 0 INTRODUCTION 
As stated at the end of the last chapter, this chapter 
looks at some trends in the economy of Zambia from the colonial 
period to the present. It seeks to highlight some of the 
principal features of the ruling economic policies and 
activities as well as the leading players and beneficiaries in 
the economic life of the country. In particular, the chapter 
will attempt to expose the availability of opportunities for 
fruitful bank lending and some of the attitudes towards the 
economic well being of the country and its people. 
4: 1. Before Independence 
The initial government of Zambia (or Northern Rhodesia 
as it then was) was formed by the British South Africa Company 
(herein-after referred to as the B. S. A. Co. ) under charter from 
the British government. The territory's economy before. the 
opening up of the copperbelt at the end ofIthe 1920s was almost 
entirely one of rural subsistence farming in which 95 per cent 
of the population were engaged. The European inhabitantsp 
numbering about 3,500 in 1921, were evenly engaged as to one 
half in administration and trade. while the other half, 
comprised farmers, predominantly growing tobacco for export and 
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maize, part of which was- consumed locally. Soon after 1900, 
mining of lead and zinc also afforded some minimal exports 
which roughly equalleA those of farmingo 
1 
After assuming control of the territory it became 
apparent to the B. S. A. Co. that, contrary to its calculations, 
it was unable to provide either the financial resources cot 144e: 
skilled manpower to exploit the territory's resources and make 
it profitable. According to company reports, administrative 
costs alone were crippling and constituted the biggest 
financial liability for the company* 2 The deficit of L96,500 
for the year ended March 31,1921 was cited as an example of 
the company's mounting problems. The B. S. A. Coo attributed the 
situation to the territory's inability to attract a much larger 
influx of European farmers who 
-would 
have been a source of 
substantial tax revenue. In view of these problems and despite 
earlier reservations, the company was compelled to seek outside 
capital investment and technical expertise to carry out the 
prospecting and subsequent mining operations in the territory. 
This change of attitude in favour of allowing others to work in 
the territory is said to have been inspired by more than anyone 
elset one director - Edmund Daviso It was later termed as a 
1. Anthony Martin, Minding Their 'Own Business; ' Zambia's 
Struggle Against Western Control (London: Hutchinsonj 1972) 
P. 28 
2. See A. Young, Industrial Diversification in Zambia (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1973) P. 30-. 
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"forward step" by Sir Theodore Gregory when he gave the 
following account of how it was accomplished: 
"Early in 1923, Edmund Davis suggested to members of the 
board of the B. S. A. Company that they should place the 
development or at any rate the prospecting of Northern 
Rhodesia in the hands of syndicates with ample capital, 
properly managed and 3 with the necessary technical staff 
at their disposal". 
Following the adoption of this policy Rhodesian 
Selection Trust (RST) and Anglo-American Corporation (AAC) were 
invited to Northern Rhodesia and mining operations commenced 
towards the end of the 1920s. The B. S. A. Co. which claimed 
ownership of all the mineral rights in the territory took 50 
per cent interest in both companies as a price for allowing the 
minerals to be worked, a policy which it resisted changing 
until much later when the need for further prospecting became 
more pressing. A significant transformation of the territory's 
economy soon began to. show following the opening up of four 
mines, namely, Roan Antelope, Mufulirap Rhokana and Nchanga. 
This new change placed the copper mining industry into the 
dominant position that it still enjoys in the economy of Zambia 
even today. Tables 4 and 5 overleaf. offer. an illustration of 
this position. 
3. Sir Theodore Gregory, Ernest Oppenheimer and The Economic 
Development of Southern Af-rl-ca, kLondon: Ayer Co. Publis-Fe--rsp 
=) P. 3921. 
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Although there have been remarkable, changes ý in the 
sectoral structure with manufacturing gaining some 
significance, these have not been able to replace the dominant 
role of the copper industry. Indeed, virtually all the gains in 
the non-mining sectors were themselves related in one way or 
another to the mining industry and did not supersede it. Thus, 
whereas between 1945 and 1953, exports of copper accounted for 
an average of 86.5 per cent of the total exports with the 
remaining 13.5 also derived from the mining industry, this 
dependency reached 92 per cent in 1964, rising to 95.7 per cent 
in 1967.4 In 1983 the mining industry accounted for 15.4 per 
cent of the GDP while still generating over 90 per cent of the 
country's foreign exchange earnings. This situation has not 
significantly changed even today. 5 
As the demand for copper on the world markets increased, 
owing chiefly to the expanding electrical and automotive 
industrial growth in the industrialised countries, production 
at the territory's mines also quickly expanded. From a 
negligible quantity in 1930 it rose to 138,000 long tons in 
1934. But due to a depression on. the world markets thereafter, 
4. A. G. Irvine; The Balance of Payments of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland 1945-54 (London: Oxtord University Press, 1959) See 
also The Annual Report, Ministry of Development and Finance, 
1970; PP. 52-53. 
5. Zambia, An Economic Report Published by National Westminster 
Ban'Ry October 1984. See also IMF, International Financial 
Statistics,, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1 January 1986 PP. 514--5TT-. 
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there were no significant improvements in this figure until 
1937 when sharp increases followed, thoughýthey were curtailed 
from time to time by such events as war and technical 
difficulties. 6 
This 'remarkable growth in output naturally created 
considerable wealth. The distribution of that wealth however 
was not equitable and was based on racial lines. The chief 
beneficiaries of the wealth in terms of jobs or higher 
positions, salaries and social amenities were European workers 
and settlers. Africans by contrast continued to be manual 
workers and no effort was made to help them attain skills. 
Their social amenities were poor and over crowded. Equally 
notable was the absence of any effort on the part of the 
government or the mining companies to use the territory's 
wealth to induce development into other sectors as will be seen 
below. 
4: 1: 1 Attitude of The Mining Companies Towards Economic 
Diversification 
Despite realising huge returns on their investments in 
the territory, the mining companies were unwilling to stimulate 
furtKe-r investment by diversifying into other areas of economic 
life. Thus instead of ploughing back their profits into the 
6. See -- M. L. O. Faber and J. G. Potter, Towards Economic 
Independence; Papers on The Nationalization of the Copper 
ustry in Zambia: University of Cambridge, Dept., of Apllied 
Economics, Occasional Papers No. 23 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1971) P. 1. 
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country these companies preferred to externalise them abroad 
where they distributed them out as generous dividends. They 
attributed their actions to the narrowness of the market in 
Northern Rhodesia, citing low population and per capita income 
7 v- 8 of the indigenous people as its causes. Lord Robins 
statement succinctly characterised the attitude of these 
companies: 
It we shall continue to seek profitable outlets, but have 
resisted, and will continue to resist suggestions that 
it would benefit the country or its people to invest in 
failures and squander capital for propaganda purposes". 
This attitude was clearly based on self-serving grounds, 
typical of the old colonial capitalism under which managers saw 
their responsibilities primarily in terms of maximizing profits 
for their companies and. shareholders with duties to the 
community coming last. 
9 When such a community was largely 
African or racially different there was even less incentive to 
invest. It is significant in this regard to note that while 
these companies were denying all responsibility for inducing 
commerce and manufacturing in the territory on the basis of the 
narrowness of its market, they were deliberately paying their 
7. John M. Mulwila, Parastatal Companies and The Law in Zam7la 
(Ph. D. Dissertation, University ot London, 1980) P. 27. 
8. B. S. A. Co. Chairman's Statement to the Shareholderst 7th 
February, 1962. London. 
9. See Tom Haddert, Company Law and Capitalism,, 2nd edition (London: Weidenfieid and Nicolson, 1911). 
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African workers very low wages. They even went further by 
creating a system of discrimination called "job reservation". - 
According to that system only Europeans entered into skilled 
and well paid jobs. Africans on the other, hand, being unskilled 
and not entitled to any training were only hired to do 
jobs despised by Europeans. As far as the mining companies were 
concerned job reservation and bigger wages, for Europeans were 
unavoidable practices as they helped them to attract necessary 
skilled manpower into what was then considered an unhealthy 
climate where even the barest amenities were, lacking, while, the 
line of unskilled and illiterate Africans seeking work was 
unending. 10 
In reality job reservation was a 'sympton of the 
racialism that existed on the copper mines. ' The European trade 
unions saw it as a too! ' for safeguarding their members' 
interests and jobs and therefore stood' firm against any 
acquisition of skills by Africans - still more their exercising 
them or obtaining full reward for them. 11 The government was 
itself not neutral in this matter. The , campaign to stop 
Africans from acquiring skills was allowed to spread from the 
----6opper mine-s--to all'areas involved with African employment. 
These discriminatory practices even gained legal backing, for 
10. John M. Mulwila, op. cit. 
11. Michael Buroway, The Colour'of Class on The Copper 'Mines: 
From African Advancement to Zambianization; Zambian Papers, 
No. 7 (MancTe-ster: Manchester University Press, 1972). 
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until 1959, it was criminal for any African to allow himself to 
be engaged as an apprentice. 12 Any"person'engaging an African 
in that capacity was also guilty of a criminal offence. 
It is known that the foregoing measures- were not the 
only deliberate acts perpetrated to keep the market and 
industrial 'base of . Northern Rhodesia narrow. Dr. Busschau 
for 
instance, has urgued that despite low wages and job 
reservations, there was still a significant level of savings 
which could have been- loaned out for ' investment, in diverse 
areas. 13 In addition, he asserts that even ifthe locallmarket 
was itself narrow, surely outside markets were wide enough to 
receive the territory's goods had there been willingness to 
make them. In this regard it is significant to note the 
sentiments of members of one government committee: 
"Northern Rhodesia is in a favourable position for the 
export of manufactured' articles to Southern Rhodesia, 
Bechuanaland and the Northern Rhodesia - Congo Basin 
Area. The manufactured goods of Southern Rhodesia must 
pay a duty to enterýSouth Africa, and similarly Southern 
Rhodesia protects its industries from the Union 
manufactured articles by the imposition of a duty. 
Northern Rhodesia, on the other handj&s free access to 
Southern Rhodesia and South Africa". 
12. See Section 3, The Northern Rhodesia Ordinance No. 15 
1943, in supplement to the Government Gaze-tt-e---cTated 24th 
December, 1943. See also The . 
Manpower Report (Lusaka, 
Government Printer, 1966) P. 1. * 
13. W. J. Busschau, Northern Rhodesia Report on the Development 
of Secondary Industries. 1945 Lusaka at P. 40. 
14. NorthernRhodesia, First Report-of the Advisory Committee'on 
Industrial Development, March, 1946 P. 2. 
-159- 
Despite these assurances Orguments about the narrowness 
of the market continued to persist. This led many commentators 
to conclude that there was a ploy to retain Northern. Rhodesia 
as a market for the products of other countries particularly 
Britain and white dominated Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. 
19, 
Thus, while Northern Rhodesia kept sending unprocessed copper 
ores, she continued also to import finished copper and, other 
products to sell to her people. 
4: 1: 2 The Attitude of the Northern Rhodesia Government 
Company rule in Northern Rhodesia ended in 1924 and was 
followed by a new administration which was directly under, the 
colonial office. This change, did not however, produce a 
difference in attitudes towards the moot issue of investing in 
non-mining areas or inducing others to do so. For its part the 
new administration immediately accepted the notion that it 
lacked funds for non-mining investments. 16 Government officials 
never tired of saying that the government was unable to balance 
its budget, particularly between 1924 and 1935. They were 
helped in this by a line from the pIM17 Report 'which 
acknowledged the government's financial constraints. The 
15. -See e. g. Robert E. Baldwin, supra Table 1, at P. 181. -- 
16. See e. g. Statement by the Acting Chief Secretary, Northern 
Rhodesia Legislative Council Debates, 2nd April, 1946 Col. 150. 
17. Report of The Commission Appointed to Enquire into the 
Financial and Economic Position of Northern Rhodesia (Chaired 
by A. W. Pim) (London, H. M. S. O., Colonial No. 1451 1938) P. 91. - 
A 
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officials however tended to go beyond the commission's 
position, which was merely to recognise that the government has 
fewer sources of revenue for administrative purposesý It 
identified the three principal sources as customs dutiesi 
native and income taxes. On the question of the E238,000 which 
the government had received from - the British treasury at' the 
time of handover by the B. S. A. Co., officials were quick to 
assert that that was a loan not a grant, and that in any case 
it had become depleted in payments to recover a deficit. Other 
funds such as those from the Colonial Development Fund and the 
Beit Railway Trust, it was said, were utilised for non-profit 
yielding social purposes such as schools, water-boring, bridges 
and aerodromes with the remaining collections from other local 
sources merely amounting to L1,000 in 1938. 
With regard to the allegation that proper investment 
could not be attained because of preoccupations with social 
functions, this was belied by the poor quality of life for the 
majority African population at the time. Economic and political 
favour continued to be directed to the settlers at the expense 
of the Africans and of general economic growth. The B. S. A. 
Co's. policy which allowed only European farmers to supply the 
agricultural requirements of the mines was continued. This 
policy was a. follow up -to an earlier one of supplying the 
African workers with food as part of their wages, thus reducing 
their net income and ensuring that they were perpetually 
dependent on their jobs for subsistenc e. These European 
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privileges were accompanied by an allocation of higher sales 
quotas and prices for European products. The Maize Control 
Ordinance of 1936,18 for examplev establisýed a maize control 
board and gave it powers to purchase and sell maize at fixed 
prices. Africans were allocated only a quarter of this market 
while three quarters went to Europeans. Similarly the Cattle 
Marketing and Control Ordinance of 1937 
19 achieved much the 
same results in respect of livestock marketing. The government 
also followed similar policies in the area of native taxation 
which was introduced to force able bodied African men into wage 
employment in the mines and other European facilities. The 
consequent social effects such as the rise in the rate of 
divorces as a result of adultery between wives lef t behind by 
their husbands and remaining or returning men as well as 
invalids and older men were ignored. Similarly, the reduction 
in the productive capacity of the African sector caused by such 
absence of a capable workforce were glossed over as 
. 
they 
allowed for increased production in the settler sector. The 
irony of the whole policy was that while taxing the Africans 
the authorities, with all their claims about subscribing to the 
cause of morality, accompanied by an express undertaking to 
pursue justice, were unwilling to incur more than a minimum on 
administrative costs required to maintain law and order for the 
18. Vol. 111 CAP 98. 
19. Vol. 111 CAP 3. See also Robert E. Baldwin op. cit. 
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preservation of the dominant European interests. '20 
The ultimate result of this- inequitable system of 
distribution of the territory's resources was the creation of a 
"dual economy" comprising a highly profitable mining, farming 
and trading sector reserved for Europeans, while the rest of' 
the economy consisted of a stagnant subsistence sector'-occupied 
by the bulk of the African population., 21' Even a change in the 
colonial policy which was ushered -in ' by the" Colonial 
Development and Welfare Acts 22, " did notý produce signi-ficant 
results. The content of those 'Acts was that the British- 
Government undertook to ensure that the interests of- the 
indigenous peoples of the colonies were preserved, and that 
certain investments would be encouraged to' promote 
diversification in 'the economies of colonial territories. 23 
Towards -this end the government' provided some money for 
investment and created The Colonial Development Corporation and 
the Overseas Food Corporation to-act as instruments for capital 
20. P. E. Ollawa, Participatory Democracy in Zambia, Me 
Political Economy of" National Development kDevon: Arthur H. 
Stockwell Ltd, 1979) P. 66. II 
21. Richard Jolly; "Economy",, In'. Africa, South - of the' Sahara, 
1981-82 11th ed of a Survey and Reference Book of all Countries 
South of the Sahara including a "Who's who"Of Major 
personalities in the Region (Europa Publications) P. 1170. See 
also Ann Seidman, "Atternative Development Strategies in 
Zambia", Ltc No. 86, Land Tenure Centre, 310 King Hallt 
University of Wisconsin at June 1973. 
22.1940 and 1945. 
23. See United Kingdom, Colonial Development and Welfare; 
Dispatch, 12th November, 1945 from Secretary for Colonies, Cmd 
6713. 
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generation in the colonies. While these bodies provided certain 
amounts of capital for investment, the cornerstone'' of the 
colonial policy was to encourage private sources to provide the 
bulk of the necessary capital. 
But even after the colonial office had taken the 
measures just outlined above2 The territorial government in 
Northern Rhodesia maintained the position that it had no 
capacity to expand beyond the services it was already 
providing. It was not until the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies indicated that the imperial government might assist 
should it become impossible for the government of Northern 
Rhodesia to finance development services at a necessary level 
that certain steps were taken to 'initiate diversification* One 
of the first steps was the 'creation of 'the said Advisory 
Committee on Industrial Development (ACID) whose task was to 
provide advice on matters on industrial development.. in the 
territory. Secondly, the, government recognised that it could 
undertake certain projects on its own, but only in those cases 
where it was satisfied that the uncertainty involved was too 
great for private investors. For the bulk of the investments 
however, the government saw, its role only as broker for private 
investors, inducing them with extra capital and technical 
advice, including soliciting for private loans for them. * 
* see Robert E. Baldwin op. cit 
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of making loans for agricultural purpose. This last body was 
itself replaced in 1952 following the realization that- some 
difficulties were encountered in reaching out to all farming 
areas. A centralised body - the Land Bank, was accordingi. 4 
established to coordinate and supply agricultural credits. 24 
But like its predecessors, the Land Bank confined its services 
to European farmers. It was not until 1955, after the bulk of 
the European requirements had been assumed, by the Federal 
government, that a small local scheme was- set. up to assist 
Africans. Under that scheme only E15,000 was placed in a 
revolving fund administered by the Director of Cooperatives and 
African Marketing to cater for the whole African population.. 25 
By 1948 The ACID had already redirected the governments 
position to the old "Narrow Market" theories of the 1920s and 
'30s. It advised that: 26 
"Until the European population in Northern Rhodesia was increased to over 35,000 and the standard of living of 
the African population is raised above the present level, the internal market will remain too small to 
support manufacturing industries of a size to require financial assistance from the government. " 
24. John Inambao Aýricultural Credit Institutions in Zambia, 
Obligatory Essay: Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirements 
of the LL. B. Degree, (University of Zambia (Unpublished) 1982) 
P. 22. 
25. Northern Rhodesia, Report of the Development Authorityp 
1955 P. 15. 
26. ACID, Third Report, May 1948 P. 7. 
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How the African living standards were going to be raised 
in view of the low salaries and obstacles to agricUltUriij 
production, remained unclear. Similarly, the promised 
procurement of more private investment and lending also 'lost 
momentum. These events shattered all the hopes that had been 
raised towards greater non-mining development in the territory. 
For this reason, in 1950 Mr. Welensky, in a move hailed as his 
only progressive act in colonial politics, tabled a motion in 
the Legislative Council calling upon the government to revive 
its investment programme. 27 In his address Mr Welensky urged 
the government to set up a local finance development 
corpporation to assist in the establishment of industry and 
business in the territory. Not wishing to be seen as a non 
believer in private enterprise, he further recommended that 
private institutions should be invited to participate in the 
initiative, stressing however, that, should such an overture 
fail to materialise, government should proceed with the 
corporation's formation. Mr Welensky rested his contribution 
with the suggestion that an initial capital of E250,000 should 
be immediately pumped into the proposed corporation and that 
its management should be on business lines. 
It was appreciated during debate on Mr Welensky's motion 
that considerable time would be required to decide the powers 
27. Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council Debates, 8th 
September, 1950. 
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of the proposed corporation as well as in preparing and passing 
the necessary legislation itself for the corporation's. 
formation. It was agreed therefore, that the Industrial Loaps 
Board was to be set up first, and after a firm foundation it 
would be followed and taken4Ver by a full-fledged. corporation. 
The Governor announced that the board would be functional in 
1951 with the following as its objectives: 
28 
.. 
to assist industry with capital for varying purposes of 
development, including the financing of fixed assets, 
the installation of new labour-saving plant and 
equipment and the provision of working capital. 
To render such assistance only in cases where other 
existing means are not available on reasonable terms and 
for such time as may be necessary to achieve the object 
for which the aid has been given. 
Even these modest advances however, did, not get enough 
time to be f irmly established, as the creation of,. the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland brought new set backs. The 
Federal constitution stipulated that certain matters including 
---commerce and industry were to be the exclusive responsibility 
of the Federal Government. 29 Similarly, such key responsi- 
28. General Notice No. 1304,1950. 
29. Anthony Martin, Supra note 1, P. 55. 
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bilities as power over income tax, non-African education and 
Agriculture fell under its control. This gave the r*ederal 
government power to tax the resources of the three territories 
and deploy them according to a plan which concentrated on the 
needs of the Europeans. Specifically, it was able to milk the 
tax and foreign exchange revenues of the Northern Rhodesia 
Copper mines, by far the biggest generator of wealth in the 
federation, for the benefit of the Europeans most of who lived 
in Southern Rhodesia. 
There was also obvious bias on the part of the federal 
government in favour of Southern Rhodesia in respect of major 
projects. The biggest project, the hydro-electric scheme went 
of the Southern side of. the Kariba, Lake. This decision ý was 
significantly -influenced by political rather than economic and 
technical considerations - which favoured the Kafue within 
Northern Rhodesia. Similarly, the railway system was 
strategically placed and controlled by the Southern Rhodesians 
while the Northern side, with only a third of the system's 
assets assumed responsibility for over half of its liabilities. 
In industry, the only industries that went to Northern Rhodesia 
during federation were those which found it cheaper -to supply 
the Northern market from separate factories in the North. Their 
products were usually low in value and therefore uneconomical 
to ship over long distances. Examples were maize milling, 
_sugar 
refining, brewing and manufacturing of some building materials 
such as cement. The only other industries worth mentioning were 
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the ordinary service industries such- as - the motor trade, 
hotels, banks and retail stores* 
30 
While Southern Rhodesia claimed all the benefits 
depicted above, her finished products were simply dumped, as 
were South Africa's on the markets of the other members of the 
federation. Thus by the time of dissolution of the federation, 
Northern Rhodesia (later Zambia) was saddled with a load of 
public debt which was out of proportion to the benefits she 
might have received. Under the break-up settlement, the 
territory found itself with a national debt of L97 million 
compared with only E22 million which it had before it 
surrendered its autonomy 10 years previously. Similarly, in the 
case of the Railways, Zambia took on half of the liabilities 
even though Southern Rhodesia kept two thirds of its assets., 31 
It was in response to these enormous problems that the 
government, while preparing for hand over to the Africans, 
decided to redefine its. policy on industrial development. The 
outcome was a policy which placed more emphasis on private 
enterprise as opposed to the Welensky policy of gover nment 
participation with or without private entrepreneurs. The policy 
as redefined was summed up as follows: 
32 
"The government believes that economic development 
should be achieved mainly through private enterprise and 
30. Ibid. 
31. Ibid. 
32. Northern Rhodesia Development Plan 1961-65. 
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that Government activity should in general be limited to 
providing the best possible climate for that 
development, including the provision of supporting 
services such as research and- extension services, as 
well as by the maintainance of a stable government". 
4: 1: 3 The Formation of INDECO 
Despite adopting a new industrial policy, the-government' 
still included certain aspects of Mr Welensky's proposals in 
the second stage of its plan. Accordingly the Industrial 
Development Corporation (INDECO) was created in 1960 'as 
successor to the Industrial Loans Board. The corporation's 
responsibilities included, the initiation and carrying out of 
investigations into the possibility of establishing industries 
to process the territory's primary products. It was also 
required to provide information and advice to investors wishing 
to set up industries in 'the territory. In addition it was 
authorised to provide capital by way of loans or guaranteeing 
them from financial institutions, and in special cases it could 
form companies and manage them until willing private 
entrepreneurs came forward to acquire them. The corporation was 
also responsible for providing management and technical 
assistance to exidting __ industries wishing them. These 
responsibilities were expanded in the 1961-65 Development Plan 
to give attention to rural development. 33 
33. Northern Rhodesia Development Plan 1961-65. See also 
Northern Rhodesia, "The Role of INDECO", A Budget Address by 
Hon. T. C. Gardner, 7th July, 1961, Lusaka. 
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4: 2 After Independence 
It is clear from the foregging that the country's 
greatest handicap during the colonial days Was the absence of 
adequate private investors willing to come forward and invest 
in non-mining sectors of the economy. It is also clear that 
there was an ac ute shortage of financial resources from 
private financial institutions in the form 'of loans and 
investments. After independence the government quickly took 
note of these problems and produced an industrial policy which 
it thought would over come them. The main objectives of the 
government's policy were: 34 
to diversify production so as. to make the economy less 
dependent on a single, export commodity; copper 
to achieve self sufficiency in consumer goods 
to create labour intensive industries which would 
contribute significantly to the development, 
'of 
people's 
skills. 
(iv)to establish industries in rural areas 
(V) to encourage the training of Zambian nationals as 
managers and technicians. 
34. White Paper on Industrial Development, 1964 
, 
(Revised in 
1966), Ministry of Commerce and Industry (Government Printer; 
Lusaka). 
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The policy nevertheless recognised that the government 
would have to be closely involved in development by stimulating 
it and even by undertaking ventures where there were . specific' 
reasons for not leaving the job in private hands. ' '35 Such 
reasons could involve an inability on the part of a given 
industry to attract private investment, for example. The policy 
reserved for the government the role of making development 
plans as well as the right to outline areas requiring urgent 
investment or those containing potential returns'for'investors. 
In this respect the first National Development Plan (1966-72) 
laid down the guiding framework for diversifying the economy 
from copper-mining to agriculture and other commercial fields. 
It also established a broad outline for social and economic 
infrustructure which would form a basis for further 
Development. 36 The main. thrust of the industrial policy 
however, was to emphasise the government's task in 'Creating 
conditions that are conducive to industrial development by 
private investors. Accordingly, the government adopted the 
following list of incentives'. - 
35. This was in accordance with the 'advice of a UN, ECA and FAO 
Economic Survey team. See Report of the UN/ECA/FAO, "Economic 
Survey Mission on Economic Development of Zambia (also known as 
the Seers Report, Ndola: Falcon Press Ltd, 1964). 
36. Ministry of Developmnent Planning and National Guidance, 
First National Development Plan 1966-1970 (Lusaka: Government 
Printer, 1968). 
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Tariff protection: 37 This provided duty free entry or 
entry at low rates of duty for raw materials and capital 
equipment required for industrial purposes. This 
protection was accompanied by Anti-Dumping and "shut- 
out" provisions to protect local business from low 
priced imports and to keep out goods of similar nature 
respectively. 38 
(ii) Tax incentives: The Pioneer Industries (Relief From Tax) 
Act, 1965 was enacted to provide income tax relief on 
the profits of pioneer industries for a period of 
between two and 'five years. The Income Tax Act 
39 
also 
permitted investors to deduct normal expenditure of 
revenue incurred wholly and exclusively for business 
purposes in producing business income. It also provided 
for allowances in respect of expenditure incurred on 
plant and machinery, buildings, patents, copyrights, 
trade marks, research, double-taxation, passage and pre- 
commencement expenditure. 
(iii) The government also maintained a liberal exchange rate 
and regulations. Thus, subject only to the production 
37. See Customs and Excise Act (CAP 667) and Amendment A 
Nos. 31 and 47 of 1965. See also Mini s tr of Commerce and 
Industry, Annual Report for the Year 1964 
ýLusaka: 
Government 
Printer, 1965) P. 7. 
38. Section 4. 
39. CAP 668. 
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of appropriate documentary evidence, investing 
enterprises were permitted- to remit profits2 dividends 
and interests abroad. They -Could also be granted 
permission to repatriate capital brought into Zambia 
together with increases in that capital arising-from 
their operations. 40 
Alongside the industrial policy and incentives 
accompanying it, the government also embarked on a new 
programme of investing in education, health, services, roads 
and other things that were needed for the initia tion of 
meaningf ul development. Public expenditure on education alone 
rose to over L20 million in 1966-67, an increase of over 95 per 
cent. In contrast the colonial administration had spent only 
L5.1 million in 1963-64, L1.1 million in 1954, E131,000 in 
19449 E26,000 in 1939 and 1348 in 1924-25. All these projects 
were undertaken with maximum speed as the government contended 
that it had a backlog of development projects to clear. 
In addition, the government accepted the UN/ECA/FAO 
Mission's advice and undertook to participate in industry, to 
the extent that there were no willing or capable private 
investors. Most of-the government's participation was to be 
40. Zambia's Economic Revolution, Address by President Kaunda 
at Mulungushi, 19th April, 1965 (Lusaka, ZIS, Government 
Printer). See also Appendix to the Outline of the Government's 
Industrial Policy. Revised Edition, 3rd January, 1966. 
(Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government Printer, Lusaka) 
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through INDECO, and only in productive as opposed to extractive 
or service ventures. In these latter sectors, i any government 
investment was required, it ' was envisaged - that direct 
investment, possibly through the medium of civil servants or 
Ministers was more appropria'te. 'l Accordingly, the government 
held direct stakes in the Central African Electricity Supply 
Corporation and the Central African Road Services. Other 
important government deeds- after' independence included the 
creation of the Credit Organisation'' of Zambia" (COZ) 
41 'as 
successor to the Land Bank. Through" it the government intended 
to give loans to the most needy sectors especially small 
farmers and entrepreneurs. - , INbECO'also performed the same ta sk 
by making loans, with funds mostly provided by the government, 
to bigger industrial ventures* 
4: 2: 1 Changes in Government Policy 
Despite' a liberal industrial policy and generous 
incentives, there was no queue of foreign investors anxious to 
be given an opportunity, to bring their, money and 
'skills, 
into 
Zambia. Domestic investment 
-by lboth 
the resident expatriate 
community and indigenous Zambians, that was hoped for, never 
41. At independence the Land Bank became the Land' and 
Agricultural Bank of Zambia. The latter was dissolved on 11th 
August 1967 and its assets aiid liabilities transferred to COZ 
under the terms of the Credit Organisation of Zambia Act, 1967. 
According to Section 28 of the Act, the organisation-was 
permitted to lend to farmers, co-operative societies and small 
commercial and business ventures. 
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materialised, and if anything it even began to shrink as 
foreigners began to externalise more and more of their 
resources. A number of factors combined to produce these 
negative reactions to the government's new goals; chief 
among them was that in adopting its industrial policy the 
government was influenced by a number of deceptive factors and 
assumptions. First, at that time the country's economy was the 
richest and fastest growing in sub-Saharan Africa with an 
unlimited supply of capital in the monetary sense. 42 Events 
occurring immediately before 'and after independence accounted 
for this boom and new sense of hope in Zambia's economic 
outlook. These events included the acquisition of the mineral 
royalties on the eve of independence which enabled the 
government to retain the mineral tax. These royalties had 
hitherto been going to the B. S. A. Co. The price and 
international demand for copper at that time were also 
reasonably high. 
The second factor was-the dissolution of the federation 
with Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This event contributed to 
the retention of capital within the country. The result of 
these factors was that -between 1964 and 1969 the GDP increased 
by 13 per cent (in 1965' prices). This represented- an annual 
expansion of between 5 and 6 per cent as well' as a tremendous 
improvement in the terms of trade. 43 Thus, even though the 
42. First National Development Plan 1966-1970 P. 1. 
43. Richard Jolly, op. cit. P. 1170. 
-176- 
government increased its spending there was still an excess of' 
revenue. But things began to change almost in-tmz4Jqk? -IM, - and the 
disillusionment about the permanency of the earnings and 
anticipated investments began to unfold. 
The realisation tha t Zambia's good earnings and 
investment potential might not be able to solve , 
all her 
problems or be permanent began with the advent of U. D. I. in 
Southern Rhodesia on November 11th, 1965. That development 
introduced new factors such as a border closure with Southern 
Rhodesia and a suspension of all trade. Many resources had to 
be expended in the process of diverting the country's trade and 
transportation routes to new areas. As a result, plans for more 
investments in production had to be abandoned. 
The government was also disappointed with the attitude 
and behaviour of foreign investors, particularly British, 
businesses. These businesses were unwilling to change from 
their colonial patterns of trade and communications. For them 
Zambia was a part of a large market, and their idea was to 
serve it by what were usually no more than branch distribution 
offices supplying goods manufactured in South Africa and 
Southern Rhodesia. Before UDI they generally showed no 
willingness to expand or localise their operations in the 
country as the Zambian government had hoped. Even when UDI 
occurW and the government took steps to cut off dealings with 
Southern Rhodesia, most businesses continued to believe it was 
only a matter of time before things reverted back to the pre- 
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UDI "normalcy". They'were therefore unwilling'"to disengage from 
their operations across the border let alone establish what 
they considered to be an unnecessary duplication of production 
and supply systems in the same market. For example, when INDECO 
approached some of the transport companie's to participate in 
the creation of an alternative route to-the east, none of them 
was willing to come in on'a long term basis. This forced INDECO' 
to turn to Intersomer - an Italian company - to supply trucks. 
Similarly, the oil pipeline from 'Dar-es-Sala'am to Ndola wa's 
built by Suain - Projetti, another Italian' company after 
resident British'and other companies operating branches in'the 
country declined to take part. ' 
Perhaps the most illuminating analysis of the British 
and other resident companies' psychology andlack of enthusiasm 
for the government's indus*trial 
_policy 
and incentives is that 
offered by Anthony Martin. 44 Starting with these companies' 
general outlook on African markets, he asserts that these 
companies do not on the whole find the. prospect of, a near 
monopoly of a small African market potentially enticing if., they, 
are required to put themselves substantially at risk 
_there. 
They usually start from a position of supplying a fair share 
of the market by exports from their existing factories, and 
they are not keen to complicate their lives by investing money 
to manufacture goods in a country whose policies they do not 
44. Anthony Martin, op. cit. P. 81. 
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particularly want to understand but where the-risks of- coups, 
nationalisations and sudden upheavals - of policy as, well- as 
curbs on their freedom to make profits and send, -them home are 
certainly great if not incalculable. ' Thus, in- the case-, of 
Zambia even the more forward looking companies who-had, realised 
that it would be impossible to go on supplying the Zambian 
Market from Southern Rhodesia, usuallyýwent no further than to 
bring Zambia under their East- African operations, and run - it 
from what they considered relative safety in Nairobi- as 
compared with Lusaka. The only way of -reversing this. -trend 
would have been by using - counter, - psychological ý measures 
such as threatening to withdraw- these companies' monopoly. 
This can be done through proof that the , country concerned 
intends to interest another big company, in the same line of 
business to put up a local plant with the consequence,. that the 
existing monopoly will -'diminish., These counter measures' must 
over come alliances between - international companies, and. -other 
obstacles that may be employed against them. Where these 
measures succeed, then only will these companies reluctantly 
consider an investment, but even then they will be looking for 
a maximum return on minimum investment. 
45 In the case of 
Zambia a more common tactic was to convert what had been a 
branch of a South African or Southern Rhodesian operation into 
a Zambian company with a small nominal capital, and carry on 
with the same structure of management and distribution. 
45. Ibid. 
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It was however, the reaction of the resident expatriate, 
businessmen which were the main cause of the government's 
disillusionment especially with. , tfiose in - credit giving 
businesses like banks. An obvi6us influence on government 
policy at independence was Kaunda's-philosophical, and, political 
thinking of missionary -christianity and moderate nationalism., 
His most passionately held conviction was that racial 
discrimination was iniquitous and that there was a need for, a 
truely non-racial society in which the fundamental equality of 
man would be recognised. He envisaged that once the colonial 
government was out of -the way, there would be an identity of 
interests between the government and the governed,. including 
resident expatriate businesses and community. People's innate 
energies would thus be liberated and the way ahead would be 
cleared for political, social and economic development of the 
country. Other non-racist Europeans would also be welcomed into 
the country and their capital and skills would make a useful 
contribution to economic growth. There was little said about 
neo-colonialism or the dangers of capitalist exploitation. 
From the beginning however, - there was never much contact 
between government -and the private business community, itý was 
trying to entice. Most Europeans in the first place-supported 
the federation, and at the time of independence the majority of 
them thought of their roo'ts as' being in S ou thern' ^'Rhodesia'. A 
typical white businessman had no friendly feelings about the 
African nationalists 'and no high expectations of what the new 
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government was likely to achieve. Few took seriously the 
government's assurance that they had nothing to fear if they 
identified themsleves with the aspiraftons of the new country. 
For many the thing to do was to make much money on minimum 
investment as quickly as possible and take it out of the 
country without involvement in its political or social affairs. 
More charges were laid at the door of private business during 
the President's Mulungushi speech. These included such 
accusations as the unjustifiable reaping of 64c: 6ssive profits 
without reinvesting them in the country, o- peration of price 
rings, use of unacceptable management techniques and their 
reluctance to evolve personnel and training policies that were 
in accord with the country's needs. 47 As will be seen later, 
similar sentiments were expressed in relation to the lending 
institutions. 
The demonstration of such a hostile attitude by so many 
resident businessmen or businesses, including those 'who had 
purported to make Zambia their home, was therefore another 
factor responsible for the gradual change of Kaunda's own 
attitude from the original one of laissez-faire envisioned in 
the industrial policy, thobgh-he' still kept [fis ' n'On-: racial 
ideal. The disillusionment was aggravated by the obvious '- 
46. Ibid. 
47. Ibid. See also, Zambia's Economic Revolution, An Address by 
President Kaunda at Mulungusl#, 19th April, 19b8 (Lusakap ZIS. 
Government Printer) P. 37. 
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collusion of some of the resident expatriates , with 
the rebel 
Rhodesian regime, thus increasing the government's concern 
about national security. 
4: 2: 2 The Economic Reforms 
The economic reforms were introduced in three phases. 
The Mulungushi economic reforms appeared first in 1968. ' They 
were followed in 1969 by the Matero reforms. The last reforms 
came in 1970 and were known simply as the 1970 economic reform. 
The basic content of the reforms was as follows: 
(a) The Mulungushi Economic Reforms: - These reforms were 
introduced on 19th April, 1968 with the aim of promoting 
Zambian entrepreneurship as well as the extension of 
state participation in the commanding heights of the 
economy. When the President introduced them he said: 48 
"it pains me, to see that three and a half years after independence there is not a single Zambian owned business in Cairo Road., There is not even a resident 
expatriate business for that matter with a Zambian 
manager in Cairo Road". 
-- The-- President also reminded the nation of his 
government's industrial policy. since independence which 
has been aimed at making members of the resident 
48. Ibid. 
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expatriate communities,, identify themselves with the, 
nation's aspirations and to Zambianise their businesses. 
Many of them he said, had cho, sen simply to take 
advantage of the economic boom so that they could make 
quick money and take it out of the country. 
With regard to loans, the President said even though his 
government had tried to assist Zambians in that regard 
as well as with know-how through INDECO and COZ, these 
methods had failed. The government could- lend very, 
little money, mainly for fixed capital development, 
while the banks and other financial institutions which 
could have filled the gap by providing working capital 
were unwilling to do so. These institutions were openly 
aligned with expatriate businessmen to discriminate 
against indigenous Zambians. Accordingly, -the President 
directed that thencefortb., the borrowing capacity- of 
expatriates and expatriate enterprises, would, be 
restricted. Financial institutions were required to 
ascertain the nationality of all applicants for loans 
before approving such loans. Non-Zambian applicants, were 
to be referred to the exchang-e"cOn'trol *authoritie-S-who-- 
could approve or reject their applications using the 
same criteria as thoseused in the case of applications 
from foreign - controlled companies. 
49 Under thcie 
49. Ibid P. 28. 
-183- 
criteria the main considerations were the size of a 
company's investment in the country and the type of 
business it was involved in. But above all the 
authorities considered the amount of money each company 
brought into the country. The aim of the directives was 
basically to enable financial institutions to acquire an 
excess of liquidity which it was hoped would-be lent, to 
Zambians to assist them in establishing business. 
How and f rom where the President acquired the power to 
issue these directives remains somewhat unclear. In chapter six 
it will be urged that it is because bankers are aware of the 
dubious legal basis of these directives and that no other 
independent legal framework exists to ensure that they are 
followed, that nothing much in the way of obeying them has 
been done. The principal regulatory authority in the country, 
the Bank of Zambia, confines itself mainly to, the management of 
inflation and other fiscal controls. Its main enforcement 
department the inspectorate department is widely regarded in 
the bank as a dumping ground for ill-qualified and ineffective 
or erv employees. It also lacks appropriate measures or 
criteria-, 'of 'its own, and confines its, operations mainly to 
monitoring the outflow of foreign exchange and complicLnql with 
the exchange control regulations. 50 
50. Private interview, Bank of Zambia Research Department, July 
292 1986. 
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The modification to' the exchange control -'regulati6ns 
which did not appear until 1972, also did not provide any 
enforcement mechanism. In fact these regulations, have not 
incorporated the directives restricting the borrowing ability 
of non-Zambians in the way the President issued them. Under 
those modifications the Bank of Zambia, acting in accordance 
with its powers under the Bank of Zambia Act, directed that 
with effect from 10th January, 1972: 
51 
11 ., 
W applications by individuals other than Zambian citizens, 
exceeding K1,00 0 must be referred to 'the e xchange 
control authorities. 
(a) Loans or overdraf ts to any body corporate (Zambian 
or non-Zambian) which was by any means directly 
-or 
indirectly. 
-I 
(i) controlled outside Zambia- or 
(ii) controlled by persons who were not citizens 
of Zambia and 
(b) A loan to any person (individual or body corporate, 
Zambian or non-Zambian) under terms whereby such loan 
was secured, whether by guarantee or otherwise by any 
individual who was not a citizen of Zambia, or indirectly 
51. Bank of Zambia A. D. Circular No. 29v 8th January, 1972. 
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controlled outside Zambia or by anyýpersops. who were not 
citizens of Zambia were: 
(i) in the case of individuals, if the amount exceeded 
K1,000 and Ii 'ý IIII- 11 1 
(ii) in the case of a body corporate, to be referred to 
exchange control. 
(iii) Applications for foreign exchange on behalf of,, a 
body corporate were toýbe considered only within a-debt 
(equity ratio of 1: 2; i. e. - for every paid up K2 a 
company could borrow K1. -- Companies whose facilities 
exceeded the new limits wereýrequired to run, down their 
balances to a specified figure within a period of six 
months. Finally, facilities then existing which had not 
been utilised to the full extent under -previous 
approvals were not to beýmade use of-if such use of them 
entailed that, new limits would be exceeded. 
It is clear from the circular containing the directive 
that it applied to persons seeking loans for the purposes of 
obtaining foreign exchange. It is also-clear-that Zambians were 
just as much affected by the restrictions as were non- 
Zambians. Moreover, it is important to note that in subsequent 
modifications no references are in fact made to the nationality 
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of any customers seeking loans or foreign exchange. 
51 
It is also significant to point-out that the President's 
directives, including the one restricting the types of business 
for expatriates and areas where they could do their businesses 
could be circumvented and contained two undesirable 
characteristics. First they cc)ntained a recipe for corruption. 
For instance upon realising that their businesses were in 
danger of being given to indigenous Zambians or of losing 
access to loans, many expatriate businessmen registered their 
businesses in the names of Zambian born children, who were by 
law Zambian citizens. 52 There were also those who sought to 
beat the measure by themselves acquiring Zambian citizenship. 
Among this group, there were those who employed unorthodox and 
illegal means to acquire citizenship. They used bribery of 
government officials to cut-short the procedures and 
requirements relating to naturalisation or residence. Thus, in 
the accused was convicted on six the People V. Mulwanda 53 
counts of corrupt practices involving large bribes which he was 
found to have accepted as a senior civil servant for the 
purposes of giving Zambian citizenship to people who were not 
51. See e. g. Bank of Zambia, Modifications to Foreign E-x-c-. Ta--nge 
Arran ements, 1985. See also the June 1972 regulations, Chapter 
5 P. 
Nk 
52. Under Article 7 of the Independence Constitution, a person 
born in Zambia whose father was an established resident became 
a citizen at the time of his birth until the age of twenty-two 
years when he could renouce it or renew it. 
53. [1974] ZR46. See also Nzalu&we V. The People (1976] ZR176 
and SenSenta V. The People L19/bJ ZR164. 
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entitled to it. 
Secondly, with regard business areas and trade licences, 
these were potential tools for pofitical intimidation and 
antagonisation of members of the opposition. In fact, during 
one of his speeches, the President threatened to sack his 
Minister of Commerce and Industry if-he renewed trading 
licences belonging to members of the -opposition. 
54, 
ý Thus , in 
Collins Nalumino Simioti- V. Livingstone Municipal Councilp . 
55 
the applicant alleged that he was! denied a trading licence by 
reason of his membership of the opposition party. Perhaps the 
only consolation for expatriate businessmen was -that ý this 
latter power was directed mainly at indigenous-Zambians. 
other measures introduced at Mulungushi to help Zambian 
entrepreneurs were: III 
the limiting of road service licences to Zambians. In 
the case of companies, or co-operatives only those, with 
at least 75 per cent Zambian ownership could qualify. 
Limiting of the grant of building materials to Zambians. 
., I 
54. Richard Hall, The: High Price'of Principles, Kaunda and the 
White South (London: Pengull-n Atrican Library, Harmondsworth, 
1973) P. 52. 
55. Selected Judgements of Zambia (No. 9 of i969) . Lusaka High 
Court, Civil Case No. 1969/HP/43 P. 54. See also Chandacka V. 
Luanshxa MuniciRal Council Selected Judgements of Zambia (No. 1 
ot 19b9) Ndola High CourE Civil Case No. 1969/HN/169 P. 99. See 
also a related case of Chilufya V. City Council of Kitwe (19671 
ZR115. 
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a directive to large companies wishing to . make sub- 
contracts to hire Zambian sub-contracters. 
(iv) Awarding PWD contracts of less than K100,000 only to 
Zambian businessmen. 
Finally, the government introduced active state 
participation in leading industries so as to achieve 
full control of the means of production (outside the 
mining sectors. Owners of twenty-six-big companies were 
invited to sell 51 per cent of their equity - to the 
state. INDECO was instructed to carry, out theý 
negotiations for these acquisitions and to hold the, -51 
per cent equities on behalf of the government. 
(b) The Matero Economic Reforms: - The second round of economic- 
reforms was announced at, Matero township on 11th August 
1969,56 where the President made known his intention to 
takeover 51 per cent shares in existing and future 
mining companies. Naturally this came as. a shock as 
hardly a year earlier, during the, Mulungushi reforms, 
the President had promised to leave the mines alone, 
saying they were "too big business for -us,,. 
57 The 
President explained that this moye was unavoidable as it 
56. Kaunda D. K. , "TowarE[s Complete Independence"; The Matero 
speech, August 11, OT97TEusaka, ZISj Government Printer). 
57. Zambia's Economic Revolution op. cit. 
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had become imperative for the state to have a stake, in 
the dominant means- of creating wealth and, use that. to 
spread development. 
(c) The Last Economic Reforms - The wave of economic reforms 
was completed on 10th November, 1970,58 when the 
President announced, his government's intention to. lenter 
the financial field, which comprised the banks, 
insurance companies ,. building societies and hire 
purchase companies. The President was critical of the 
staffing policies. of the banks and the rate at which 
I 
they opened new branches in rural areas as well as their 
policies towards lending to Zambians. Although the 
government had established the National Commercial Bank 
in 1969, it was felt that this would necessarily take 
time to expand. 59 It'-was therefore decided to take 51 
per cent of the shares of the Standard Bank and those of 
the Barclays Bank DCO. Barclays Bank DCO would then be 
merged with" the National Commercial Bank to form a new 
state bank with 49 per cent of the shares accruing to 
Barclays Bank DCO. A second national bank yould be 
established through the merger of the Standard Bank and 
T 
. )b. Zambia, This Completes Economic Reforms: "Now Zambia is ours", An Address by President Kaunda, 10th November, 1970. 
59. See Bank of Zamb'ia, Report and Statement of Accounts for 
the Year ended December 31st, 1970. P-35. 
-190- 
the remaining banks, viz, the National and Grindlays 
Bank and the Commercial Bank of Zambia Limited. The only 
accepting house in the country, the Merchant Bank would 
also be required to offer 51 per cent of its shares to 
the state. The president also announced that all foreign 
insurance companies and building societies would be 
closed and their businesses would be taken over by the 
Zambia State Insurance Corporation and the Zambia 
National Building Society respectively. At the same time 
a Finance Development Corporation (FINDECO) was formed 
to take care of government interests in all- financial 
organisations as would INDECO in industry and MINDECO in 
mining. All three were in turn to be subsidiaries of the 
Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO). 
What was most notable about the government's . stated 
intention to participate in the banking sector was the change 
of method of that participation. In the past the practice was 
to acquire 51 per cent of the existing share capital. In the 
.I 
case of the banks, the government wanted to participate in the 
existing enterprises by contributing additional capital. The 
60 President explained this change of strategy as follows: 
"In the case of the banks, I am aware that they are in 
_. 
need of additional capital if they are going to break 
away from their parent organisations. In view of this, 
instead of buying 51 per cent of their shares and thus 
making a payment, we shall acquire control by additional 
9 Supra note 55. at P. 10. 
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contribution thus ensuring that all the existing capital 
of the banks will remain in the country. " 
The details of the arrangement were never released and 
negotiations between the banks and the committee representing 
the government of Zambia, with the Attorney-General as chairman 
and including the governor and ex-governor of the Bank of 
Zambia as members, continued into 1971. These negotiations 
eventually aborted. In the words of Mr. Mwanakatwe (then 
Minister of Finance), when introducing the Banking Bill: 61 
"It became evident from the very beginning of the 
negotiations that the terms and conditions under which 
the commercial banks were prepared to hand-over to the 
state would not be properly reconciled with the 
government's objectives and the terms and conditions 
demanded by the commercial banks (except the Commercial 
Bank (Zambia) Limited) were extortionate and 
unreasonable. They could not be accepted by the 
government. Consequently, in the absence of reasonable 
basis for a compromise, the negotiations for the take- 
over of banking business in Zambia had to be abandoned". 
This failure by the government to reach an agreement 
with the banks, has been interpreted by Rothchild and Curry as 
a sign that the government had learned a lesson from its take 
over of the mining companies where the master agreement as well 
as the management contracts were heavily loadedýin favour of 
the companies. 62 They also saw it as a reflection of the power 
61. Banking Bill 1971,2nd Reading, National Assembly Debates, 
No. 28 of 23rd November - 3rd December 1971 at P. 297. 62. Donald Rothchild and Robert L. Curry (jr) ' Scarcity, Choice and Public Policy in Middle Africa (Berkeley: University ot 
California Press, 1978) P. 1b/. See also J. M. Mulwila, supra P. 102. and Patu Simoko p Why Under Development? (Lusaka: Third World Publications, 1981) PP. lb-Z-'). For the Master Agreement, 
see M. L. O. Faber and J. G. Potter, Supra note 6. 
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of multinational companies over small and economically weak 
countries. 
To preserve at least a degree, of its objectives in the 
financial sector, following the failure to negotiate a 
settlement with the banks, the government introduced the 
Banking Act, 1971 which introduced a revised policy-on banking. 
The Act withdrew the Merchant Bank's monopol-f , in the sphere 
of accepting and discounting bills and authorised all 
commercial banks to engage in that" business. 1 63 It also 
introduced changes in the sphere of capitalization, management 
licensing and registration. 64 
4: 3 The Economic Situation After Reforms. 
The reforms of 1968 to 1971 were followed, in 1972 by a 
new National Development. Plan whose objectives were, the 
following: 65 
to improve the rural standards of living and create a 
self-reliant and progressive rural society. 
(ii) to create new jobs in the rural areas and to improve 
Anfrastructural-services related to increased rural 
63. The Banking Act, 1971 Section 4(4). 
64. See Chapters One and Three. 
65. Republic of Zambia. Second National Development Plan 1972- 
76. PP. 3-4. 
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productivity in order to curtail rural-urban drift. 
to increase the contribution of the rural sector to the 
gross domestic product. 
to promote a diversified national economy. 
(v) to achieve self-sufficiency in staple foods and-reduce 
dependence on imports. 
(vi) to improve nutritional standards by increasing 
production and encourage consumption of protein-rich and 
protective foods. 
These aspirations together with the measures already 
discussed were intended by the government to see the country 
into a prosperous future. Unfortunately however, Zambia's 
national economy continues- to show no signs of improvement. In 
fact by the time of the introduction of the Third 'Naiional 
Development Plan in`1979, the economy was in total disarray. in 
1970 the economic picture ceased to be as bright as it had been 
during the aftermath of independence. The boom of the early 
independence years became eroded by' the ensuing" fluctuations 
in copper prices and demand. The enormous expenditure within a 
short time, on too many social projects and services which 
occurred after independence also contributed to the. decline, as 
did the re-routing of imports 
'and 
exports through East Africa 
after UDI and later during the Angolan Civil War. While Most of 
the investment in social services was necessary and constituted 
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a significant response to the legitimate expectations of the 
people, in circumstances commonly known as the "crisis of 
expectations", 66 there is no doubt that a degree of spacing 
might have eased the burden somewhat. In doing so Rene Dumont's 
lesson that, too much emphasis and investment in social 
structures or infrastructure in a backward country is tantamant 
to sacrificing the hope of increasing production in order to 
gain immediate satisfaction and is in the long run anti-social, 
would have been learned. 67 In other words, policies oriented 
in the line of social investment lead to an inevitable drying 
up of monetary resources as no local wealth is created by 
social infrastructure. Immediate evidence of such drying up of 
resources in Zambia's case should have been seen from the 
government's failure to meet the targets it set for itself Jn 
the first national development plan, such as the. creation-, of 
one hundred thousand jobs by 1970. Similarly, the failure of 
the plan's objectives to achieve an investment of K560 million 
during the four years of its duration also ought to have 
induced caution. Of the government's resources earmarked-for 
investment in accordance with the plan, all had been wiped. out 
by the end of the second year. 68 Needless to say, this was an 
bb. see Anthony Martin. op. cit. 
67. Rene Dumont, False Start in Africa (London: Andre Deutsch, 
1966) P. 48. See also Richard Hair-, `2ambia; the First Twenty 
Years", Observer Magazine Survey, 21st October, 1984. - 68. See Third National Development Plan, 1979. P. 4. See also 
Anthony Martin o. cit. P. 40 and Richard Hall, Observer 
Magazine , Supr; PI-H= 
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indication that though private investment and loans had been 
solicited but largely declined, they ought to have been 
courted further on a different strategy than that employed in 
the reforms and related legislative enactments. The decline is 
also an indication that by themselves development plans are of 
limited value. In this regard it is notable that both the 
central and provincial governments have lamentably failed to 
implement the planned objectives. It is also notable that 
improperly appraised projects are not uncommon. Other notable 
factors are the acý-ute shortages of skilled manpower and the 
existence of price controls that are unrelated to economic 
costs and therefore stifle development, despite plans to do 
otherwise. 
The situation of decline is aggravated by the rapid 
population growth which ' has seen the country's overall 
population move from 4.3 million in 1971 to over 6 million by 
1979, an increase of 3.2 per cent per year. 69 Another, factor 
was the occurence of a mine disaster at Mufulira at the end of 
1970 which adversely affected the overall national income, 
balance of payments and budgetary receipts. 70 The impromptu 
redemption of the ZIMCO lbanstock and bonds -71 in' 1972 also 
caused the national income to dwindle even further. These were 
69. Third National Development Plan 1979. P. 2. 
70. Ibid. 
71. These were the means of payment for the Mines which were 
taken over in 1969 in accordance with the Master agreements. 
Upon realising that the country had been out manoev,. red by the 
Mining team at negotiations the president abruptly announced 
the redemption of the bonds and loan stock. See Address by 
President Kaunda. State House, 31st August, 1973. 
__ 
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not due for redemption until 1978 in the case of the,, bonqs and- 
1986 in that of the loanstock. 72 
A further aggravation arose from rising import costs. 
The country was paying enormous amounts on oil and other 
imported goods. Indeed contrary to what had been envisaged in 
the import-substitution programme enshrined in the second 
national development plan, the country sank even deeper into 
the system of importing highly-capital intensive technology' as 
well as raw materials. On top of that the country has had to 
carry its exports to the door-steps of its customers while 
buying its requirements from those door-stýps and bririging them 
all the way home at enormous cost. The level of mismanagement, 
bureaucratic red tape, corruption, subsidies, wastefulness and 
unquenchable lust for luxuries, are also taking their toll on 
the country's resources. 
73 ýOne has only to -look at the 
management scene in business to-confirm this. That -scene is 
littered with political appointees, many of'. them members. of 
more than one business, a factor which denies them adequate 
time to concentrate on the affairs of any business let alone 
understand them. Other concerns are -headed by,, former civil 
servants or primary school teachers whose only contribution to 
72. For details on the terms of the Master Agreement see-m-.!: -. U-. 
Faber and J. G. Potter, op. cit. 
73. The passing of the Corrupt Practices, Act-(No-14) of 1980 at 
least confirms the view that corruption is endemic. See also 
E. F. Ssempebwa, "Law in the context of underdevelopment": 
Comment on the Industrial Development 'Act, 1977,7-9-. Zambia 
Law Journal 1975-77on the view that lust for luxuries is now 
entrenEFFET7 
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their companies is red tape and secrecy, 74 These people's 
understanding of business operation is dubious. With the almost 
daily reshufTles that the President makes in company management, 
whereby erring managers are merely transferred to other 
companies rather than dismissed, most of the managers adopt a 
hands off approach so that they earn transfers to bigger and 
more rewarding companies. How their current companies are doing 
is therefore immaterial, as personal success is not tied to 
business success. This indifference is accompanied. in all 
cases by huge expenditures on personal comforts like free 
electricity, entertainment, water, cars, servants, guards, 
travel and holiday allowances. 7,5 1 
To these problems must be added the ravages of the 
weather which have often reduced crop harvests, and the impact 
of inflation in the industrial world with its disast-. rous 
impact on the exports of primary commodities. The result is 
that by 1980, per capita' G. D. P. was only K250 in real 'terms, 
representing a'droP' of- sOýe 20'per cent below the 1970 level. 
Indeed even this figure understates* the disast. rous declines of 
the second 'half of the 1970s. From 1974 to 1984, real G. D. P. 
per head was halved, private consumption per head declined in 
real terms by one-third, expenditure on government services per 
head by nearly one-quarter and government capital expenditure 
by nearly two-thirds. 76 By 198'0 severe shortages 
74. See John M. MUlwila pp. it, 
_. 
SL 
75. Patu Simoko, supra note 60. at P. 32. 
76. Richard Jolly op. cit. 
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of foreign exchange, basic'goods (including basic food-stuffs, ) 
and for many Zambians, especially those in rural areýs, 'severe 
pressures on living standards$ became a common phenomenon. 
Even though the government, recognised much, earlier, that 
one of the principal factors -in the deterioration, of the 
countryls economic performance,. was lack of investment, it was 
not until 1977 that another enactment was made to woo foreign 
investors. The Industrial Development Act 77 provided a set of 
incentives to foreign investors, who invested in manufacturing 
and brought technology into the country. Even this however has 
done nothing to prevent the downward trend. Not many investors 
took advantage of it. 78 Although there was a slight growth in 
1983, due mainly to an improvement in copper prices the 
subsequent down turn in 1984 prevented that improvement being 
sustained. The picture on the balance of payments and foreign 
exchange side has generally been similar and disturbing. The 
balance of payments has deteriorated sharply over the period of 
economic difficulties, resulting-in the implementation in 1978 
of a two year IMF stabilisation programme. But despite a slight 
stability, the country's domestic and external problems could 
not be cured and another appeal was made tolthe IMF in 1981 for 
bailing out. This reliance on the IMF continued for sometime, 
allowing f6r a short lapse in 1982 over allegations'of 
77. No. 18 of 1977. 
78. See Anthony Martin, op. cit. P. 86. 
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government non-compliance with the terms, until 1987 when 
negotiations irretrievably broke down. In 1985 meanwhile, a 
system of auctioning foreign exchange had been introduced to, 
allow for the most importers to have access to 
foreign exchange, as the country's,. reserves had literally 
disappeared. This method was also unsuccessful as bidders used 
it to externalise funds as well as bring in more luxuries. 
Today with a debt of more than US $5 billion, 79 and despi'te-' 
occasional rescheduling of payments and donations of aid, 
Zambia's economy is in a sorry state. Even food stuffsý which 
could be locally produced if local investments by local people 
with the help of local lenders are made, are becoming a problem 
for most people. 
4: 4 Conclusion 
It is clear from the foregoing deýails that economic 
diversification and development have not been easy to induce 
in Zambia. Colonial governments of all kinds showed reluctance 
to commence non-mining ventures largely for what they called 
reasons of capital inadequacy. This was however, said 'in the 
face of enormous profits arising from copper mining and sales 
which were externalised as dividends; and in the case of1those 
made during federation, poured into Southern Rhodesia. 
It was not until the late 1930s that attitudes began to 
79. Times of Zambia, 4th December, 1986. 
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change and the need to improve the welfare of 
I 
the colonial 
peoples began to be accepted. Some measures were therefore 
introduced to achieve this goal. These measures 
-or 
policies 
81 were enacted into law in Great Britain in 1940 80 and 1945, 
The territorial governments were offered financial inducements 
and directed to promote economic growth in their territories. 
But even af ter such policies and laws were adopted the 
territorial authorities in Northern Rhodesia still continued to 
express less enthusiasm to initiate change ' on account of 
financial difficulties. It was generally agreed however -that 
the best way to stimulate diversity was by inducing private 
investment. Such inducements were however met with obstructions 
like the obvious bias in favour of Southern Rhodesia during 
federation and the existence of racialism which prevented, a 
general extension of services like creditf,,, marketing and 
technical skills to all peoples. . 
Government participation had 
therefore to be called back for and this led to the creation, of 
the Industrial Loans Board which. subsequently became, INDECO in 
1960. Other public bodies were the Agricultural Loans Board 
which changed twice to Land Board, and Land Bank, respectively. 
When the independence government came to power in 1964, 
it took note of the problems which existed before independence 
80. The Colonial Development and Welfare Act, 1940. - 1 
81. The Colonial Development and Welfare Act,. 1945. 
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and resolved that it would take even bolder steps to initiate 
development. A new industrial policy Which laid more stress on 
private investment and individual initiative was introduced. A 
new set of incentives were also introduced. Under the new- 
industrial policy the governfnP_nt undertook to refrain from 
investment ventures itself except where private investors were, 
unavailable or unable to venture on their own. It limited its 
participation to the provision of infraltures and necessary 
social services. Where state participation was-required on 
account of non-availability of private investors or their 
inability to do so, INDECO was to be the principal instrument of 
the government. It was also authorised to assist private 
investors with resources, know-how and other facilities. 
But despite this liberal approach, the problems of 
inadequate investment in Zambia continued. These consisted of 
unwillingness on the part of immigrant private entrepreneurs to 
expand their business and identify with the country's 
aspirations. They also included the absence of financial 
resources, especially to aspiring Zambians owing mainly to the 
reluctance of financial institutions to help them. The 
government was therefore forced to reverse its earlier policy 
to assume a much bigger role in the country's economic life. 
Three sets of economic reforms were OLnnounced and the 
government acquired 51 per cent in most of the leading sectors, 
including the mines. Though similar measures in the banking 
sector did not materialise, the government attempted to achieve 
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its goals by introducing stricter legislative controls of 
operations. To date these measures have produced dismal 
results; if any. The economy has deteriorated to levels worse 
even than before independence. Admittedly other factors have 
played a major role in this decline. These factors include the 
introduction of UDI in Rhodesia which introduced new and 
expensive alternative trading and transportation relations, the 
decline in the price and demand for coppert the drought, 
mismanagement and corruption as well as lack 'of foreign 
exchange and the mounting foreign debt. 
In chapter f ive we shall look into precisely how the 
country's banks responded to the calls for diversification. The 
chapter will establish the actual levels of participation so as 
to establish the legitimacy of the notion that their 
participation was unsatisfactory. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE ROLE OF COMMERCIAL BANKS IN fAMBIA'S DEVELOPMENT 
5: 0. Introduction 
This chapter evaluates the role played by banks in 
fulfilling government objectives for economic development. it 
has been seen that since the discovery of rich copper deposits 
in Zambia, the need. for investment and working capital has 
remained high. During the early colonial days, the acuteness 
of the situation was revealed by admissions that ýýwere made 
prior to and after the change of policy by the imperial 
government in favour of colonized and dependent peoples. 
1 
-The 
new policy which was later enshrined in the colonial 
Development and Welfare Acts of 1940 and 1945 required 
administrative authorities in all colonial, and dependent 
territories to actively undertake measures aimed at improving 
the welfare of the native inhabitants of those territories. 
They were also required to undertake measures that would 
initiate a system of growth and economic development in their 
territories and to encourage private businesses and persons to 
invest there. 
Before the coming , into . being of the imperial 
government's policy Northern Rhodesia's governmentýreported 
1 See Chapter Four. 
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that it was running budget deficits, as a result of which it 
could not contemplate any non-mining investment ý in the 
territory. Even after the coming iiito being of that policy 
however, the government's assertions of financial difficulty 
2 did not cease. Perhaps the best known and principal cause of 
the shortage of financial resources for investment in Northern 
Rhodesia, a territory which was one of the leading producersýof 
a highly profitable copper mineral, was the creation of the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. But before that, there 
were other causes. These included the attitudes of the 
administrators themselves and the settlers who saw the country 
only as a narrow market territory. Their policies towards 
agricultural production and marketing also did little to 
encourage the emergence of alternative sources of revenue. In 
addition, such policies as job reservations, poll taxes and 
poor social services for the Africans merely served to entrench 
stereo types against the majority Africans and inhibited the 
occurrence of conducive conditions for diverse growth based on 
objective considerations. 
One indication of this paradox of fixed attitudes is 
----that even- after the government of Northern Rhodesia'-had 
realised that the solution to the problem of capital shortage 
lay in the 
-opening up . 
to private sources of capital and 
investment, not much improvement occurred. In terms of that 
realization the government had resolved that it would not 
Chapter Four P. M. 
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participate in industry or give loans unless it was revealed 
after careful enquiry why such investments or loans could not 
be provided by private sources. 3 While banks and other 
financial institutions continued to offer services, their 
response could certainly not be described as revolutionary. 
One of the principal causes of their caution and reluctance to 
openly identify with the government's policy was said to be the 
uncertainty of the territory's future. Dr Busschau4-was told 
in this regard that: 
"Capital will not flow to the territory unless 
the colonial office decides whether this is to 
be a white or a black man's country". - 
As a result of these hard positions of the expatriate 
community and businesses, it became clear that non-mining 
development would be very difficult to attain in Northern 
Rhodesia. It was also for the same reasons that the 
legislative council was compelled in the early 1950s to create 
the Industrial Loans Board and in later years INDECO to 
dispense loans for other kinds of investment. I 
3 See-Chapter Four P. 165. 
4 W. J. Busschau, Northern Rhodesia Report on the Development 
of Secondary Industries. Lusaka 1945, P. 40. 
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5: 1. Pre-Independence Commercial Bank Advances 
Tha t the territorial government 1had 
to enter the 
investment process by creating alternative institutions did not 
mean that the Banks were doing nothing . at all. 
As stated 
before, these institutions offered services. but only of a 
limited kind. But due to the absence of proper records it is 
not possible to determine the volume of any bank joans that 
occurred before the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland came 
into being. According to Sowelem5 however, the activities of 
commercial banks during that time were characterlsed by two 
things. First they were mainly service oriented. In other 
words, they confined the bulk of their operations to acting as 
transmission channels which only handled 'funds for their 
expatriate customers, businesses and government. On the 
advances and loans side, and this is the second aspect, they 
geared their operations largely to one direction, namelYP that 
of meeting the needs of importers and exporters of goods 
between the U. K., Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. These 
requirements were mainly temporary and introduced few potential 
risks as bank books could be balanced once the bills of sale 
and lading or any other forms of promise to pay had been 
delivered. 
The best time for judging the lending aspects of the 
5 R. A. Sowelem, Towards, Financial Independence in a 
Developing Economy. (to-ndon : George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 
19b/) P. /9. 
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territory's banks before independence then would be the 
Federation period. During that, time the level of credits to 
public and private sectors did indeed rise. Thus in 1952 for 
instance, total loans worth L25 million were recorded. But by 
1963 these had risen to E53.2 million for the public sector 
alone, an increase of more than 50 per cent with some sectors 
recording even higher takings. During the same period banks 
invested Z5.4 million in expansion and other services. * 
The flow of credits during the period under discussion 
however, was neither uniform nor consistent. There were times 
when the rate of increase was comparatively higher, as for 
instance between 1954 and 1956, and in 1960. In other years 
they declined significantly. One of the reasons for the low 
levels of credit over the greater part of the federation, period 
was the rate of fluctuation in the price and volume of copper 
sales which in turn affected the level of foreign exchange 
reserves. Because of such decreases in reserves credit 
availability declined because the government reacted by 
imposing credit restrictions and increased interest rates. 
Another important reason for the decline was the introduction 
of other sources of credit, although in the case of Northern 
Rhodesia such sources were introduced as a reaction to the lack 
of adequate credit in the first place. These sources were the 
Land and Agricultural Bank, the Industrial Loans Board and 
* see R. A. Soweleml op. cit. 
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statutory commission bills in respect of those of statutory 
boards and commissions. When the statutory commission bills 
were discontinued in 1959,, the bodies concerned were catered 
for by the government by way of treasury bills. 
By and large the most notable aspect about the 
dispensation of credit in Rhodesia and Nyasaland was the uneven 
way in which it was done, especially in relation to population 
groups and industries. As far as the African needs were 
concerned, the attitude. of bankers was most notable for their 
unwillingness to expand their operations to rural areas. Taken 
together with the other physical and material handicaps that 
afflicted Africans as a whole, vis, their disadvantages in the 
areas of employment, collateral, title , to land, and ignorance 
of business management, this attitude on the - part of 
bankers 
effectively ruled out any *meaningful extension of advances to 
the African sector. It was rather to the European sectors, 
especially in Southern Rhodesia, that most advances went. Thus 
when examining the pattern of credit dispensation by pre- 
independence 
that: 6 
banks in Zambia, the Seers Commission reported 
"One important feature of commercial banks in 
Zambia is the fact that loans to the public 
(enterprises and consumers) amount to only a 
fourth of their deposits from the public. It 
is not clear how commercial banks have invested 
the remaining three-fourths of their deposits, 
6 Report of the UN/ECA/FAO Economic Survey Mission on the 
Economic Development of Zambia (Ndola: Falcon Press, 1964), 
P. 141. 
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but presumably a substantial part has been lent 
to customers in Southern Rhodesia and other 
countries". 
T 
Another important aspect of the credit situation in 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland which tends to confirm the assumption 
that most of the loans went to Southern Rhodesia, was that the 
actual distribution of loans did not really take cognisance of 
the sectoral or subsectoral contribution to the GDP. In other 
words had the contribution to the GDP been the criterion for 
enjoying higher levels of loans, then Northern Rhodesia's 
copper mines which contributed the greatest share of revenue to 
the federal economy would have received the highest levels. 
But in reality the mines did not receive much from the banks 
albeit by choice to some degree. Thý mining companies saw 
little need to resort to local commercial banks for vital 
credits. These companies were in the hands of giant 
international companies and as such they relied mostly on their 
parent companies or had loans raised for them outside central 
Africa. 7 
Aside from that element of choice other determinant 
factors in the way loans and advances flowed were the practices 
and traditions that shaped British connected banks at that 
time. Those practices and traditions, commonly known as "the 
demand following finance" doctrines taught that it was not the 
business of banks to create conditions for investment; rather 
7 R. A. Sowelem op. cit., P. 79. 
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their capital must be attracted by already existing and less 
8 risky opportunities. Accordingly such banks tend to prefer 
short term self-liquidating loans. As far as the banks in 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland were concerned this tendency is clearly 
demonstrated by the following statement of a representive of 
British overseas banks operating in Africa which was made to 
the Radcliffe Committee. 9 
"we do not feel it is any part of our duty as 
bankers to provide more than temporary borrowing". 
The underlying characteristic which makes self- 
liquidating short-term loans attractive is their predictability 
and the swiftness with which the banks can react to situations 
that may prevent recovery. These loans were seen as safe as 
they were usually supported with exported or imported goods or 
certificates thereof and* marketable agricultural products. 
Furthermore, as they were short-term they were less likely to 
be rendered unprofitable by the effects of depreciation or 
other contingencies that visit long-term loans. Thus, as far 
as the banks were concerned their credit levels were adequate 
because they were able to monitor them. 
In terms of the mining companies and other important 
sectors it was not worthwhile depending on the banks for 
working capital and other requirements because their outlook 
8 See Chapter One. 
9 Committee on the working of the Monetary System, "Minutes of 
Evidence" q. 4372 cited in R. A. Sowelem op. cit. 
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and that of the banks were founded on different premises. As 
long term investors the mining companies sometimes took long to 
realise profits, and as such they could not all the time be 
expected to be in a position to discharge short-term 
obligations. With those leading entities out of the race for 
bigger loans smaller enterprises and other commercial activists 
enjoyed the bulk of the loans. Those enterprises and activists 
fell into three categories. These were in manufacturing, non- 
African agriculture and distribution. As earlier stated, the 
bulk of these were situated in Southern Rhodesia. In Table 6 
the distribution of commercial bank advances is demonstrated. 
TABLE 
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As can be seen from Table 6 (overleaf) bank advances to 
the manufacturing sector were quite high, during the period of 
federation reaching L66.5 million in-1963 compared with f. 26.9 
million in 1954. This placed manufacturing in second place 
after mining which had 993.8 million in 1954 and 9111.4 million 
in 1963 respectively. Two factors influenced this rise in the 
level of lending the manufacturing sector. The first was that 
there was reluctance on the part of the parent companies to 
supply funds to their subsidiaries in Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
due to the unsettled political situation, particularly at the 
end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s. In the 
absence of such support local manufacturing enterprises looked 
to the banks for their short-term needs. A significant 
expansion in manufacturing was also taking place, particularly 
in Southern Rhodesia where it was encouraged by settler leaders 
who sought to achieve the confidence of white settlers as well 
as to establish a more stable country for their permanent 
settlement. 10 
The second source of influence over the levels of 
commercial bank credits to the manufacturing sector was the 
increasing expenditure on industrial development-- -which was 
taking place in the United Kingdom itself. That expansion 
obliged the parent companies to many of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland's companies to invest more at home; compelling their 
subsidiaries to turn to local' banks for injections of working 
capital. 
10 R. A. Sowelem op. cit., P. 80 
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A sector which absorbed the largest proportion of bank 
advances during federation was distribution. This sector 
covered a wide variety of activities in the wholesale and 
retail business. It also included dealers in new and used 
vehicles. 11 Sowelem's data on this sector again shows why it' 
was a favoured sector, namely, it represented the largest scope 
for the export and import trade which the local banks were in 
essence set up to serve. 12 
The non-African agriculture sector constituted the last 
of the most important drawers of bank loans during the period 
under discussion. This sector prospered and attracted bankers 
for two related reasons. First, this sector was a highly 
subsidised and favoured sector for which the federal government 
was directly responsible. Secondly as a result of such 
protections and favours it presented a very secure business for 
the banks which responded with ever rising credit levels. 
The loans to this sector followed a distinctive seasonal 
pattern., rising during the pre-crop seasons and declining in 
the second and third quarters of each year when repayments were 
__. 
m, ad_e 
_out 
of the 
_crop. 
ý! ales. 
11 Ibid 
12 Ibid, first data was provided in 1954. 
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5: 2. Commercial Bank Advances Before the Reforms 
As seen in the last chapter the independence government 
of Zambia came to power with a resolve to achieve economic 
development sooner rather than later. Its initial industrial 
policy showed this, albeit with an emphasis on private 
investment and credit, leaving government to become involved 
only in a supporting role or in the event of extreme necessity. 
At the same time the country was endowed with excessive 
liquidity which arose out of the booming copper sales and 
demand. The expatriate banks operating in the country 
benefited immensely from this and by the end of 1965 they were 
in possession of considerable liquidity, with spare cash held 
in banks abroad. Their total deposits which stood at about K91 
million at the end of 1965 had reached K140 million by 1965, a 
record rise of 54 per cent over a two year period. 13 
No definitive data regarding the size of credit levels' 
of commercial banks during the early years of independence are 
readily available. 14 Although a special investigation-wasý 
conducted by the Bank of Zambia in 1968, four years after its 
establishment, the interpretation of its findings was by no 
means unanimous. N. A. Nujumdarl5 for example, suggests that 
13 see C. R. M. Harvey, "Financial constraints on Zambian 
Development ", in Charles Elliot (Ed) Constraints on the 
Economic Development of Zambia (London: Oxford UNi'versity 'P-r-ess, 1911), P. 120. 
14 The Bank's coding system which operated during the early 
years of independence was not designed to furnish such 
data. 
15 N. A. Mujumdar, "The New Economic Policy - Implications for The Banking and Monetary Sectors", in J. B. Zulu and N. A. 
Mujumdar, Money, Banking and Economic Development in Zambia (Lusaka : Bank ot Zambia, 1970), p=.. 
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the total level of loans and overdrafts outstanding at the end 
of 1968 was in the order of E93 million. His co-author and one 
time Bank of Zambia Governorg J. B. Zulu16, on the other hand. 
puts the figure at E71 million. At the extreme end comes 
another researcher, C. R. M. Harvey17 who states that from the 
time of independence to June 1968, the rise in loans and 
advances amounted only to 154 million. But despite such lack 
of consensus, all are agreed that the best way to comprehend 
the significance of commercial bank credit during the aftermath 
of independence is not by looking at the distribution of such 
credit to particular industries in the economy. Instead 
virtually all their studies examine the nature of pre-reform 
credit in terms of its outflow to the local and non-local 
sectors respectively. The local sector has been treated as 
comprising the government sector industries which include both 
the central and local government, indigenous private companies 
and public corporations and boards such as the National 
Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMBOARD), the Cold Storage 
Board, the Dairy Produce Board and INDECO. In the category of 
indigenous companies were included companies which were 
exclusively owned and controlled by Zambians * as well as those 
in which Zambian interests amounted to 50 per cent or, 
16 J. B. Zulu, "Commercial Bank Credit in the Zambian Economy" 
in J. B. Zulu and N. A. Mujumdar, Ibid, p. 40. 
17 C. R. M. Harvey, "Financial Constraints on Zambian- 
Development" in Charles Elliot Ed) Constraints on the 
Economic Development of Zambia 
ýLondon 
Oxford University 
Press, 1971), P. 12Z. 
A very rare phenomenon at that time. 
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more. Obviously therefore, all those companies in which INDECO 
or Zambian nationals had controlling shares fall into this 
category and as such the credit extended to them was regarded 
as credit accruing to the Zambian sector generally. But as 
J. B. ZU, U18 points out, a strict treatment of that credit 
would have further divided it into local and non-local 
components corresponding to the respective proportions of the 
share capital contributed by each side. This would have 
revealed the true extent to which commercial bank loans were 
going to Zambians or Zambian owned businesses. At that time 
however, such a sophisticated exercise was not possible as data 
relating to the origin and levels of shareholding of the 
borrowing enterprises or persons were neither readily available 
nor required by law to be with commercial banks. They 
therefore relied on how the borrowers described themselves. 
Apart from the categories referred to above the rest of the 
economy was treated as belonging to the non-local sector. 
Having classified the sectors as shown in the preceding 
paragraph, it was established that about 77 per cent of the 
total loans and advances made by commercial banks went to the 
non-local sector. -In other__wor4s, despite incqrpor4-ting. into 
the 7-ambian sector many industries which were really foreign 
owned, it was discovered that nearly all, except just 23 per 
cent, still went to foreign owned enterprises. In addition it 
was also established that of those foreign owned enterprises 
which enjoyed the bulk of commercial bank loans, it was really 
18 Op. cit., P. 40. 
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the biggest ones that benefited most. Thus according to 
Mujumdar, of the 993 million that he had estimated to be the 
total of credit that was generated, 984 million went to this 
category. 19 J. B. Zulu20 reaches a similar conclusion, 
finding that 90 per cent of all commercial banks loans went to 
only 400 accounts with the residual 10 per cent being shared 
out to more than 6,500 accounts. Another striking feature 
about the loans to those big companies was that they were 
mostly in excess of K20,000 which explains why smaller Zambian 
enterprises could not afford them. 
21 Tables, 7,8 and 9 
illustrate this outflow. 
19 N. A. Mujumdar, op. cit. 
20 Op. cit. 
21 N. A. Mujumdar, op. cit. 
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Table 7- Loans and Overdrafts at the end of December 1968 
Government 
(including 
Central and 
Local 
Corporate Bodies Private Accounts; 
Governments Zambian Com- Non-Zambian 
but panies and Companies 
excluding pub- Public Corporations and Unspecified 
lic Corporations Corporations Categories 
corporations) Zambian Non-Zambian Total 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Banks Combined 679 2,094 12,911 51,623 987 2,588 156 71,037 
Source : J. B. Zulu, "Commercial Bank Credit in Zambia Op. Cit. P. 43. 
Table 8- Loans and Overdrafts to Zambian and Non-Zambian Sectors 
(Amounts in K'000) 
Proportion of 
Credit to 
Zambian 
Sector (1) as, 
Zambian Non-Zambian Total a percentage 
sector sector Advances of (3) 
(2) (3) (4) 
Banks Combined 16,671 54,366 71,037 23.5 
Table 9 Loans and Overdraft Outstanding 
as at the close of business 
19th April, 1968 
Limits No. of iccountS' Total amount outstanding 
Up to K1,000 4973 KI. 050,057 
K1,001 to K5,000 1074 2.373,166 
K5,001 to K10,000 302 1,942,459 
KIO. 001 to K20,000 222 3,626,361 
K20,001 and over 421 83,960,605 
TOTAL 6992 K92,952,648 
All banks (including Merchant Bank) 
Sources : J. B. Zulu, op. cit. 
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The adoption of the Mulungushi economic reformS22 and 
some of the revelations accompanying them regarding the methods 
and patterns of lending by commercial banks confirm Mujumdar 
and Zulu's findings. But by the time of those, reforms, the 
economic climate and condition of the country had begun - to 
decline. 23 In terms of'the banks-) for example, by theiend-lof 
1968 their net balances held with banks abroad had moved from 
97.8 million in 1965 to a- negative figure of -E. 5.1 million. 
This means that Zambian banks had become net borrowers . from 
banks overseas, mainly their own head' offices or parent 
companies. At the same time their internal position was 
becoming similarly precarious; -as it hadýstarted in some cases 
to press against the - -limits - set f or- - of f icial reserve 
requirements. 
The decline in the liquidity position of commercial 
banks did not however mean that the banks had no other 
resources. They still commanded considerable levels of notes 
treasury bills24 and bills of exchange25, as well as 
investments such as stocks26. -But for several reasons, these 
resources could not be easily used to alleviate the-effects of 
decline. - On the one -h&nd', ' -cash-; especially, ti: ll'-mo*ney, ', is 
22 See Chapter Four. 
23 See Chapter Four. 
24 E7.7 million. 
25 Z20.8 million. 
26 98.5 million; almost entirely in locally registered stocks. 
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usually preserved for normal banking operations such as demand 
payments to customers. It could not therefore be' used-as an 
alternative item for credit transactfons some of which 'might 
have been relatively longer-term. On the other hand, the use 
of the other alternative resources was -hampered by the non- 
availability of a capital market in the country. Admittedly 
those resources could have been discounted -with the Bank of 
Zambia. The banks however were cautious of the' Bank of 
Zambia's monopoly in fixing the discount rates, a situation 
which could have subjected them to 'real losses. It could do 
this by increasing, its discount rates or lowering the '-buying 
prices in respect of government or - local government stocks. 
The selling of short-dated assets like^ treasury 'bills " also 
would have left the banks open to the danger of losing their 
liquidity in the long-term even though it might have introduced 
no immediate loss. 
The other possibility was to incur further indebtedness 
to their head offices overseas. As HarveY27 asserts there is 
no reason why the big international banks should not be willing 
to allow head office overdrafts to branches in one part of the 
--- --vorld - albeit at the expense of branches somewhere ___ else. 
Zambian banks had in fact just moved from such a position 
whereby they were net lenders to the rest of the world by way 
of transferring most of their excess liquidity and- profits to 
head offices. But although some money had indeed been received 
27 C. R. M. Harvey, op. cit... P. 126. 
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from the head offices that option was of limited significance 
and tended at times to be unreliable. International banks were 
prepared to make advances in one coiintry, in excess of the 
deposits in that country, only as a temporary measure; such as 
in respect of the seasonal requirements for agricultural 
implements and imports or marketing. Even during federation, 
any deterioration in the liquidity position of commercial banks 
was not treated differently. If anything such deteriorations 
almost always led to a corresponding slow down in the flow of 
28 credit from head offices. What this means is that Zambian 
banks would not regard head office overdraft as a definite 
source of relief during periods of low liquidity. Sowelem adds 
that the attitude of the big banks on this matter is determined 
largely by their fear of exchange rate instability which could 
lead to losses. 29 
What remained for the banks to do was restrict advances 
to their customers. Lucletly, the decision to take this measure 
was made for them when the government introduced the Mulungushi 
reforms. 30 Bank credits to non-Zambians were severely 
restricted so that Zambians could borrow from the excess 
liquidity thereby created and thus acquire new enterprises or- 
expand existing ones. Therefore as they entered the post- 
reform period Zambian, commercial banks faced reduced liquidity 
levels as well as credit restrictions. - The next section 
28 See Charles Harvey., "The Control of Credit in Zambia". The 
Journal of Modern African Studies (Vol. 3,1975), PP. 383-3 
29 A. Sowelem, op. cit., PP. 250-53. 
30 See Chapter Four. 
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discusses how they reacted to the call to identify with the 
development aspirations of the country in the midst of these 
problems. 
5: 3. Commercial Bank Activities After the Reforms 
As stated above the liquidity situation in Zambian banks 
which had been rising due to increased deposit taking during 
the post independence boom began to fall in 1968 in response to 
the rising rate of inflation and low levels of foreign exchange 
which affected business activity. During 1969 however,, a small 
recovery in deposits was recorded-, until 1970. They fell 
sharply between June and July 1970 and fluctuated thereafter 
until November of the same year when high increases occurred. 
The contractions- came as' a response to the fluctuations in 
foreign exchange reserves because enterprises tended to deposit 
their funds during periods of short supply so that they -could 
earn interest. 
But even during good periods, banks were extremely 
cautious in the loan operations after the reforms. In December 
19701 in the wake of the last reforms, total loans and advances 
were only 912 million higher than they had, been at that time 
two years earlier. While the proportion of credit available to 
the Zambian sector increased, this was rather due to the 
contrdls imposed on lending to non-Zambians than to any marked 
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rise in credit generally. 31 This is not to say however, ' that 
the government achieved complete success in its efforts to 
limit the borrowing ability of non-Zambians. As seen already 
non-Zambians could legitimately acquire credit after meeting 
the criteria of the exchange control authorities. Others 
gained credits by virtue of being companies or enterprises in 
which Zambians or the Zambian government held some 'shares. 
32 
And as there was no way of ensuring that non-Zambians would not 
use Zambian proxies to enjoy credit benefits it is, impossible 
to rule out that some of them may have used that avenue.. 
By the middle of 1971 the country's economic situation 
again began to show signs of strain. 
33 This developme I nt 
concerned the Bank of Zambia which considered it to be a sign 
that the 1968 and subsequent measureS were ineffective* Thus 
from 1972 onwards Commercial bank lending in Zambia was very 
closely monitored and regulated by the authorities. , 
In the 
next section it will be seen how such regulation and other 
factors influenced the credit situation in the country. -,.. 
While reducing the borrowing ability of the private 
sector, the measures that the authorities introduced generally 
helped to raise the level of lending by commercial banks to the 
31 See Bank of Zambia Report and Statement of Accounts for the 
year ended December 31st, 1970 (Lusaka: Bank of Zambia, 
1970), P. 9. 
32 See P. 217 above. 
33 See also Chapter Four. 
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government, thereby financing its deficit. This can be seen 
from the increases in local registered stocks which rose from 
K22.6 million at the end of 1971 to K25.2 million by 1972. The 
holdings of treasury bills also increased. On the whole 
lending to government by these measures increased by 18.9 per 
cent during 1972.34 
It was not until 1974 when monetary developments 
reflected a substantial government surplus and a turn about in 
the balance of payments situation that lending to the private 
sector was substantially relaxed and demand remained high 
throughout the year. In addition to the lowering of ceilings, 
etc, on loans, the authorities also relaxed controls on the 
issue of import licences and instructions to importers. Indeed 
a circular was introduced to this end, requesting. importers to 
finance their requirements by borrowing from -, - local 
institutions. 35 The introduction of these, instructions 
suggests that the Bank of Zambia Is controls were not, water 
tight and that the authorities had become aware that importers 
had resorted to overseas credit facilities to run their 
operations. Total credits to both Government and non- 
government sectors -during that, -period increased- by -26.9- per 
cent compared with only 18.7 per cent recorded in 1973. 
34 Quarterly Statistical. Review, Bank of Zambia Vol. 2, No. 2 of 
June 1972, P. 8. In fact 90 per cent of all government 
borrowing was provided by the banking system by 1978. See 
Michael M-tell, Government Revenue stabilization in Primary 
Producing Countries: A Model for Zambia 21 Journal of 
Modern African Studies (1983) P55 at P65. 
35 A. D. circular No. 63 of 1974. See also Bank of Zambia 
Report and Statement of Accounts for 31st Dec. 1974, p. 68. 
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But by the end of 1974 the drop -in the price and demand 
for copper again brought back recessionary'conditions. -Banking 
sector liquidity which as a result of -the! previous years) 
substantial monetary, expansion was -very high, began to decline 
gradually. Thus by, the end of 1974ý, the, liquidity level-f or 
all banks combined stood at 34.9 per cent compared with' 53.4 
per cent the previous year. This tight liquidity situation 
made it necessary, for the , authorities to take new steps, ' 
including the exercise of the power of lender of last resort, by 
the Bank of Zambia to try and shore up the economy. 
From 1975 onwards the economy has been on a downward 
track. But due to constant control by the authorities the 
liquidity levels in the banks have been rising instead of 
falling. Thus in terms of liquidity ratio this rose from 
per cent in 1974 to 125.0 per cent in 1978.37 The official 
minimum liquidity ratio requirement meanwhile had remained at 
30 per cent only. 
38 Aside from close control another 
possibility is that the government which was before the largest 
alternative channel for the bulk of that liquidity was no 
longer absorbing significant levels of it. Such government 
cotil7d haVe_'been induced by failure on the part of the 
government to meet obligations of short-term borrowing any 
longer. 
36 Bank of Zambia Report and Statement, Ibid. 
37 Michael M Bell, supra note 32. 
38 C. R. M. Harvey, supra note 14, P. 123. 
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Surprisingly! despite such potential to increase credit 
levels, at least on a selective basis only one commitment was 
made in that direction. On the contrary strict regulation 
continued to be the case. The one commitment to 'selective 
lending occurred in the sphere of agricultural marketing where 
loans were authorised seasonally to enable the marketing 
organisations such as -NAMBOARD and the - co-operatives to 
purchase produce from farmers. It would -seem that two reasons 
were responsible for the lifting of restrictions for lending to 
agricultural marketing-organisations. First it was important 
to buy crops as the government considered that task to be vital 
for political stability both in terms 'of keeping farmers 
reasonably conten-ted as well as for ensuring that food 
continued to be available. Secondly, there seems to have been 
a belief that the provision of credit for agricultural 
marketing on a non-permanent basis was in any case not unsafe 
and could not therefore seriously breach the programme of 
fiscal control which the authorities were conducting. It was 
rather thought that such credits would have less inflationary 
potential as the purchased crops were sold off fairly quickly, 
thereby enabling the marketing organisations to pay back the 
loans. With regard to lending to the farmers themselves, this 
will be discussed later- when the directions of bank loans and 
priorities pursued by individual banks ''in their lending 
operations are dealt with. 
-228- 
As a result of the decline in the country's economic 
performance, coupled with other factors commercial bank lending 
declined in Zambia by 49.1 per cent; from. K893.9 million in 
December 1977 to only K454 million in December 1978.39 
' It was 
only with the adoption of new policies in 1985 that significant 
changes in credit levels occurre4'ýO With 'th'os-e* changes, 
commercial bank credits to the. public and statutory boards, at- 
least shot up to K1,224.8 million by September' i985. K80 
million of this figure was however provided by ' the Bank of 
Zambia to commercial banks for the purposes of lending to the 
parastatal sector. 41 At the same time commercial bank 
holdings of treasury bills rose by K44.9 million to K551.2 
million, nearly half of the ordinary commercial bank credit. 
This is an indication that government borrowing has once again 
began to dominate. the lending scene despite promises to- 
restructure the economy so as to put,, productive investment 
ahead of government budgetary requirements and deficit. Table 
10 illustrates the yearly loans and advance totals from 1971 to 
1985. 
39 See Bank of Zambia Report and Statement of Accounts for the 
year ended December 31st, 1978, P. 78. 
40 See Chapter Four above. 
41 Bank of Zambia, Quarterly and Statistical Review, Vol. 17, 
No. 3, September 1985. 
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TABLE 10 
TOTAL LOANS AND ADVANCES TO THE PUBLIC SECTOR (K'000) 
YEAR TOTAL 
1971 141,733 
1972 157,808 
1973 160t416 
1974 270p377 
1975 328,459 
-1976' 324,730 
1977 3339022 
1978 301,590 
1979 387,340 
1980 4319576 
1981 6999775 
1982 747,719 
1983, ' 862,899, 
1984 11029,280 
1985 11224,827 
Source Bank, of Zambia, Quarterly Financial and Statistical 
Review, Vol. 17, No. 3, September 1985. 
5: 4. Determinants of Commercial Bank Lending to the Economy ., 
The principal determinants of the lending choices and 
patterns of commercial banks in Zambia are not really different 
from those that influenced it before independence. Some of the 
determinants I are: 
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5: 4: 1. The Demand Following Finance Doctrine 
a-' 
As seen in Chapter One the underlying theme of this 
doctrine is that the principtZi objective for setting up a bank 
is to ensure that it is a profitable business. Under this 
doctrine long term profitability is considered to be bad 
banking practice. For this reason a bank could not be 
established in the hope that it will attract business. In 
other words the attitude of British bankers, that banks should 
follow business, rather than the other way round,, became the 
norm in post colonial banks. 
During the' colonial days the notion that banks would 
only be established where profitability was assured was easily' 
fulfilled. As seen, the colonial relationship was basically 
one in which raw materials were collected or bought from the 
colonies and sold abroad. In return the colonies acted as 
markets for the metropolitan finished ýroducts. Such a 
relationship ensured that the business of banking flourished 
through the handling of the funds involved concerned" and by 
making nominal loans to keep the 'relationship going. 'Side by 
side with the doctrine ad --depicted here-', * w_eift -the "real bills 
principle" whereby banks were made to consider self-liquidating 
loans as a model banking practice. 42 
42 See G. O. Nwankwo, "Bank Lending in a Developing Economy 
The Nigerian Experience", in Journal of African Law (19751 
P. 87. 
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The survival of these two doctrines into present day 
banking has created certain undesirable consequences. Some of 
them are that rural areas which are- considered, to be of no 
valuable business prospect are under-repre sent ed in terms of 
branches. Secondly, there has been scarcely-any contact with 
the local people as they continue to be viewed -as an 
unnecessary business risk. 
Other consequences are the introduction of pre- 
determined perceptions about the role of the local people. 
With regard to their role, the general notion that banks do not 
stimulate enterprise and that they merely serve it, has tended 
to continue. Local people have continued to be viewed with 
the old racial stereotypes and prejudice in respect of their 
credit requirements. Thus even though the degree of 
entrepreneurship has been -generally low amongst the indigenous 
people, not much effort has been expended by I ocal banks to 
improve it or to understand their requirements without 
sacrificing business prudence and profits. As a result of such 
perceptions even those people who possess capacity to manage 
loans properly and generate profits are denied the opportunity 
to do so. 
Finally the continuation of the doctrine seems to be due 
to the fact that the ownership of -most 
banks and the- training 
and social affiliation of those who run them continue to come 
from the same source or sources. 
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5: 4: 2. Legislative and Administrative Regulations 
Soon after realising that the 1968 and other reforms had 
been ineffective in directing the flow of loans in accordance 
with the government's specifications, the authorities decided 
to introduce further regulations. As seen in Chapter Three 
from the early 1970s onwards almost all the new regulations and 
controls by the Bank of Zambia were wholly dictated by the 
twists and turns in the declining economy; including sometimes 
the conditions of international lenders like the IMF. The 
principal aims of all controls were basically three, vis, to 
slow down inflation, trim the balance of payments problem and 
finance the government deficit through accelerated borrowing 
from the banks. With regard to this last objective it is 
important to note that even the exercise of administrative 
controls could not produce adequate levels of funds to meet the 
government Is requirements. This can be seen from the extra 
lending that the Bank of Zambia had to make. 43 All in all most 
of the controls used one weapon; the control of credit. 
5: 4: 2. (a) A. D. Circular No. 29,1972_. 
_ 
The first significant measures appeared on 8th January 
1972. These were in fact the nearest thing to the legal 
'teething' or implementation of President Kaunda's instructions 
43 See Michael M. Bell, supra. 
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in 1968 to restrict lending to non-Zambians. 
44 
-Overall 
however, they affected the practice of acquiring loans for use 
in obtaining foreign exchange. The authorities -'it -, would seem 
saw this as an unjustified way of doing business without-a. 
corresponding input in investment. 45 Another notable aspect 
was that the regulations applied to Zambians and Non-Zambians 
more or less in the same way. 
5: 4: 2. (b) The June 1972 Regulations 
These directed that: 46 
(a) from lst July 1972, the minimum reserve requirements, 
which all commercial banks were required to hold'became 12 per 
cent of their demand deposits and 8 per cent of%time deposits, 
instead of the previous rates of 8 and 3, respectivelyl- 
(b) from lst July 1972, all commercial banks were 
required to raise their holdings of minimum liquid a ssets from 
25 per cent to 28 per cent of total liabilities. 
44 --See Chapter Four, P. 183. 
45 During the 1986-87 auctioning of foreign exchange lending 
in this was -- ; seen as a device by commercial banks to 
earn more profits from interest payments, as the higher 
the loans they made the higher the bids their clients 
made. It therefore had the undesirable effect of raising 
the rate of exchange. See Zambia Daily Mail, July 23,1986 
" iorex Loophole Sealed", P. 1 
46 Bank of Zambia Quarterly Statistical Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 
June 1972, P. 9. 
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(c) the percentage of liquid assets which could be-held 
by each bank in the form of bills -of exchange and promissory 
notes eligible for discount at the Bank of -Zambia was, not 
allowed to exceed 20 per cent after June 30th and 10-per cent 
by 31st July. Previously there was no limit on the amount, of 
such bills. 
(d) all locally registered stocks issued by the 
government of Zambia, irrespective of maturity date were 
required to be counted as liquid assets. Before only 
securities with a final maturity of six years or less could be 
counted as liquid assets. 
47 I 
With respect to this last regulation, its effect was to 
increase the volume of commercial bank liquidity without a 
corresponding increase in lending. With only one buyer for 
their stocks; the Bank of Zambia, the ability of commercial 
banks to turn stock liquidity into cash liquidity for lending 
was severely limited. As seen already, the banks were also 
liable to heavy losses by selling longer dated assets before 
maturity, as the Bank of Zambia enjoyed wide discretion in 
fixing discount and buying rates. 
In addition to the foregoing measures, the Bank of 
Zambia also ensured that-balances held with overseas banks were 
not treated as part of commercial banks' liquid assets in 
accordance with Section 21(3) of the Banking Act. By way of 
47 See Chapter Three, note 65. 
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omission that provision effectively declassified those 
balances, other than items in transit, from being part of the 
minimum liquidity requirement or any other form of liquidity. 
Before this change, Section 21(4) of the Banking Act, 1964 
permitted banks to consider overseas balances as part of the 
liquidity requirement or loanable liquid assets. With this new 
change commercial banks could no longer divert some of it for 
their local lending requirements. 
It is not clear why the government took this measure, 
It would only seem that it was aimed at removing the ability of 
banks to externalise profits by purporting that they were 
repaying loans which had been made with such foreign based 
assets. It must also have been felt , that., 
if balances with 
overseas banks continued to be treated as part of the overall 
liquidity, then banks could claim that they were entitled to 
keep them up to -date for that purpose alone or in accordance 
with the terms of the minimum liquidity requirements of the 
Banking Act. Either way such a situation would involve the 
country's foreign exchange earnings and reserves being further 
eroded. 
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5: 4: 2. (c) The Creation of a Pipeline 
In 1978 it was directed that all the funds which were in 
transit to overseas claimants, be they exporters, individuals 
or governments were to be placed in a special deposit at the 
Bank of Zambia, as opposed to staying in the premises of the 
commercial banks responsible 'for handling them. 
48 This 
measure was aimed both at mopping up some of the excessive 
liquidity that had developed in the banks and at preventing 
commercial banks from using them for business purposes, namely,, 
lending. 
5: 4: 3. International Agreements 
Towards the end of 1978 a package of much tighter 
monetary and credit controls was introduced as a result of the 
Zambia/IMF programme, whereby the latter agreed to provide a 
standby facility to help the country's budgetary and balance of 
payments requirements. These controls were also considered to 
__be a necespaxy complementary. -factor .. 
to fiscal policy in 
restoring growth in the domestic economy. Some of them 
included the strict enforcement of a new 100 per cent special 
deposit requirement on all allocations of foreign exchange. 
This sealed a loophole by which some enterprises conducted 
48 See Bank of Zambia Report and Statement for the 'year ended 
December 31st, 1976, op. cit. 
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their import or export deals using borrowed money., from 
commercial banks to pay for the foreign exchange necessary for 
such transactions. 
49 Another meagure which was designed 
especially to promote a more active mobilisation of domestic 
savings dealt with the upward adjustment of the deposit and 
lending rates. 50 In addition another measure requiring'banks 
to provide information on all loans exceeding K500,000 was 
introduced. Quantitive quarterly ceilings were also placed. 
These strict credit policies and measures led some 
enterprises to run down their deposits with commercial banks to 
finance their operations. Their introduction once again 
suggests that some banks were ignoring earlier regulations. 
The only consolation is that the figure of K500,000 mentioned 
in the last paragraph is not a small one. This could be an 
indication that banks were-free to make credits at lower levels 
to the extent they liked. The important issue in the, next 
sections will therefore be to establish how they channelled 
their loans. 
Inspite of the expiry in 1980 of the two year standby 
arrangement with the IMF, the authorities continued to pursue 
monetary and credit policies aimed at restraining excessive 
demand conditions in the economy. These restrictions received a 
new impetus in 1981 when the government announced a new policy 
49 Bank of Zambia Report and Statement, 1978, op. cit., P. 81. 
50 The Maximum lending rate came to 12 per cent, see Bank of 
Zambia Report, 1978, 'Ibid. 
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to reduce its budget deficits and borrowing. The objective of 
the government was to pursue a stricter control of its 
recurrent expenditure as well as reducing subsidies. it 
further sought to strengthen the financial performance of 
parastatal companies by ensuring that they adopted realistic 
or economic prices and incomes policies. 51 Accordingly, 
private sector credits in 1980 barely increased. Though it 
rose sharply by over 50 per cent in 1981, this was merely due 
to the increased demands of the co-operative unions and 
NAMBOARD to pay for a bumper crop harvest of that year. By 
this time the mines had also began to look to the local banks 
for some of their cash requirementsý as the low copper earnings 
which made their recovery uncertain 'discouraged outside 
lenders. 
A further impetus to the general trend of restrictions 
occurred in May of the same year when a new agreement with the 
IMF was reached to extend the facility it had been giving to 
the government since 1975. The objectives of the new programme 
were to provide sustainable growth while progressively 
improving the balance of payments situation. Specific 
objectives were: 52 
(a) to maintain average copper production at 600,000 
tons a year; 
51 See Republic of Zambia, Financial Report, February 1983 
(Lusaka, Bank of Zambia), P. 11. 
52 Ibid, P. 15* 
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(b) to- increase agricultural production for home 
consumption and export; 
(c) to improve the financial performance of parastatal 
enterprises; 
(d) to balance external payments and reduce budget 
deficits to tolerable levels over the three years; and 
(e) to reduce payments arrears progressively. 
Ceilings were imposed on private and government 
borrowing from the Banking system, as well as on the Bank of 
Zambia's lending to the mining , companies. 
Private sector 
borrowing fell by 6 per cent in 1982. from the 1981-levels. 53 
Other measures affected imports. From May 1981, imports were 
required to be financed by documentary letters of credit, 
instead of direct payments of cash in foreign exchange. Each, 
letter of credit required special approval by the Bank of 
Zambia. The only other authorised mode of payment was through 
bills of exchange or suppliers' lines of credit. 54 Of those 
authorised import volumes and modes of credit, 30 per cent was 
reserved for imports of essential commOdities. 55 
53 op. cit. 
1, 
P. 11. 
54 op. cit.,, P. 14. 
55 Soaps and detergents, edible fats and cooking oil, salt, 
dairy products, maize and stock feeds, paraffin and 
petroleum products, medicines and drugs, rice, fertilisert 
toilet paper, matches, candles and baby foods. 
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5: 4: 4. The 1985 Measures 
By the middle of 1985 the country's economic situation 
had become so precarious that the 'government felt it had no 
choice but to introduce more fundamental policy reforms aimed 
at arresting the negative trends and creating conditions for 
economic recovery. Thus using its widened powers under the 
Bank of Zambia Act, 1985, the Bank of Zambia introduced a new 
system of auctioning foreign exchange from 3rd September 
1985056 It also moved to strengthen the treasury bills 
market. The maturity date on all treasury bills was to be 
strictly 90 days. The interest on loans was to be determined 
entirely by market forces instead of the Bank of Zambia as was 
the case before. Apart-from the Bank of Zambia and commercial 
banks, members of the public and/or companies were also allowed 
to participate in the purchasing and selling of treasury bills 
through their banks. 
The authorities also removed controls on' domestic 
interest rates. 57 Thus, with effect from 3rd September again, 
commercial banks were given the freedom to fix their own 
deposit' anýf_ lending rates-" which were to ' be based on their 
respective liquidity situations. The introduction of these new 
measures was seen as a way of shifting emphasis from a monetary 
56 Bank of Zambia, Quarterly Financial and Statistical Reviewo 
Vol. 17, No. 3, September 1985, P. 7. 
57 Ibid. See also Chapters Three and Four. 
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policy of aggregate credit ceilings to a method of controlling 
money supply through the amount of reserve money made'available 
to the economy. In other words - the use of open market 
operations came to be seen as a much more effective way of 
allowing the Bank of Zambia to exert pressure and control over 
commercial banks and their reserves; and therefore of achieving 
a monetary expansion which was compatible-with the prevailing 
economic-situation. 
Although significant rises in lending occurred, the 
government continued to be the biggest beneficiary. The effect 
of the treasury bill market has been to serve as a facility for 
financing an ever growing government deficit. It has also 
limited the growth in quicklyconvertable liquid reserves of the 
banks thereby restricting the intended credit expansion. 
5: 5. The Main Featuresof Commercial Bank Lending in Zambia 
Having examined the volume of and certain determinants 
of the credit flow in pre and post independence Zambia, 
including the use of statutory and administrative powers to 
attain fiscal control of the credit situation, it is now time 
to highlight some of the leading features of that credit., In 
doing so, the main focus-or primary-objective is to demonstrate 
whether the flow of credit in the country conforms to such 
national aspirations a sý rapid industrialization, -' improving 
agricultural production and small scale manufacturing as well 
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as improving the overall living standards of the people. 
Unfortunately one of the principal handicaps' in this exercise 
is that the data available is in certain respects inadequate. 
The lending patterns of Zambian banks reveal certain tendencies 
which are hard to reconcile'with stated government policies and 
objectives. First there is a tendency to deemphasize the needs 
of the indigenous or small time borrowers. During' f ederation 
this tendency was generally projected through the business 
choices of the banks which included the laying of stress on a 
limited function of supporting exports and imports. Such 
stress was in fact nothing less than a sign that the banks 
intended to continue being mere handlers of the vast sums of 
money that exchanged hands between traders. The only lending 
functions, that occurred were temporary and were aimed at 
supporting the exports of raw materials and imports of finished 
goods. As they saw themselves chiefly as providers of a 
service to non-native clients, these banks also directed their 
services towards Southern Rhodesia where foreign owned 
enterprises and settlers provided a secure sources of business. 
With regard to the post independence era, the Mulungushi 
--and -6ther refo'rms have shown that the colonial 'pattern has 
continued to apply. As can be seen from Table 11 below the 
proportion of loans going to agriculture and the personal 
sector, where most of the indigenous entrepreneurs are supposed 
to be represented has been rather low; coming fourth and sixth 
respectively after distribution (K157.5 million), manufacturing 
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(K105.7 million), mining and quarrying (K100.6 million) and 
other uses(K%48.9 million), in March 1985. These big borrowers 
are seen as safe debtors because thef are largely involved in 
export and import businesses which make their interests 
coincide perfectly well with those of the banks. Secondly some 
of them especially parastatals, are adequately protected by 
government guarantees and subsidies. It can only be reiterated 
that, in any case the seemingly healthy flow of credits to 
parastatals can not really be proof that government objectives 
are being satisfied as many of them are partly owned by foreign 
interests. 
TABLE 11 
-244- 
-0 ýý. ýo 10 ý cý 
00 
I- fI In a' N0 
O%NI'l ('I -- "- 
NO 
-- 
t ý, j loý "oýý rýOmý - w-- ýýým-m. 10 m 10 o. 0m Co m ch ý- 
cr mcImmfýr-Orý 0,4, ný 0,0c00 mmýrý -oý ý= ýý -, w- ýý- ýmý0, 
'. 0-.. 
-ý 
Ch 0m -4 CD m rý 0 CD m- (0 " 0, 
0E"- 
pý o! r: le r: W! 1i9-i lý 9-- 
>0 10 -- Co cr. Co Mý Co ý rý rý 
9 
.4w; 
ý 
-: cý rý cý r: 
j 
cý rý r: 
-4 
a 
a 
14 
,0 
10 
0 -0 ým ý-0 ýýý0 ý00 r-i (A r. ý r. 
ý rý ý r4 0 ýn 0 m0mm m r- 0 rf r- Im -m Aým ;: 
ýn 10 m Co 0ý 0% ý r. Co CA 0--- ýý-ý -ýmý rý Co ý - uý 0m "m 'n Co r4 Co ein ý 10 ý Co 
0, C, 0 ul A cr, r- g" m Co cr, 0o m o UN Co Co ra 0, 14 m mm"m 10 Co M m 
ok 
ýýý"o00 A tn l Co rý Co 0 m r- 0ý A-ý mm Co 0ý0 ýc m 0 C) mý ýn ýý 0 ýý ,-ýý m rm ý tn e ýe rý ý 0, g ý 10 ý- rý 0N 
,'0 v! r: i99r! -! 1 cý i v: r: 9 ci c: ri 9 cý 9 i 9 a: r! 99 w0- ý0m0, ch mmo m CD tn 0 -o r- Co f4 Co r- (71 f" C-1 rý ri m0 f" ,v; m r4 m Im mým mmým f4 m "Mm r- Co m ý ýn m 
e- 4j 4 r- Co 0 0,0 m 
,: 10 1 cm 'n 0 0, g r4 m0ým0r. mý Co 
,4 loj lýI C! lýI 11 r! 
c-ý -0 ýeý--m rý mým cr, ý 10 0, m0ý-ýý 131 
r6 00mmmA0 ein -H (N m Co r- 0 Co Co rý 
r! r! li i ri r: r! li 02 W! 
u-0umýeýý"ým-ýým0, ý0ým Co ýýý 10 0, " 
e. 0uA------m--mý-ý- 
co 
II-IM 
14 
-e f4 00 Co Co m CD ý .4m Co rý fl CO -m0e 
c> r, ý, ý c" 2 r, 0w4 
Ln 0, li li r! . lý . -: 9 -! i C! . lý -! 'ý lý i W! r4 0ý- Co ýý 10 0 rý ým-ým- rý ý r4 '" 14 --- r4 -mý"-mN-m 
v C5 0ýý 10 mým co 0m en v co ým in 
,nc, m Qý ýn 0% a 4A 10 go Ch mv cy, ýN"ýNý-N"ý"w Ln m 
ýý-M-"ýMMý (A M rm ý e% MýAMýý fý MA c), mmýýý0m-, mm 
r-ýý-m ZO m0 ZO 'n r400, oo, in Co m f4 r- m r- r- -n 0, 
0 -! :9r: r: r: 
01mmeA ýa w0eoo em in o vi ýn tn o -e ýem -4 ry rý w f4 
.. 2ýmm-ýýýý, mýým (M "mAýýýý-ý- ýWO ýýmw Icý ýg -ý ýým 
01 
:'0 
w oýýf-Dý oýg"r. mýCoý or-Chf" Icoloý r--co Mr. ýM ýloAcr, ýýmýf4 ýýo 
Z mýOmýMý- ýr-O MCO(YCh coccoý Co e0 t', m Co 00r. Co 0, , c 0mm f4 'm ,, 
9: 1 pý ri li 1 lý 12 -: W! cý W! lý r! rý lý li r: c2 gý 9 r! lý <ý lý Z li 9 lý .ývc Zc0mý ýc ýo A 0, CD Co rý 10 10 m00w0, Co c2 Ch A cn rý (F, 0,0 
Co 0u 
wýA, ýýIwwýý- .0 
2: w 
10 10 10 in co rt 
M 
ý0' 10 
mo tn 0e 
c; w ch fý 0 e4 10 
r. rý 10 10 , rý 4n w (11) co f. ,, rý w (40-- ý cr, Co m 
-ýým el Co 0 r- 0 Ch m 
r. ýmm Co 0o ýn mý f- 0 rý m cm 0o00oo Co ýn fm r. r- rý 0, f4 o 
w. G, 
01 CY, -ý" r- ým (71 ýý- r4 ý f4 ý CO CO 0 r4 ý rý CO mAý CD ýý- 00 00 Co 10 ý0ýý0 Co 
ii ri -! 9 lý li 79 lý lý lý r! 9 lý -: 9i9i lý r! 9 lý "! li i 12 lý i lý 9 lý 1: le ei m r- m Nn Co--, 0m Co. ý-ýý0ým-- Co Co w0D00e cr, m-ýý0ýým0, CD MM mmý Co r- r- ý0,, Co m"---"mwý fý m-. ýoýýýýý ce 0 CD mý 
x4 c3. --- 
1W 
-4 U 
=cýýýmýý"0ý&ýw (4 ý-0 Co 000ý0m0mM 
m Ch ýmr. 10 Co mm 14 
C, 3 
w li '! li .i. W! -! ý! V! li . lý 9 lý pz lý . lý 19 .91 lý i lý r! . "! i1 lý rý lý ", i1.. lý lý li CO 0 r4 0MMmýýýA ch rý uý ýM ýo rt f" Co " rý --mý00 CO fý m 00 Mý rý ýn 
------------M r4 MM" r4 In 10 A uý 10 cý eA, 10 10 ý Co Co w el 
oý r4 ý 'o mý2ýýý. -*. -, 'n C, m. CN ,, 'D 0, rý ý, r4 ý 'm 
ý* 
v co N vi - Cý r'l C4 m 
-ýwý-Iý ýa ý--m" I- "ýWýýý 00 .0v-ýmý-mýý-ý0 
0,0 -0-m rý co rý 0, co Pý m 'D oA "' A 'o "02ý-, 7-" 
mmmm M"ý" ,"m 4-1 m en fnvw M., Mn -Vwý loýr- 
0 le rKu 10 0K 1. c u tL O li 1 tL c *r ti I e c, -. r 
10 . ýI ul z 
4) 
f 
0 
tn 93 
00 4) 
=4 :10 
4) lu c4 r 2 q) m vi ca 
- 2 4) .m U) Z vi 
-5 x w 4,0 
"mý - Co cm 0 
Co c13 
m 
Co an 
0, m cm Ch (21 m cy, 
0 lu 
.u u0 0) - 
14 - 
ll, 
0 
0 
0A 
.A-., 
bl W k, 
c 
0mZ 
10 -0 't 
w ci, r, 
0 CL 
ej 
=U -t 
w0t 
C, 
Z0 
.0-t 
c6 c 
'2 41 
q, 0 
00> 
Z2 
-245- 
In the case of the agricultural 
again, even though there have been some 
of loans this does not necessarily imply 
major improvement in the share of ind: 
The existence of certain conditions 
improvement. These are that indigenous 
the only ones competing for loans in 
and ý personal sectors 
increases in the flow 
that-'there has been a 
igenous entrepreneurs. 
rules', against such 
entrepreneurs are not 
these sectors. The 
existence of government disquiet58 over the levels of loans 
going to small scale farmers and artisans is evidence that 
commercial farmers and established expatriate businesses 
continue to be the chief beneficiaries. These groups also 
enjoy the advantage of being established traditional customers 
of commercial banks with extensive experience in business 
management and choices. 
The fact that small scale entrepreneurs and farmers 
compete with large marketing organisations and cooperatives, for 
the loans going to the agricultural sector also militates 
against the possibility of any fundamental changes in-their 
share of receipts. Indeed the fact that the largest amounts of 
credit occurred during Marchp June and sometimes September-of 
each year (despite -, some changes in 'recent , years) As 
confirmation that the bulk of such loans went to the marketing 
rather than the production functions; 
_as 
most marketing 
occurred during these months. 
58 See Chapter One, note 5. 
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The second feature is that there has been an increase in 
public sector borrowing from theý'bankinj system* 'Some of -this 
borrowing has been " by the' government itself - to" f inaýcý'"its 
deficit and balance of payments. Some'of it'goe's to statutory 
boards which like parastatals-are guaranteed, borrowers which 
also received government subsidies. -Iý-ý, i- ýj - 
It is perhaps not far fetched to suggest that there is a 
contradiction in arrangements which permit government borrowing 
by treasury bills but refuses long term lending. This is 
because even though treasury bills are short 'term i nstruments 
their redemptions usually consist of new issues of treasury 
bills. A similar point is made by Mr J. H. Frimpong-Ansah, one 
time Governor of the Bank of Ghana, when he contenAs that there 
is some thing drastically wrong with a banking system which 
refuses to give a loan to a customer who comes with a loan 
proposal for a small scale plan or rationalisation whiCh'will 
take four years to repay, but in which the same banks will 
happily renew Overdrafts over the" . same" period. 59 Clearly 
there should be some rationalization 'irý "this long' "standing 
practice apart from*saying that it is an accepted norm. If'all 
norms were to be unassailable then the world would have changed 
very little, 
59 See "The Ghanian Banking System and, the Challenges of our 
Time", An Address at the Annual Dinner of the Local Centre 
of the Institute of Bankers, on August 29,1970. The, Bank 
of Ghana Quarterly Economic Bulletin, Vol. 11, No. 1, 
January - March 1970., P. 14. 
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Another sector which has benefited well from commercial 
bank loans and advances is manufacturing.  -And 'rather 
surprisingly, the mining companies have*also, been relying more 
on the commercial banks for their requirements-in'recent years, 
As indicated earlier on, these companies are long term 
investors whose profits take years to create. Their 
requirements therefore posed a risk as far as commercial banks 
are concerned as they would affect their demand liabilities. 
Those considerations caused those companies to re-, ly on their 
parent companies and outside sources for most of their 
requirements. 
As stated in the preceding paragraph the recent rise-in 
the levels of credit f lowing to the., mining companies - -f rom 
commercial banks can be attributed to the low copper prices and 
demand on the world markets which have forced these companies 
to be less profitable and therefore less creditworthy in the 
eyes of international lenders. Other reasons could be that the 
government's take-over of a 51 per cent state in the companies 
has caused their original parent companies to feel that it was 
no longer their duty as minority shareholders to pledge 
considerable - -resources in* ' -support of thei-i c6mPanies' 
requirements. Given these circumstances these companies have 
no choice but to incur the rather stringent conditions of the 
local banks to meet their current long term investment and 
working capital requirement. ' The' availability of 'supp6ri-f rom 
a local shareholder (i. e. the government) could also have 
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hastened this change of focus to local sources,. ' With regard to 
their requirements of new machinery and spare parts, here again 
the growing level of the Bank of Zambia's lending-to the mines 
suggests that they can no longer organise foreign exchange on 
their own. 
The role of the Bank of Zambia in providing short-term 
credit especially to the parastatal sector raises a few 
questions. Undoubtedly, the bank like any other c entral bank 
is entitled to exercise its lender of last resort privilege, 
but in giving money to commercial banks so that it can be lent 
out to parastatal companies on short-term basis, the bank has 
also been flouting one of the established caný. ons of central 
banking, namely; that a central bank should not lend short-term 
as this is a function of commercial banks. 60 
With regard to commercial bank lending, to manufacturing, 
here again as in the case of the distribution sector and the 
mines, the fluctuations in the availability of foreign exchange 
are a very significant factor to the flow of credits. Short- 
falls in the level of' loans to this sector have usually 
occurred whenever it has become clear to the banks that 
repayments would be affected by defects in the ability of 
manufactua-ds to meet their'high import needs due to shortages 
of foreign exchange. 
60 See G. D. Nwankwo, supra note 38. 
-249- 
The last feature about the credit situation in Zambia is 
the low levels that are provided. The main pointer to this 
situation is the never ending government criticism of the banks 
for failing to lend more money. 
5: 6. Sectoral Priorities of Individual Banks 
As seen in Chapter Two only six commercial banks existed 
before 1984. These are the Barclays Bank (Zambia) Limited, The 
Standard Chartered Bank (Zambia) Limited, The Grindlays Bank 
(Zambia) Limited, The Zambian National Commercial Bank Limited, 
The Citibank (Zambia) Limited, and the Bank of Credit and 
Commerce. The rest of the banks were set up after 1984. Most 
of the later banks have not yet started to publish data on 
their sectoral choices for lending. However, even in the case 
of the older banks most of the data available does not go 
beyond 1984. In this section only the 1980 - 1985 data was 
examined. 
The Standard Chartered Bank 
In 1981 the total amount of advances made -by this bank 
was K228,860,000. Of these K25, ooo, oo went to the treasury 
bills market. In 1982 total lending was K196.3 million with 
treasury bills taking K41.4 million. The proportion of lending 
to the government changed drastically between 1984 and 1985, 
when total lending was K224.7 million for 1984 and K232.0 
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million for 1985 with K27 million and K162 million going to 
treasury bills for 1984 and 1985 respectively. 
61 
In terms of other sectors, agriculture has enjoyed a 
relatively large portion of the rest of the loans made since 
1979. Between 1980 and 1983 the levels improved by over 7 per 
cent to reach 28 per cent of the bank's overall lending. 
62 
More improvements appeared in 1984 when the level reached 38 
per cent. Manufacturing and mining received 11 per cent and 10 
per cent respectively during the same period, although 
fluctuations occurred occasionally. These impressive shares 
accruing to the agricultural sector, must, as said in section 
5: 5, not be considered in isolation from the known unequal 
system of distribution which favours the marketing instead of 
the pro, 14ctive sides of that sector. 
5: 6: 2. The Barclays Bank 
This bank's advances in 1981 amounted to K302.2 million. 
These increased to K312.8 million in 1982, and rose again in 
1983 from K347 million to K364.8 million in 1984.63 
61 Standard Chartered Bank (Zambia) Limited, Annual Report, 
1981,1982,1984 and 1985. 
62 See Memorandum No. 2, to the Board Advances Committee 
submitted to the Bank of Zambia. 
63 Barclays Bank (Zambia) Limited, Reports and Acc"ounts, 1981, 
1982,1983 and 1984. 
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Like the Standard Bank, this bank began to direct a 
significant proportion of its loans to the agricultural sector 
in the 1970s. In 1983 the bank spent almost 35 per cent of its 
loanable funds on this sector. This figure rose to 45 per cent 
in 1984. Mining and quarrying came second with ' manufacturing 
staying third. 64 Again as with the Standard Bank, it is 
important to remember that the banks figures especially in 
respect of agriculture must be treated against the background 
of unequal allocations to the actual participants such as 
farmers and buyers/sellers of agricultural products. According 
to Frank Wilson65 the bank's loans for agricultural 
production went largely to farmers who, participated in 
government schemes on state land and to commercial farmers. The 
schemes involved ranged from the tobacco schemes which were run 
in association with the Tobacco Board of Zambia to the 
agricultural training schools and their graduates who became 
independent af ter going through them. These schemes 'attract 
the bank owing mainly to the proper management and 
organisational skills which they I enjoy, the' use of ý' m6de-rn 
farming techniques and the supp I ort of clearly defined deeds and 
documents of title to the land. 
64 Anthony-Mulimbwa, Law and Agricultural Development in 
Zambia (Ph. D. Dissertation, University ot London, 1981), 
P. =. 
65 Frank A. Wilson, "The Role of the Non; Specialist Credit 
Agency - The Commercial Bank in Zambi ", in Frank A Wilson 
and Victor A Amman (eds) I Financing Rural Develument : 
proceedings of the Eastern Atrican AgricuLtural Society 
Conferenceg University of Zambia, Lusaka May 22-25 1974; 
(Kampala: Eastern African Agricultural Economic's Society, 
and Makerere Institute of Social Research, Makerere 
University, March 1975, PP. 77-80. 
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5: 6: 3. The Zambia National Commercial Bank 
This bank's loans amounted to K131.3 million in 1979, 
K151.3 million in 1980, K170.1 million in 1981, K208 million'in 
1982, K261.1'million in 1983, K272.1 million in 1984 and K324'. "I' 
million in 1985 respectively. In 1985 treasury bills accounted 
for K72.5 million of the total lending; an increase of K30.5 
million over the previous year. K9.0 million was invested in 
government stocks. - This represented a fall from' the previous' 
year's K10.5 million. 
Despite being a government bank the ZNCB has been giving 
priority in its non-government lending services to the 
manufacturing sector. The retail sector came second with 
agriculture trailing in the third place. According to Anthony 
Mulimbwa66 the portion of the bank's lending going to 
agriculture though small, is supplemented by other, lending to 
such financial institutions as the Lima Bank which lend mainly 
to farmers. In 1984 such lending totalled K40 million. 
66 Anthony Mulimbwa, op. cit. 
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5: 6: 4 The Grindlays Bank (Zambia) Limited 
In 1982 this bank spent 13 per cent of its loans on the 
agricultural sector. The biggest proportion, (i. e. 
-half) 
went 
to the mining and manufacturing sectors. The bank also showed 
a remarkable bias towards multinationals and other foreign 
owned companies. The other sector, which fared'. well was retail.. 
By 1984 manufacturing accounted for 'over 
32, per cent-of the 
banks total lending with agriculture., coming second for the 
first time with nearly, 23 per cent. Mining, took-third place. 
67 
5: 6: 5 Citibank 
This bank Is total * lending in 1984 amounted to K32 
million. Of this amount the agricultural sector received 19 
per cent. The biggest recipient was the mining sector which 
received 58 per cent. Manufacturing, distribution and retail 
shared 12 per cent. 68 
67 Ibid, P. 389. 
68 See letter from Citibank to, Director of Research Bank of 
Zambia, dated 15th January 1985. See also Citibank returns 
submitted to the Bank of Zambia. 
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5: 6: 6. The Bank of Credit and Commerce 
The figures representing the total lending strength of 
69 this bank are not available. According to Anthony Mulimbwa, 
the bank allocated 17 per cent of its total lending to 
agriculture. Its priority sectors however, were manufacturing, 
mining and quarrying. Building and construction, also received 
higher proportions. By 1983 however, agriculture's share 
doubled to 31 per cent while manufacturing still remained first 
with 38 per cent. Mining, . 
building,. and construction, 
distribution and other services shared the remaining proportion 
of the loans. In 1984 agriculture again received an improved 
share of 36 per cent elevating it to second place replacing 
building and construction and other sectors. Manufacturing 
still came first. 
5: 7. Conclusion 
High demand for bank credit has been a common phenomenon 
since the early colonial days. The main problem however, has 
been that not much of it has been coming in adequate levels to 
meet local demand. During the time of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
commercial banks concentrated their loans on the export and 
import trade in accordance with the prevailing business 
pattern so that Southern Rhodesia which had a high 
69 Ibid. See also Zambanker, Vol. 9 September/November 1983, 
p. 3. 
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concentration of the federation's industries and settlers to 
enjoy the bulk of the credit flow. I- I- 
Independence did not do much to reverse the trend in 
credit flow. Zambian entrepreneurs and individuals barely 
received any loans and advances while expatriates and foreign 
owned businesses benefited most. Although reforms-were 
introduced in 1968 and again in 1970, the history of lending 
has continued to be one of unsatisfied demand. Despite 
legislative and administrative regulations, foreign businesses 
and persons still enjoy a substantial level of credit in the 
country. Indigenous people still display the same 
characteristics like the lack of business skills which place 
them at a disadvantage when considerations for giving credit 
are made. 
The other determinants of the credit flow are the 
persistent shortages of foreign exchange due to poor copper 
sales. Such shortages of foreign exchange have introduced 
numerous problems such as the inability of enterprises to 
obtain raw materials which would keep them profitable and 
creditworthy. The other determinants are the continuing 
economic crisis which has shifted the attention of the 
authorities from development investment to the management of 
government debt, deficits and budgetary supplementation through 
borrowing from the banking system. The rest of financial 
resources are used to provide at least some of the basic social 
amenities and services in operation. In addition the 
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government's unprofitable regulation of the banking system and 
bilateral agreements with the IMF have further inhibited the 
flow of credits. - The result has been that out of the banking 
system's total of K4.0 billion in assets and K3.6 billion in 
deposits only K1,224.8 million was lent out in 1985. But even 
that modest figure could not have been attained without extra 
lending by the Bank of Zambia. 
The leading features of commercial bank lending in 
Zambia are therefore as follows: 
(i) that only a very small proportion of the loans 
actually goes to indigenous people. 
that there is heavy reliance on the banking 
system for public expenditure and other government services. 
(iii) that only a limited group of sectors, mainly the 
mining, manufacturing, distribution dominate private borrowing. 
Although agriculture receives significant levels of credit, 
most of them go to the marketing organisations and commercial 
farmers. 
(iv) that--there- i's a growing tendency by the Bank of 
Zambia to supplement commercial banks. 
(v) that in general the level of lending in the 
country is low. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
AN APPRAISAL OF THE ROLE AND REGULATION OF 
COMMERCIAL BANKS IN ZAMBIA 
6: 0 Introduction 
In Chapter Three we outlined the various statutory and 
administrative regulations and regulators that affect 
commercial banks in Zambia. Chapter Four, on the other hand, 
stated the government's objectives, including its view of what 
Zambian banks' functions should be. ' Having discussed the 
actual role of banks in mobilising and allocating, savings., in 
Chapter Five, it is now time to evaluate the efficacy of that 
role and the effect of, regulations and regulatory authorities 
in steering banks towards the attainment of the government's 
objectives and therefore, fulfilling our contention in Chapter 
One that regulations can inhence or returd the potential and 
distinctive role that banks can play in national development. 
First, a brief background to the Zambian regulations is given. 
The Zambian government's objective for economic growth 
and development is to achieve a higher standard of living and 
increase employment by expanding agriculture, small scale 
manufacturing and entrepreneurship. This objective is 
enumerated in various policy documents and national development 
plans in the following terms 
1 See Chapter Four. 
2 See Chapter Four. 
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(a) to diversi4y production so as to make the economy 
less dependent on a single export commodity; copper, 
(b) to create labour intensive industries which would 
contribute significantly to the development of people's skills, 
(c) to achieve self-sufficiency in consumer goods, 
(d) to establish industries in rural areas, and 
(e) to encourage the training of Zambian nationals as 
managers and technicians. 
On the role of banks in attaining these goals, the 
government's policy has been that those institutions should 
play a key role in providing financial resources for investment 
and entrepreneurial activities by Zambians. Indeed initially, 
the government had intended that all investment, including 
capital resources should 'come from private sources. The 
government was to be involved only when private sources - were 
unavailable or when it was impossible for private sources to 
embark upon the kind of. investment envisaged. 3 The Mulungushi 
Reforms of 1968 which were introduced after it had been 
realised that the response of private investors and financial 
ih6titift'i6fiS to the- -gover-n--men-t-l's plans was luke warm made a 
slight variation to that government policy. Under the reforms, 
the government's instructions were that the banks should use 
4 their resources to help Zambians to set up in business. 
3 See Report of the UN/ECA/FAO, "Econ'omic Survey Mission on 
Economic Development of Zambia" (Ndola: Falcon Press, 1964). 
4 Chapter Four. 
-259- 
They were also encouraged to set up in rural, areas and to help 
Zambians attain management positions. During the 1970 reforms, 
the government added that it was tlýe duty of the banks to 
identify with the country's aspirations. Although the ultimate 
mode of identification vis, the takeover of, 51 per cent 
interest in the banks failed to materialises other measures 
were introduced to facilitate this purpose., These included the 
passing of the Banking Act, 1971 which provided that: 
5 
(a) only locally incorporated and registered companies 
are entitled to carry on the business of banking in the 
country, 
(b) only banks whose boards consist, at least in half, 
of Zambian citizens or established residents will be allowed to 
carry on in business, 
(c) all registered commercial banks can carry on the 
business of merchant banking, 
(d) every bank in which the government holds all or some 
of the shares is required to maintain a paid up equity capital 
amounting to not less than K500,, 000., 
(e) every bank without government participation is 
required to maintain a paid up equity capital amounting to not 
less than K2 million. 
Section 4. 
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In addition the government has persistently issued 
political overtures and incentives urging all persons in Zambia 
to love one another and work together for the prosperity of the 
country. 6 It has also reformed the land tenure system and 
other laws poncerning collateral security with the aim of 
promoting a safe system of lending. The only measure which can 
be considered rather discriminatory was the one placing 
restrictions on the borrowing of non-Zambians. 
7 
Unfortunately despite all the measures and overtures 
made by the Zambian government, dissatisfaction with the level 
of commitment by commercial banks to the country's objectives 
8 continues to exist. As seen in Chapter Five a series of 
factors, many of them independent of the banks, have combined 
to determine the extent of commercial bank lending to the 
economy. Some of those factors are: 
6 See Anthony Martin, Minding Their Own Business, (London 
Hutchinson, 1972), P. 81. See also K. D. Kaunda, Humanism. 
in Zambia and a Guide to its Implimentation Parts 1 and 2 (Lusaka, ZIS , Government P! einter). 
See Zamb: Lals. Economic Revolution, An Address by President 
Kaunda at Mulungushi, 19th April 1968, (Lusaka : ZIS9 
Government PYinter). 
8 See'OCheap Loans Needed Mulondwe Muzanga, Minister of State 
for Commerce and Industry says commercial banks should 
arrange concessionary rates of interest for small 
businesses. Times of Zambia, 3 July 1986. See also 
Mbambo Siyanga; Minister of State for Legal Affairs in 
Times of Zambia, March 25,1986. 
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(a) the shortage of foreign exchange. This has come 
about as a result of a poor demand and price for copper on the 
world markets. This coupled with mismanagement have created a 
severe economic crisis in the country which is now 
characterised by a huge public debt, an enormous balance of 
payments problem, a budgetary problem and other government 
deficits crisis. 
(b) the international bilateral agreements. with the IMF 
which limit the level of lending to the private sector. 
(c) the inherited' business principles and ' attitudes 
which discriminate against rural areas and indigenous persons* 
(d) the legislative and administrative regulations which 
continue to introduce inhibitive requirements, and fail to set 
or reinforce appropriate inducements and standards for banks to 
meet. 
In the sections that follow below the legislative and 
administrative regulation of Zambia's banks are examined to 
establish why their role is creating dissatisfaction with the 
performance of commercial banks in the country. In particular, 
the discussion will look at existing banking principles and 
methods of doing business with a view to establish their 
appropriateness for achieving government objectives. Then the 
regulations themselves will be examined to establish their 
appropriateness. The first to be examined will be the Banking 
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Act's provisions relating to the formation of commercial banks 
and control of foreign interests in them. 
Regulation of the Formation and Foreign Control of 
Commercial Banks 
The principal sources of authority for the formation of 
banks in Zambia are now sections 4 and 18 of the Banking 'Act, 
1971. Section 4 provides for incorporation, registration and 
management of Banks. Section 18, on the other hand deals with 
capitalisation. As seen in Chapter Two, nearly all but two- of 
Zambia's commercial banks are foreign owned with a wide ranging 
supranational structure. Some of them are continuations of old 
colonial banks which dominated banking' business in the whole 
region before today's nation states came into being. Many 
others are subsidiaries of powerful international banks which 
operate world wide networks. 
Some Implications of Foreign Ownership and Control of 
The Banking SyStem 
--Du'r-in*g the-- reforms, the . government saw the extensive 
connections between Zambian banks and foreign banks as a 
principal cause of the banks' unwillingness to identify with 
the country's objectives. In other words, it was felt that, by 
reducing such foreign ownership of Zambian banks and 
introducing a bigger Zambian stake in their holdings, those 
-263- 
banks would automatically assume a 'Much more sympathetic 
posture towards Zambians and Zambian aspirations. It was 
because of the failure to attain that- ideal by means of a 51 
per cent acquisition of shares in foreign owned banks that the 
Banking Act, 1971 was introduced. With it also came the 
demonstrations of diS. illusionment with the banks, and also new 
policies to exert control on them. Thus in addition to the 
changes introduced by sections 4 and 18, the Act also removed 
the right of Zambian banks to treat balances and other assets 
held with their parent companies or any other banks abroad as 
part of the liquidity ratio requirements. As stated in Chapter 
Five, the adoption of that measure appears to have been 
predicated on the need to prevent further outflows of the 
country's foreign exchange for the purposes of keeping such 
balances in credit. Another motivation for removing that right 
appears to have been a suspicion that balances with overseas 
banks were being used by such outside banks as a mechanism to 
manipulate the credit policies of Zambian banks. In other 
words, as such balances could be treated as part of the overall 
liquidity level or statutory liquidity ratio requirements, it 
was felt that overseas banks 'could use them to control the 
outflow of credit by moving them up and down in accordance with 
their own plans and considerations. The possession of such 
power in the past could have enabled them to determine not only 
what portion of the resources could be loaned out, but also the 
pace and direction of the country's overall development. The 
abolition of the right to treat overseas balances as' part of 
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the liquidity level or ratio therefore means that Zambian banks, 
can hold funds abroad as working balances only but not for 
portfolio optimization. 
The ownership and control of Zambian banks by foreign 
companies also presented a potential for keeping resources 
abroad in countries which are already rich in resources at the 
expense of a desperate local economy. Usually when funds are 
kept in overseas deposits they get loaned out to other 
countries; thereby depriving the country of their origin of 
vital capital for its own development. The practice was not 
uncommon during the colonial era. That it is still p-erpetrated 
even today has been confirmed by large outflows of funds before 
the Mulungushi reforms. R. M. Harvey's assertions that Zambia 
has been a big time lender by reason of a large outflow of 
profits and other funds to. overseas accounts also confirms this 
point. 10 
Another way in which foreign ownership of the majority 
of the country's banks tends to thwart the government's 
objectives is through the introduction of certain business 
principles and attitudes. Some of the principles are 
9 As far back as 1934, Report of the Ceylon'Banking 
Commission gave a particularly well documented description 
of this practice. See Ceylon Sessional Paper XXII of 1934; 
also cited by W. T. Newlyn and D. C. Rown, MoneV and Banking 
in British_Colonial Africa, (Oxford -: O-x --d 
University 
Press, 1954), P. 76. 
10 C. R. M. Harvey, financial constraints on Zambian Development 
in Charles Elliot (Ed) Constraints on the Economic 
Development of Zambia (London : Oxford University Press, 
1971), P*-26. 
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(i) the theory that banks should only maintain 
profitable branches or operate in places where business 
prospects are assured. 
(ii) that banks should avoid small accounts which are 
administratively cumbersome and expensive. 
that bank loans should always be secured and 
self-liquidating. 
These principles constitute what in economic terms are 
generally known as the "demand following finance" and the "real 
bills" "or commercial loan" doctrines. The first doctrine 
opposes the establishment of banks where the business climate 
is so uncertain that profits are not assured. 'The second 
discourages long-term lending and 'sometimes medium-term 
lending, particularly on mortgages which entail a- potential 
acquisition of immovable properties. " It'also opposes the 
making of loans where ability to re'p-ay is doubtful or 
conditional rather than'certain. 12 In reality this principle 
has been applied selectively to deny credit to subsistence 
farmers, small scale entrepreneurs and other persons who are 
unable to submit traditional securities jike de,; ýeloped lands 
with deeds of title or life policies and other modern items and 
11 See Margaret Rodgers and A. N. Allotty Introduction and 
Report of Proceedings, International Conference in Banking 
_Law and Development in Africa, 19 Journal of African Law [19751 P. 3. 
12 As will be seen later, it is not argued that these 
principles are entirely wrong. 
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appliances. 13 Before examining the success of the Zambian 
government's efforts and measures attempting to change the 
attitudes and practices of commercial banks it is important to 
discuss some of the factors that reinforce such'practices. 
6: 1: 2. Other Causes of Demand Following Finance and'Other 
Doctrines 
Many years have passed since the Zambian's. attainment of 
political independence, and passing of economic reforms and 
controls. The effects of imported principles and doctrines are 
nevertheless still in evidence. It can however beýargued that 
in view of the length of the period from independence, coupled 
with the fact that some significant shifts in banking practices 
elsewhere have occurred involving, for instance, a -move from 
reliance on the balance sheet to considerations of potential 
cashflows, 14 , attitudes of Zambian banks should now -be 
considered an internal matter. This arRument is reinforced, bv 
the fact that many other factors which are. typically local are 
also at play. Aside from those outlined in-Chapter- Five, 15 
others are 
13 A. N. Allott; "Credit and the Law in Africa :A Special Study 
of some Legal Aspects of Economic Development", in 19 
Journal of African Law [19751 73 at P. 78. 
14 See Jack Ravell, Solvency and Regulation of Banks (Bangell 
Occas. -ional Papeis in Economics, No. 5, University of Wales- 
Press, 1975), P. 21. 
15 See P. 2,30 See also P. ^.. c,; L above. 
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6: 1: 3. Absence of Contact with Local'People ' -- .I 
As has been shown in Chapter -Four, there has been a 
history of hostility or unwillingness on the part 'of most 
bankers to engage in intimate social contact with local people. 
Fixed attitudes persist about their business , acý. umen. 
Expatriate bankers have always considered them as sources of 
risk. No attempt was made to locate or understand their 
requirements for a long time. Even when some measures were 
taken in the 1970s and 80s these were limited to a few secure 
schemes set up by the government and big parastatal 
companies. 16 The result was that only a few of those' who 
possessed the capacity to utilise bank funds profitably were 
offered the opportunity to do so. .I 
6: 1: 4. Absence of Sufficient Entrepreneurial Spirit and Ability 
While the attitudes and principles followed by the 
expatriate bankers and the Zambi. ans they trained were 
responsible for the low levels of lending to the indigenous 
peoples, the low entreprenurial experience of those people also 
played a major part. It is significant to note in this regard 
that by and large most Zambians are still engaged in -a 
subsistence way of life ýnd production. Those of them wh o have 
attempted to go into the commercial field generally opera, te 
small grocery shops, butcheries or market stalls which. they run 
16 See Chapter Five, P251. 
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in the most, unsophisticated manner. As Godwin, Mwangilwa 
observes about Zambian business.: 
"Fearing the consequences of a family business, 
the Zambian entrepreneur finds himself wrapped up 
in a European-type of enterprise in which he trusts 
absolutely nobody. Typical of this narrow minded 
business philosophy is one Lusaka grocery which 
opens when the proprietor or his wife are around. 
-If they wish to go away they close the shop". 17 
At the same time there are many, other qualities of 
indigenous life which are not compatible. with serious banking. 
These are : 1. 
W the poor command of modern commercial methods by 
many local people. 
(ii) poor organisational abilities and support. 
(iii) the infusion of business ventures with 
superstition and secrecy. ' 
(iv) inability to keep records. 
In addition, Zambian entrepreneurs like most Africans 
are handicapped by the bonds of their extended and largely 
dependent families. Some of the businessmen in f4cýt -owe. -their- 
success to the contributions of the family members in the 
17 Zambian Small Business; Debit, Credit, Broke? Enterprise 
Magazine, December 1973, P. 30. 
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past. 18 But in business these bonds are usually obstructive. 
They cause profits to be spirited, -away unnecessarily and 
encourage exploitative and destructive tendencies as family 
members help themselves to some of the goods, backed by the 
African creed "my brother's property is mine". 19 
The result of these short comings is -that the 
requirements of most Zambian entrepreneurs are unattractive-to 
bankers. And as their businesses are fragile and requirements 
modest, they also tend -to be administratively costly to deal 
with as far as the banks are concerned. -The only cost 
effective way of serving them would be by wayýof charging them 
correspondingly higher rates of interest and handling. These 
rates on the other hand have until 1985, not ýbeen within the 
power of the banks to set. 20 In. any case the employment of 
higher rates as a vehicle for defraying costs is a politically, 
18 See Stanslave Andrenski, "The African Predicament" A Study 
in the pathology of modernisation (London : Michael Joseph 
1968), P. 102. See also Ronald Wraith and Edgar Simpkins, 
"Corruption in Developing Countries": including Britain 
until the 1890s (London : George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 
1963), p. 46-and Shankar Archaya, "Perspectives and Problems, 
of Development in sub-Saharan Africa"; World Development, 
Vol. 9, P. 127 and E. Wayne Nafzinger., "The Effect of the 
Nigerian Extended Family on Entreprenurial Activity", 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 1969-70. 
P. 25 at P. 3U-. 
19 Godwin Mwangilwa, op. cit. cf. E. Wayne Nafzinger, "The 
Effect of the Nigerian Extended Family on, Entrepreneursh, ip 
Activity. Ibid. 
20 Only the Bank of Zambia, an institution which is vulnerable 
to political and other pressures or considerations, was by 
law empowered to set rates for the banks. This power was 
only suspended in 1985 following the introduction of the 
auction system and other changes in regulations. See 
Chapter Three 
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sensitive matter as it would dxive banking services further 
and further away from the reach of ordinary people. It would 
also not solve the problem of defaults and delays in redeeming 
loans. 
One of the consequences of the high level of ignorance 
about the demands of modern commercial methods that afflicts 
the majority of potential Zambian borrowers is that they, tend 
not to appreciate the negative affects of, defaulting on 
repayment, Many misunderstand the essence or the concept of 
credit itself. Such people see loans as rewards or gifts. The 
experiences of the Credit Organisation of Zambia (COZ)21 are 
instructive on this aspect. Many of the people who received 
loans from that organisation treated them as political gifts to 
woo their votes or as benefits of independence which were never 
to be repaid. - 
As a result, the organisation is believed to 
have lost between K20 and K30 million before it collapsed,, in 
1970. As no steps were taken by the organisation or by the 
government to educate the masses to refrain from treating loans 
as gifts, bankers got the impression that defaulters were 
officiall'y condoned. The fact that no sanctions have been 
taken to recover -the money, involved or to -punish-'t-he' culprits 
also reveals the toothlessness of the legal machinery as far as 
the bankers are concerned. 22 They therefore continued in their 
21 Discussed in Chapter VOL4Y., See P. VT5 . See also Stephen A. Quick, Humanism or Technocracy? Zambia's Farming Co- 
operatives 1965-1972, University of Zambia Institute for 
African Studies. Zambian Papers No. 12, P. 49. 
22 This point is also discussed below, see section 6: 1: 6. 
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cautious and reluctant way of dealing with potential Zambian 
borrowers. 
6: 1: 5. The Absence of Amenities and Development Incentives 
in Rural Areas 
Another factor which has aided the entrenchment of the 
imported business principles, doctrines and attitudes connected 
therewith in Zambia is the absence of social amenities and 
other infrastructure in rural areas. So far the only amenities 
that have been promoted are communications networks, basic 
educational and health amenities. In view of this only a few 
businesses have been able or willing to set up in rural'areas. 
For the banks, as long as the rural areas remain without 
adequate inducements in the form of existing industries or 
government incentives to attract them, there will always be an. 
appropriate excuse for not setting up there on the grounds that 
doing so would be unprofitable. 23 
The Absence of a Secure Legal Machinery 
Th -e- abs . en . ce -- of . guaranteed repayments of loans is again 
another factor which has, until now aided the banks' attitude 
23 See Kaye Turner and J. M. Mulwila, "Small Scale Industrial 
Development and the Law", African Social Research, 1982 
No. 33, pp. 141-73 at p. 153. See also D. A. Ailola, 
Foreign Investment : The Law and PolicZ in Zambia, (LL. M. 
Dissertation, University of Zambia, 1983). P. 3167. 
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that it would be unprofitable to, operate in certain, areas, or to 
lend to certain categories of people in the country. 
24, 
. 
Again. 
the case of the Credit Organisation of Zambia is instructive. 
Thus, in so far as it makes the recouping of profits doubtful, 
the state of the legal regime has , also contributed -to 
the 
entrenchment'of foreign doctrines in the country. 
6: 2. Demand Following Finance and other Doctrines in Practice: 
At Independence and After 
To see how foreign, principles and doctrines-influence'', ' 
banking policy in Zambia; - despite many years of 'independence, .9 
and an increase in the number of Zambian' managers, it is 
important to examine someýof the activities'of the'government's 
own bank - the Zambian National Commercial Bank (ZNCB). ''''ý, ' 
When it was created, the ZNCB was expected to expand its 
branch network on a much wider bas is than that of the other 
banks. It was also promised that while the bank was to be 
allowed to observe important banking and business principles 
and aim for profits and efficiency, it would nevertheless be 
encouraged to undertake certain social tasks, including. setting 
up branches in rural areas and promoting development by lending 
to small scale entrepreneurs and 'farmers. It was anticipated 
that the bank would be able to off-set losses by subsidising 
uneconomical branches with profits made in other branches. 
24 See Note 22 above. 
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Most importantly, the introduction of the bank was seen as a 
channel for monetarization of the whole country and especially 
of the rural people and economy which were largely dependent on 
subsistence forms of exchange like barter. It was intended to 
inculcate a banking habit in rural people which would lead to 
higher mobilization of resources and greater but healthy 
competition. 25 These tasks are widely viewed as vital if any 
development is to be achieved*26 
In seeking to achieve competition among, the banks the 
government seems to have deviated from- its humanistic and 
socialist paths into which it had sought to direct the country,,, 
Such a deviation can therefore be treated as an acceptance of 
the importance of competition in creating efficiencl/ by 
optimising production and achieving consumer satisfaction 
through lower prices and better services. In a way it is an 
indication of a strategy by the government to find another way 
apart from legislation-and fiscal controls, .. of controlling the 
banking industry. Such a strategy works by forcing the rest of 
the banks, under pressure of competition from a strong 
government bank, to employ similar ways of attracting business. 
25 Before this competition among banks was largely avoided. 
The industry was practically oligopolistic in nature, with 
a number of mechanisms having been employed to reduce 
competition. See e. g. Chapter Two, P. sz4 regarding arrange- 
ments on interest and other business activities. See also 
P. 275 below. 
26 See Erick L. Furness, "The Significance of Money and Credit 
in a Developing Economy", in Money and Credit in Developing 
Africa (London and Nairobi : Heinmann Educational Books, 1975), P. 26. 
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In that way some of the government's objectives -stand a bigger 
chance of being satisfied. 
J 
Before the creation of the ZNCB, competition among banks 
was minimal. Some of the strategies used to avoid it included 
a system of area demarcation betweeni the various banks. Thus, 
once a bank set up in an areai usually a provincial, -or district, 
centre, the rest of the banks tended to avoid 'introducing 
branches there to compete with itý27 As a result, - of -this 
practice the Barclays Bank alone served the Eastern, ' Luapula 
and North-Western provinces while the Northern, -and Western 
provinces went to the, Standard Bank. The Grindlays Bank, 'on 
the other hand secured for itself quiet enjoyment" of -certain 
key farming towns like -Mumbwa, ýSerenje 'and Mpika. Quite 
clearly the concept of competition did not have much" impact 
under that arrangement. 
The government's pretensions on competition however, 
were belied by some actions that were taken after the ZNCB was 
created. These. were that the government itself decided to 
conduct all its commercial banking, requirements with that bank 
only. The government also directed that parastatal companies 
which control 75 per cent of the economy, must do the same. 
These activities obviously reduced the , advantage which 
expatriate banks enjoyed be fore the ZNCB came into effect. 'At 
27 Situmbeko Musokotwane, Financial Institutions and Economic 
Development in Zambia (Dissertation Zur er Languang des 
Akademischem G-raUes Eines Doktors de Wirstelhaf 
Suissenchaft and de universitat Konstanz, June 1985), P. 45. 
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the same time however, they also have the effect of destroying 
the very competition they were meant to achieve. They do this 
by giving the ZNCB a near monopoly in business, leaving only 25 
per cent of the economy to competition, in which the ZNCB is 
still free to participate. 
On the matter of the bank's aims, which were carefully 
constructed to reflect government policy and objectives, it is 
also clear that only minimal success has occurred. Thus in the 
case of the need to expand both in terms of establishing more 
branches and allocating credits more widely, there can-be no 
doubt that the ZNCB has done better than any other banký. From 
only one branch at the time of its inception in 1970, today it 
has 29 domestic branches and one external branch in London. 
Numerically, this compares favourably with. l. the older banks 
like Barclays Bank (31 branches and 9 agencies), Standard Bank 
(23 branches and . 11 agencies) - and Grindlays Bank (7 
branches). 28 
But to really discover the betrayal of the original 
objective of the expansion programmes one must review the 
actual distribution of the bank's branches. Such a review 
demonstrates that in fact there is still a high concentration 
of branches in the urban and not the rural areas, as was 
promised. Thus, of theý 29 branches that the bank currently 
runs, 7 are in Lusaka alone. The other 16 are scattered along 
the line of rail, with the heaviest presence being in the 
28 See Chapter Two. 
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copperbelt cities and towns. The remaining 8 are in provincial 
capitals. It is also significant to note that 14 branches 
(i. e. about 50 per cent of the total number of branches) are in 
fact concentrated in 4 townsonly. This means that in reality 
the ZNCB is no more than a fast growing follower of the 
doctrine of demand following finance. Indeed as Musokotwane29 
argues, the fact that the bank established branches in towns 
where some expatriate banks are already operating is an 
indication that profitability is the motivating factor in the 
selection of branch sites. 30 In fact the opinion among most 
bankers is that there is still plenty of room for profitable 
operations in the traditional areas (i. e. -urban areas). The 
entry of one bank is therefore not perceived as constituting'a 
big enough threat or inducement for them to venture out 'into 
the rural areas with all their hazards like , the lack 1 of 
adequate social amenities. It can only be added that the 
absence of any drastic adjustments on the part of the old banks 
demonstrates that these banks are still firm, -in their belief 
that there is plenty of room in the urban areas and that a rush 
to the rural areas would be an, unwarranted jeop&rdisation 
29 Situmbeko Musokotwane, op. cit,,. 11,46. 
30 When the Minister of Finance was asked in parliament, why 
the bank was opening a branch in Mongu where there was 
already a branch of the Standard Bank rather than in Kalabo 
where there was no bank at all, he replied that profit- 
ability was the overwhelming consideration in the matter. 
'See Debates of the 5th Session of the National Assembly, 
Ist - 8th August, 1978; also cited by MusokotwantIbid. 
This shows that the bank's objective was like the other 
banks, profitability rather than the provision of a 
service. 
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of their profits. 'Furthermore the fact that' none' of the n, ew 
banks has a rural branch as yet is an'indicition of the"extent' 
to which the 'doctrine of demand f ollowing" f inance is ý weli 
entrenched. It also shows that 'the government's' goal of 
changing the attitudes and termý of 'business ""through 
competition have not been very successful. For 'if there had 
been sufficient competitionj some of'the-'smaller'ana'newbanks 
would surely have sought to do business in a relatively free 
atmosphere until they had enough strength 'to. 'compete against 
the well established banks. 
Another factor which undermines the seemingly favourable 
position of the ZNCB is the tendency by many of the more 
independent state enterprises to keep. accounts with foreign 
owned banks despite government pressure to desist from such 
acts. Even though many officials cite their reasons for doing 
this as being the pressure to avoid congestion at the State 
bank, it is clear that other considerations are also at play. 
These include occatS, ional opportunities to secure_. foreign 
exchange whenever the reluctant parent companies relax their, 
terms. They also include the well cultivated. and now 
entrenched psychological belief - that non-Umbian items -an& 
facilities are more prestigious and efficient. 31 Some of the 
asumptions of local people are that the ZNCB as a state bank is 
31 See Frederick Ssempemblwals lines on the taste for 
luxuries and imports in, E. F. Ssempembwa, "Law in the 
context of Underdevelopment; A Comment on the Industrial 
Development Act, 1975-1977 Zambia Law Journal, P. 56. 
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subject to various forms of pressure, including political 
manipulation. It has even been alleged that from time to time 
the bank makes questionable advancds, mostly to political 
persons and causes. 32 From all these facts and considerations 
the allocative efficiency of the ZNCB like that of other banks 
is cleal'. y questionable. This means that the regulations that 
have been taken so far must be ineffective or insufficient. 
6: 3. Combating Demand Following Finance and'other Principles 
Some of the changes that must be induced are 
6: 3: 1. Improving Amenities and Facilities in Rural Areas 
Until rural life is improved, it is unlikely that cost 
33 
conscious institutions and banks will move there. It is 
therefore imperative that the government should induce some 
improvements to social amenities in rural areas. Another 
consideration should be that, as nothing has been done to 
remove the class and status orientations of the workers and 
managers of the banks, their expectations in terms of living 
conditions must be met if they have to be lured into rural 
areas. Thus, what is needed is to speed up the building of 
roads, schools, police stations, health centres, businesses and 
other things necessary for the comfort of workers. - 
32 Private interview, Research Department; Bank of Zambia. See 
also J. M. Mulwila, Parastatal Companies and the Law in 
Zambia (Ph. D. Dissertation. University of London 198UTP. 176. 
33 See Situmbeko Musokotwane, op. cit. 
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6: 3: 2. Improving People's Business, Skills 
The absence of business understanding and knowledge has 
long been identified as one of the leaýing obstacles to the 
development of a proper relationship between banks and 
indigenous peoples in most developing countries. 34 It is 
therefore, important that the government should strive to 
achiQvv- and spread a habit of savings amongst the rural people. 
But before this. it must seek to induce a culture of thrift and 
personal initiative. Without these improvements, banking 
expansion into rural areas cannot be justified as it is bound 
to fail due to the absence of an assured market. It is 
important in this respett to note as Shankan Acharya does, that 
some of the government's own policies and regulations are 
biased against emerging small scale entrepreneurs. 35 In 
particular, such policies and regulations as those seeking to 
achieve import controls are largely in favour of large 
established foreign firms, which leaves private individuals 
with paid employment as the only incentive. 
34 See R. J. Bhatia and D. R. Khatkhateq "Financial Inter- 
mediation and Mobilisation and Entrepreneurial Development: 
The African Experience", 22 IMF Staff Papers (1975) 134 
See also E. E. Jucker-fleetwood, Money and -finance in 
Africa (London : George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1964), 
PP. 34-36. 
35 Shankan R. Acharya, Ibid,, P. 127. 
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6: 3: 3. Eliminating-Public Misconception of Credit- 
In as much as the government should introduce a culture 
of thrift and personal initiative, so too must it inculcate a 
philosophy of honesty and respect for the institution of 
credit. As seen the treatment of credit as a political gift 
has worried both bankers and commentators. Stephen Quick 
attributed the failure of COZ and the co-operative movement as 
36 a whole to it. J. K. Onoh has attacked it as a serious 
imped; ment to the 
'develo 1, 
pment of banking. 37 As it is: in the 
nation's interest that the allocation of savings by commercial 
banks should be diversified, it follows that it should equally 
be a national duty to ensure that the operations of the banks 
especially the lending aspect, should -be properly understood. 
In various countries various methods may be used. In , India, 
the creation, of regional banks coupled with an educational, task 
and simple methods of operation have produced good results. 38 
In Tanzania, attempts have been made to fuse the functions of 
the national bank into the national programme of self-reliance 
and taking institutions to the people. 39 As far as Zambia, is. 
36 Stephen Quick, Humanism or Technocracy? Supra note 21. 
37 MoneZ and Banking in Africa (London, Lagos and New York 
Longhorn, 1982). 
38 J. K. Mittal, "The Regional Rural Banks" The Law, It's 
Working and Suggested Reforms" 18-19 The Banaras Law 
Journal (Vol. 1). 
39 See H. H. Binhammer, Commercial Banking in Tanzania, - Economic Research Bureau, University College Dar-Es- 
Salaam. Paper No. 69, P. 11. See also Ali Isaa Abdi, 
Commercial Banks and Economic Development, The Experience 
of Eastern Africa (New York and London : Praeger, 1977). 
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concerned, the absence of facilities in rural areas may hinder 
such wide spread use of the banking institutions themselves 'to 
educate the masse's about their funcEions. Where possible, 
however, it should be the duty of these instituti ons to make 
their functions known and to include in that process certain 
basic information about the duties of the public in respect of 
loans. It is known that as competition increases, banks have 
tended to rely more on the media-radio, television, and, 
newspapers to advertise themselves. It is submitted that part 
of those programmes should involve education, such as on how to 
sign cheques, to open an account, to apply for a loan, and how 
to repay a loan etc. 
On the part of the government ' the educational 'task 
should be easy and inexpensive as it can rely on existing 
facilities such as the Ministries of Guidance, Education and 
Culture, part of whose function is to preach responsible 
citizenship, humanism, law and order. In addition the task 
should be made easier' by the cultural practices of most 
Zambians which associate honour with the keeping of promises as 
well as returning of borrowed things. 
6: 3: 4. Strengthening Statutory Protection 
4 
As seen one of the principal obstacles to the expansion 
of lending which is also a major cause of existing attitudes 
towards lending to indigenous people is the weakness of 
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statutory sanctions against defaulters. Apart from those 
imposing terms of imprisonment, other sanctions include'actions 
for breach of contract and foreclosure. All those sanctions 
are not without certain disadvantages. Many of them require 
the observance of intricate procedures which make them time 
consuming and therefore costly. In the case of imprisonment as 
will be seen later, the lender is still left with an 
unsatisfied debt. 40 Quite clearly what is required 'are cheap 
and convenient systems of ensuring repayment. 
There is no universal consensus, on what these cheap and 
convenient systems of repayment may' be. - Certain people" argue 
that longer prison sentences will deter deliberate acts ý of 
default. 41 other people on the other hand feel that the 
authorities should guarantee the loans or create a system under 
which certain persons . or institutions can do so. 
42 It is 
submitted here that despite the disadvantages in both, a 
combination of the two 'appýýoaches is'-'more b'6neficial. In 
addition, there should be a duty to improve 'the borrower's 
skills, including those relating to financial handling. Other 
provisions, relate to the individual characteristics of the 
Zambian mortgage, charge, and other securities, which will be 
discussed later. 
40 See e. g. The Agriculture Creditý Act'bel'ow'. 
41 Private interview with Denis wood, 24th July 1986. Seealso 
Stephen Quick, op. cit. and C. R. M. Harveyg"Financial 
Constraints on Zambian Development", supra note 9. 
42 Private interview with Denis Wood, Ibid. See also A. N. 
Allott, "Credit and the Law in Africa", supra note 14. 
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6: 3: 5. The Need to Change Bankersý Attitudes I 
As seen one of the usual criticisms against the doctrine 
of demand following finance is that it makes bankers 
indifferent and at times out right hostile to the needs of 
indigenous people. , The banks raise the failure of the people 
concerned to produce the necessary securities for loans as 
their reasons for being cautious. Sometimes they also treat 
such people's lack of experience in banking and business as an 
additional source of. risk. I 
According to Mr J. H. Frimpong-Ansah, a one time Governor 
of the Bank of Ghana, "when banks do these things, they are 
without knowing it admitting their own deficiencies, such as 
having inadequate knowledge of the credit standing and credit 
worthiness of their prospective customers". 
43 In addition 
"In effect what our bankers say when-they are 
confronted with their lack of dynamism is that 
"we want to lend safe, risk is none of our 
business". By these statements the banks are 
clearly admitting'that they are incapable of 
helping their customers to work out sound 
projects and help them with crei4t supported 
by useful suggestions to grow". 
43 "The Ghanian Banking System and the Challenges of our Time" 
An Address at the Annual Dinner of the Local Centre of the 
Institute of Bankers on August 29 1970, in the Bank of 
Ghana Quarterly Economic Bulletin, Vol. 11, No. 2, January 
- March 1970, P. 14. also cited in Chapter Five. See note 5ý9 P924-1 
44 Ibid. 
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How,, for instance, is a customer expected to have 
previous banking experience when he is put off, at his first 
entry? What is needed is for the banks to'keep a close contact 
with their customers -so that they know their problems 'or 
progress. They should also supervise the credit to ensure that 
it is not only used for intended purposes but that they are up 
to date with any developments including changes that might need 
to be made. 
Banks - should also be prepared to incur some costs ' to 
carry out some socially desirable tasks of assisting their 
clients in formulating and evaluating their needs. In India, 
the Regional Rural Banks have excelled in this task by adopting 
simple and , very open minded attitudes to their customers' 
requirements. Their branches are not only constructed in a way 
which allows for-open and fearless access, but their employees 
are also instructed to go all out to assist their customers in 
their requirements. Their offices do not bear the usual 
barriers that are characteristic of most commercial banks, such 
as counters, locked gates, security guards and strict rules'and 
procedures of operation. Employees on the other hand are 
instructed to sit with customers and help them in arriving at a 
realistic organisation and articulation of their 
requirements. 45 Zambian banks could surely do some of these 
things. They coul4i'for instance'assist customers to-acquire a 
degree of knowledge about accounting methods, book keeping and 
management skills46, 
45 J. K. Mittal, op. cit. 46 E. E. Jacker- twood, op. cit., P. 147. 
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Admittedly, the Indian regional'banks are state banks 
specifically established to support small scale enterprises in 
their regions. The important thing fiowever, is that Zambian 
commercial banks like Indian banks operate in 'similar 
conditions involving mostly illiterate peasants without 
sufficient Securities. They also share common objectives, 
namely, to be profitable. Being profitable while doing a 
public service is, in this regard, a more commendable function 
than merely ensuring that records are kept properly and loans 
recovered. 
There is evidence that in Tanzania commercial banks have 
began to offer some of the services referred to above to their 
customers with some encouraging success. 
47 It is also 
significant to note that an experimental laison between the 
Barclays Bank and a number of family schemes in Zambia, which 
the bank monitors closely has also produced a similar 
satisfactory result. 
48 Apart from monitoring, the bank also 
assisted the settlers on those schemes in record keeping, 
accounting and avoiding waste by ensuring that the money is 
spent on the actual purpose for which it was borrowed. As the 
schemes are basically government controlled, with the government 
47 See H. H. Binhammer, Commercial Banking in Tanzania, 
Economic Research, University College Dar-es-Salaam. Paper 
No. 69.11 PP. 7-8. 
48 Frank A Wilson, "The Role of the Non-Specialist Credit 
Agency : The Commercial Bank in Zambia" in Frank A Wilson 
and Victor A Amman (eds) Financing Rural Development; 
Proceedings of the Eastern African Agricultural Economics 
Society Conference, University of Zambia, Lusaka May 22-25 
1974, (Kampala : Eastern African Agricultural Economics 
Society and Makerere Institute of Social Research, Makerere 
University, 1975). 
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supplying the plots of land to registered settlers, -and, other 
services like roads, milk and produce markets and other 
necessary amenities and implements, it-can perhaps be saidý, that 
these schemes offer the best example of how co-operation 
between the government and the banks can produce a mutually 
beneficial result. 
Another important requirement is for the authorities to 
ensure that bankers direct their thinking away from the 
procurement of security and "foreclosure" in the event of 
default. For as Jaffer Hussein, convincingly argues, it is not 
sufficient nowadays to consider it safe to have loans secured 
on assets only. Economic development funds have also to be 
directed into specific areas,, according to some development 
strategy. As such, it becomes necessary for financial 
institutions to expand into cognate activities such as trust 
banking, equity financing, venture capital financing as well as 
factoring and forfeiting. 49 RuJh Weis,. is even more succinct 
arguing that : 
"It is the project and its viability which is of 
first importance. To simply liquidate a man's 
securities and take back a loan is bad business 
- in the short and long term". 50. ------ 
49 "Economic Development The Way Ahead : Efficient Banking 
is a Must", Banking World, October 1984, P. 31. 
50 "Rationalisation" says UNIP., What Next for the Banks? 
Enterprise Magazine, December 1973, P. 37. See also note 
32t Chapter Three. 
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Thus, if new forms of productive activity and, economic 
diversification are to take place, it should be. the projectand 
its viability which must command thd highest consideration. 
Therefore, directing favourable consideration only to people 
who bring such items as insurance policies, houses Usiburdened 
by mortgages and guarantees to support their impossible schemes 
should be treated as a bad banking practice. It amounts to" 
pursuing collateral for its own sake. In such a situation 
where other considerations are not treated highly, foreclosure 
becomes the banksfi. princip6L weapon. This means that just 
because a bank has been presented with, say, a house, it will 
do nothing about monitoring the utilization of the loan. In 
most cases it is the bank which loses because the house may not 
even fetch an appropriate price. The bank many also have to 
spend more money in trying to sell the house than it would have 
done if it had assisted the borrower to wisely deal with his 
loan. Allott and Margaret Rogers make the same point saying 
"By insisting on title [to land] bankers are 
denying help to the majority of farmers in many 
African countries. In any case, the value of 
this method of securing a loan in some African 
countries may be called into question. The 
situation exists in many cases where it is 
virtually-impossible to foreclose; or, when the 
banker does foreclose, he may have a nasty shock, 
as the market., being somewhat erraýtic, -..: 
does 
not realise anywhere near the value set on the 
land". 51 
51 Margaret Rogers and A. N. Allott, "Introduction and Report of 
Proceedings", International Conference on Banking and 
Development in Africa, 19 Journal of African Law, P. 15; 
[To Land] added. 
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In addition a- bank which places too much reliance on 
traditional securities of land and title nowadays may be unable 
to evict the debtor's spouse who may have an equitable charge 
on the estate. 52 Where the spouse may have contributed 
towards the cost of acquiring the property concerned, or in the 
case of traditional or customary African family systems where 
many others may have an interest in the property, it may be 
impossible to foreclose. 53 
Clearly rather than pursue security for its own sake 
banks should begin to consider ideas or projects. After all a 
bank's future profits should appropriately be tied up with its 
customers' future. Simply to liquidate a man's securities and 
take back the amount that was originally loaned out to him is 
bad business as it destroys the very fabric upon which 
potential future profits should' be based . 
54 In addition to 
the project itself other possible considerations should be the 
customer's ability to carry out,. the project, the marketability 
of his products and his own personal stake in the project. 
52 E. R. Shaw and J. B. Hawcroftv Banking Law (Oxford : Basil. 
Blackwell, 1985) PP. 147-148. ct. English Matrimonial- 
Homes Act, 1967 Section 1. 
53 See Glyn's Bank v. Boland [19791 Ch. D. 312 , 19801 A. C. 489 
and Williams and Glyn' ank V. Brown (1980ý 3 W. L. R. 
138. cf. Section luki) k(; ) of the English Land Registration 
Act, 1925. 
54 J. Milnes Holden. The Law-and, Practice of Bankin. &, Vol. 2, 
Securities for Banker's Advances, 6th ed. (London : Pitman 
1980), P. 14. 
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There should also be wider use of other debt collection 
methods such as stop-orders or assignments. 55 The now defunct 
Agricultural Finance Company (AFC) made great use of these with 
some success. 56 The company's stop-orders were addressed to 
NAMBOARD and the co-operative unions , which are the main 
purchasers of produce in the country. These instruments 
obliged. these organisations to pay directly 
-into 
the farmer's 
debt account at the AFC, which was in turn obliged to return 
the remainder to the farmer after recouping its entitlements. 
Admittedly, this type of payment does not really constitute an 
absolute assignment, as loans will ordinarily have been made 
before the marketing boards enter into any transactions with 
the farmers, thereby making it impossible to determine the 
farmer's income. 57 There is however, no fear about 
enforceability as such transactions areý good equitable 
58 assignments. 
Other considerations can be reliance on character, rather 
than actual security, giving implements instead 'of money, ý and 
post-ponement of repayments until crop harvests and purchases 
have been completed. 59 At present, some banks begin to demand 
55 See R. R. Pennington, 
gThe 
Investor and the Law (London 
MacGibbon and Jae, - TffT-. -P 79. 
56 A. C. Mulimbwa, op. cit., P. 427. 
57 Ibid. 
58 See Hughes v Pump House Hotel Co. [19021 2 K. B. 190. See 
also M. Furmston, Cheshire and Fif-oot's Law of Contract (London : Butterworth, 1976)., P. 4'9--5. 
59 These have recently been carried out in Uganda with some 
success. BBC Radio, Focus on Africa 1/8/1988. 
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repayment the month after the advance has been made. 
Finally it is important to point out that the, foregoing 
misgivings about too much reliance on security are not a, unique 
phenomenon. The Wilson Committee recently said of the, British 
banks' over-reliance on the tradition of securities that 
"It may also be noted that even their American'and 
Japanese counterparts have voiced strong 
reservations about the British Banking tradition 
which looks mainly to assets as the security for 
the loan. The "going concern approach" which 
these American and Japanese banks have adopted on 
the other hand gives more emphasis to the borrower's 
ability to repay the loans out of future cash flows., 
Accordingly the lender under this approach tends to 
be less interested in taking charges over assets, 
but merely requires the borrowers to supply profit 
and cash flow forecasts; and to allow the bankslto,. 
monitor their progress". 60 
The American and Japanese banks also rely heavily -on 
covenants in which outlines of the gearing, liquidityO interest 
and cover ratios of their customers are made and, agreed. 61-In 
the event of breach the banks have a number of options to 
follow, such as calling for security, making changes to the 
terms of the loan, or accelerating repayment. When more 
serious breaches have been committed, the banks may cancel the 
unused part of the facility. 
60 Committee to Review the Functionins of the Financialý ý -- 
Institutions, chaired by 5! r H. Wilson. Progress R rt On 
the Financing of Industry and Trade (London : Cmnd. 7937, 
HMS09 1980), P. 16. 
61 Ibid. See also Eynon Smart, "Lending, Secured -and- 
Unsecured "2 Banking World No. l. P. 52 at P. 53. - 
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Another method which is common in Germany, -and also in 
Japan is direct involvement in the borrower! s business. , In 
bigger sized ventures they can appoinf a representative to the 
boards of directors. In ventures of a smaller*size, they can 
enter into a working capital maintaýnance agreement with the 
undertaking's shareholders in which they covenant to ensure 
that certain ratios of non-borrowed money are- maintained in 
return for further borrowing. 62 
One important lesson from these new Americang Japanese 
and German approaches is that lending and borrowing are a 
business based on mutual benefit of all the parties. It is in 
no-one's interest to place conditions that make it impossible 
for one or both of the parties to realise their objectives. As 
Jack Ravell asserts, "there is no such thing as a loan which is 
in itself self-liquidating". On the contrary, to liquidate a 
loan other activities must be facilitated to generate the 
money. 63 Thus, loans for seeds on harvesting may only be 
liquidated if there is a demand for the grain when it is 
harvested or gathered, and this demand will probably depend on 
the ability of the grain merchants in turn to borrow from the 
banks. This means that it---is unrealistic"to-expect loans to--be* 
i liquidated while refusing to assist the farmers or borrowers to 
apply the loans correctly, or to lend to buying agencies. 
62 The Report of the Committee to Review the Functioning of 
Financial Institutions, op. cit. 
63 Jack Ravell, supra note 4, P. 13. 
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The other advantages are firstly that where banks are- 
part of the venture, they will seldom turn their backs on it 
even if the borrower gets into difficulties. This therefore 
gives them a strong incentive to take action to rehabilitate 
the venture and to ensure that it is properly managed. 
Secondly these approaches mean that in the absence of prior 
floating charges on assets, other creditors have equal rights 
in liquidation so that a company's ability to borrow from other 
banks is not compromised. 
6: 4. Efficiency of Formational Regulations 
Having examined the, nature, role and causes of certain 
business principles applied by banks and the effect of 
government policy and control on them, it is now time to 
examine the efficiency of other regulations. 
6: 4: 1. Regulations Relating o Ownership of Banks 
As seen, despite government regulations requiring local 
incorporation and registration, the majority of Zambia's banks 
are still foreign owned. Secondly, ' there continue. to exist 
many other channels by which foreign owners are able to avoid 
governmental controls of their businesses. For one thing the 
management of these businesses are still significantly foreign 
dominated. For another, even though Zambians have assumed 
certain management positions, their training and outlook is 
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largely foreign so that they fail to identify'sufficiently with 
national objectives. Indeed it is worth while noting that at 
present a big row is going on about the recognition and 
admission of Zambian trained accountants to professional bodies 
dominated by foreign trained members. 64 Th`e preva 
I iling' I view 
is that only those who have done the Examinations of the 
British Institute of Bankers, or the Institute of a Chartered 
Accountants - also foreign controlled, should assume positions 
of influence. It' is however doubtful 'whether- those 
qualifiations adequately prepare one for the kind of conditions 
that he or she will find in a backward country like Zambia, 
where there are no stock, - and capital markets 'to analyse or 
adhere to. Indeed the fact that the same kind of-securities, 
procedures, buildings and, methods are insisted upon confirms 
that those people live in, a world of. their own and are'l, totally 
controlled by their foreign employers. 
Also not reflected by the changes in the relations of 
the Zambian based banks and their overseas parent companies are 
the latter's powers to make investment choices and decisions. 
Indeed one striking feature about the investment or 
capitalisation levels of Zambian banks in the aftermath 'of the 
introduction of section 18 of the Banking Act, 1971 is that 
they are generally small and almost uniform. 65. Admittedl.! y, in 
64 See The Zambian Daily Mail, 3rd July 1986. 
65 See Chapter Two. Until recently the general pattern of investments involved not more than K2 to K5 million for 
most banks. 
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banking business share capital is of little significance as far 
as the lending aspect is concerned. What is important is each 
bank's ability or willingness to attract more funds by 
mobilising deposits and allocating them wisely and widely to 
people with potential to create wealth and profits. In this 
respect it is important to recognise that a bank's size and 
capital may go a long way to demonstrate its strategy on - the 
twin issues of investment choice and conscious- commitment to 
national aspirations. They, may also determine a, bank's 
mobilisation and allocative capabilities, again the two most 
important aspects of banking as far as a bank's role in 
developm-. ent is concerned. In short, by specifically, making it 
one of the principal subjects ý of its reforms and regulations, 
the government indicated , that it considered the level of 
investment in capital to be a vital matter in - so,, far as 
commercial banking is concerned. 
There can be no doubt that most foreign owned banks 
involved are able to invest more money in their Zambian 
branches than the legal requirement. Many are big 
international banks with immense resources at their disposal. 
Their investments soon af ter the introduction of the latest 
legal limits, however, were not very impressive. 66 Their low 
level investments obviously show that the government's measures 
have not been able to deprive them of the decision making 
powers. It is also important to add, in fact that, by prescrib- 
66 See Chapter Two.. 
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ing a margin of investment, the government may have frightened 
these banks from investing more. It may also have strengthened 
their resolve to be cautious. Many of them therefore have been 
compelled to invest within or slightly above the statutory 
margin for fear that the statutory mandate is an indication 
that the government is intent on a course of continuous 
intervention in their affairs with policies and actions that 
they distrke,. Although some somewhat bigger investments have 
began to appear in recent years, there can be no doubt that 
these are mainly a reaction to the falling value of the Kwacha 
and rising rate of inflation, and not necessarily a sign of, 
confidence in the government's policies or a change of heart on 
the part of the banks about their investment strategies. 
Clearly, if the government's aim was to show displeasure 
at the low level of investment by the-banks, 'what"it needed was 
an incentive and not a compulsory 'figure. -Alternatively, - it 
should have stipulated that banks already operating 'ine the' 
country which had a certain amount of assets or profits must' 
increase their level of capital accordingly by a certain per 
centage. Admittedly, this may not have worked well''at the time 
as banks__ then had a 
_r. 
ight__. to 
_repatriate--all* . -their 
profits. 
They would therefore, have been able to change the true' state 
of their assets. But as the country's manpower resources and 
methods of investigation improved, these 'problems would have 
been halted. After all, there is no need to make swift changes 
if they will only lead 'to inefficiiency or cannot be 
implemented. 67 In addition a 'proper use of the exchange 
67 Shankan R. Acharya, op. cit. 
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control regulations would also ensure that -, only legitimate 
amounts of profits are externalised. 
In short, it is clear that imposing capital limits on 
foreign banks as on Zambian banks is not going to ensure that 
those banks -identify with the country's objectives. This--is 
not however to suggest that a total. expropriation of foreign_ 
banks is the solution. Those banks can be effectively utilised 
by drawing upon their experience in banking and in creating 
sufficient and unimpeded competition. What are required 
therefore are regulations and incentives that ensure that 
foreign commercial banks are not inhibited in the level of 
capitalisation and thereafter mobilisation and allocation of 
financial resources. 
Another way of looking at capitalisation questions- is 
that there appears to have been a shift*in outlook on the part 
of the government from the pre-1971 emphasis on encouraging 
more and bigger banks, so long as they identified with Zambian 
aspirations. That old perception was evidenced by provisions 
in the Banking Act 1965, requiring banks whose head offices_ 
were situated in Zambia to maintain a paid up equity capital 
and unimpaired reserve funds amounting to not less than 
K3001*000. Those whose head offices were situated outside 
Zambia were on the otherhand, allowed a higher minimum equity 
F capital and unimpaired reserve funds, but these could not exceed 
K5009000068 The 1971 Act introduced a shift in this situation 
68 See Chapter Three. 
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by allowing the foreign- controlled banks a bigger minimum 
equity capital rather than Zambian banks! Two explanations 
could be raised, in respect-of this change of direction. These 
are that the authorities wanted more and more Zambians to form 
up their own banks so that they could fill up the vacuum left 
by the less interested foreign banks and also compete with 
them. The lower capital requirement for Zambian owned banks 
with a government stake in their operations was therefore seen 
as a mechanism for attaining control by means of the market 
forces in place of the failed method of persuasion or takeover. 
Secondly, the change could have been motivated by, the view that 
if foreign banks are to be allowed to continue operating with 
less government control, then they must bring something in 
return; namely a bigger capitalinput. 
Grand as these perceptions may appear to be., one or two 
criticisms can nevertheless itill be levelIvA at them. In one 
way they are a disguised admission of failure to acquire 
control of banking in the country and therefore an indication 
of the abandonment of any pretensions to return to the 1970 
reforms. But, in another , sense 
the 1971 capitalisation 
requirements are a green --light "to foreign owned banks 
authorising them to set the agenda for the whole banking 
industry in the country. This explains why no Zambian bank or 
group of banks has been able to wrest" the initiative to set 
up a different set of principles from the foreign banks. 
Indeed it is to be noted that instead of declining these 
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f oreign banks are expanding very rapidly and dictating new 
practices as evidenced by the Barclays BankIls 
'pioneering 
venture into farming schemes. 
6: 4: 2. Regulations Relating to Board Membership 
It is clear from the existence of the' stipulation 
requiring Zambian representation on the boards of directors of 
all locally registered banks that there is no longer a desire 
to continue with an effort to change the basic structure of the 
banks in terms of their ownership, middle management or 
inclusion in the planning process. In other words, the 
government seems to have conceded that those banks that are 
presently privately or foreign owned will continue to be so and 
that it will merely appeal to them for co-operation and 
compassion via the voice of a few Zambian delegates or 
symphasisers who sit on their boards. This concession 
obviously represents a lot of implications for original 
government policy and objectives. 
In the first place, requiring Zambian representation, on 
the boards of foreign owned banks, as a means of controlling or 
influencing their business outlook is not an -' attogether 
revolutionary development. It was part of a social development 
and debates which started in the 1920s following, the Dodge v 
Ford Motor Company case69 where the issue was whether a car 
69 204 Mich. 459, (1919). 
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making corporation can decide to put back profits into the 
business and selling a large number of cars`atý a: lower price - at 
the expense of paying dividends to shareholdýrs. In "other 
words, are directors at liberty to turn a corporation into a 
semi-eleemosgnery institution as opposed to a business 
institution. The court said orbiter that a business 
corporation is organised and carried out primarily f or the 
profit of the stock-holders. The discretion of directors is to 
be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end and does 
not extend to a change in the end itself, to the 'reduýtion of 
profits or to the non distribution of profits among 
stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes. it 
however, proceeded to hold that it had no reas on to interfere 
with the proposed expansion of the company's business, nor was 
it convinced that the alleged motives of the directors menaced 
the interests of shareholders. 
By 1929, however, people like Owen D. Young, a lawyer 
who became president of General Electric, were already speaking 
of a rising notion that managers were "no longer attorneys for 
stockholders", but "trustees of institutions owing obligations 
to employees, customers, stockholders, and the general 
public". 70 In 1932 Professor E. M. Dodd too k that theme u. p and 
developed a theory that directors,,, are_trustees not-only for 
70 See e. g. Wilber G. Katz, Responsibility and the Modern- 
Corporation; The Journal of Law and Economics, October 
1960, P. 75. 
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shareholders but also for the community. 
71 This theory has in ý 
turn led to the notion that the company is a social institution 
which has duties and responsibilities towards-the community. 
As Bhagwati J. of India recently put it 
"maximisation of social welfare should be the 
legitimate goal of a company and shareholders 
should be regarded not as proprietors of the 
company but merely as suppliers of capital 
entitled to no more than a reasonable return 
and the company should be responsible not only 
to shareholders but also to workers, consumers 
and the other members of-the community". 72 
He adds that, "a company should be, guided in its business--by- 
considerations of national economy and-progress". 
The use of the board as a mechanism to gain control of 
the banking sectors and to achieve its participation in 
national programmes ýand re-orientation of its, outlook, cannot 
however, erode certain basic realities in the institutional 
make-up or set-up of Zambian commercial banks. While the 
spirit of the Doddian theory may apply to wholly 'owned Zambian 
companies, it is hard to see how it can sway foreign' 
controlled banks which have different sets Of constituents to 
attend to. As seen, in Zambia such foreign' owned banks are in 
the majority as only. two of the_coun_try's, banks can boast of 
full-fledged Zambian proprietorship. It is common knowledge 
71 See "For whom are corporate managers trustees? " 45 Harvard 
Law Review 1932 1145-63. See also A. A. Berle and d-and 
G. C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Pro2erty 
(New k: Harcourt, Brace and World, INC. 1932) 356. see 
also A. P. Smith MFQ Co. v Barlow 13 N. J. 145,154. 
72 See National Textile Workers' Union v P. R. Ramakrishna 
AIR 1983 SC 75 at P. 81 See also note 76 below. 
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now that multinational companies do not always share the same 
goals as their host governments. Chief among their points of 
difference, is the requirement that these companies like local 
companies should perform social, tasks, some of" which, have the 
potential of eroding profits. Such tasks as-training local 
personnel, establishing labour intensive industries, or 
production methods, investing., in. poor and often inaccessible 
rural areas are the main embodiments of,, government goals which 
have been quite unpopular with, most foreign controlled 
companies. Others are price controls and other interferences 
with the market. 73 Only recently Heinz Corporation broke off a 
joint venture agreement with Refined Oil Products (ROP) of 
i 74 Zambia after the government reintroduced price controls. 
In short, the board room representation requirement 
instigated by the government assumes 'that the Zambian or long 
term resident contingent on company boards will always manage 
to either out vote or 'convince and win the sympathy of the 
foreign directors on fundamental national aspirations and 
investment choices of industry. 75 These assumptions- as I seen 
already are illusory. Without achieving an accommodation with 
such foreign companies at the organisational, or investment 
level on such matters as the proportions of shareholding going 
73 See -R-. -J-. Bhatia and D. R. KhatkhatelFinancial Intermediation 
and savings mobilisation and interprenurial Development 
The African Experience 221MF Staff Papers 1975 12. 
74 See Times of Zambia, 11th July 1987. 
75 In fact out-voting is impossible as the authorities 
erroneously left the number of Zambians or established 
representatives to'constitute only half., not more, of each 
board's members. 
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to foreigners and Zambians, the purposes of the company, its 
management, (especially middle or executive management), 
location, etc, it is highly improbable that board room 
representation will lead to consensus and unity towards social 
and national goals. In this regard it is, surprising that 
section 4 is silent on, the issue of requiring indigenous 
participation in foreign firms by obliging, those firms to sell 
a certain pe. Tc-entage of their shares to, Zambians. 
Taking board room representation as a legal concept, per 
se, it is clear that contradictions - :., abound,. and a number of 
questions about its efficiency also arise, To start with 
current Zambian company law ý is f ar behind, Justice Bhagwati Iq 
notion of corporate social obligations. Bhagwatils principle 
of social responsibility was properly founded, based as it was 
on existing-Indian law. Under section 10 and. 11 of , the 
Companies (Amendment) Act, 76 the affairs-of a company have, to 
be conducted not only in the best interest of its members for 
their profit but also in a manner which is not prejudicial to 
public interest. 77 The Zambian Companies Act, on the other 
hand is still based on the 1948 English Companies Act and 
prescribes no social obligations for companies apart from 
proscribing wilful deceipt or harming of the public, public 
interests or public morals. 78 Indeed Section 3 of the 
76 L111 of 1963. 
77 National Textile Worker's Union V. P. R. Rama Krishna AIR 
1982 SC-75 at P. 86-. 
78 see e. g. section 22,25,39 and 70 Companies Act, CAP 686. 
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Companies Act79 stipulates that a company may be incorporated 
for the purposes of gain of- its members. - Section 9- (i) goes 
even further to provide that, "every provision in the memorandum 
or articles or any resolutions of the company- purporting to 
give any person a right to participate in the divisible profits 
of the company otherwise than as a member shall be void". In 
other words the Zambian Companies ý Act makes no allusion to 
government objectives, ý and social aspirations, which have come 
to characterise recent public statements and perceptions. 
Expecting a company incorporated under it to act otherwise than 
according to its stipulations is therefore, futile at the very 
least. Indeed it is to be noted that even those banks which 
were incorporated after 1971, have not made specific 
commitments to any of the government's objectives such as rural 
branching, appointment and training of Zambian managers or 
devising new lending policies and techniques in their memoranda 
of association. 80 
Another aspect, of this matter relates to the duties of 
directors themselves and how: far their citizenship-or'long-term 
residence may vary. 
_or_dilute 
them. These duties fallinto'ýtwo 
distinct-parts: the fiduciary duti6s'-of"-loyalty and g- ooa faiih 
and the duties of care and skill. The fiduciary'duties require 
79 CAP 868 Ibid (Underlining added). 
80 See e. g. Article 3 of the memorandum of Association of the 
Bank of Credit and Commerce (Zambia) Limited. Even though 
Sub-Articles(J) and (X) etc authorise the Bank to act as 
agent for the government, it is clear that they are limited 
to business work and not social services and objectives. 
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the director to act in what he believes to be the best'interest 
of the company and to exercise his 'powers' for the, 'particular 
purposes for which they were conferred. He must not put 
himself in a position where his ability to'do'so is 'restricted 
or where there is a conflict between his' duty and-some other 
interest. In other' words the loyalty of a-diiector must be 
undivided or influenced by no consideration other than the 
welfare of his company. 81 
The fiduciary duty of the company director to act in the 
best interest of his company has been very narrowly interpreted 
as an obligation to shun engagements which create a real 
sensible possibility of conflict between personalýinterest (or 
another interest which the director is bound to' protect) and 
the director's duty of loyalty to the company. 82 The 
director's obligations are'to the interests of the shareholders 
both present and future. 83 Thus despite a long standing debate 
about the significance of-the Doddian theory, ' the courts still 
hold that no law exists to make them change their position that 
locompany interests" are no more than shareholders' interests. 
Thus in Parke V. Daily News Limited, 84 where the Ladbury 
-family 'who controlled the selling company' wished to 
81 Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy 
Cmnd 6706 (HMSO 1977),, P. 60 Par 8. 
82 Aberdeen Railway Co. v Blaikie Bros. [1843-601 All. E. R.. 
249. See also Phipps v Boardman TN967] 2_AC. 46.. 
83 See Dodge v Ford Motor Co. op. cit. 
84 [19621 Ch. 927. 
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distribute the whole of the purchase price among the employees 
who would become redundant as a result of the folding up of the 
News Chronicle and Star, and where -one shareholder sued to 
restrain them from doing so, it was held by the court. that the 
argument that, "the prime duty must be to the shareholders, but 
the board of directors must take into consideration their 
duties to employees", was contrary to law. Plowman J. said in 
particular that : 85 
"no authority to support that position as a 
proposition of law was cited to me;, I know of 
none and in my judgment such is not the law". 
The only ._ qualifications to this position were. introduced 
recently by Section 309 of the English Companies Act,. 1985 
which provides that : 
"the matter to which the directors of a company 
are to have regard in the performance of their 
functions include the interests of the company's 
employees in general as well as the interests 
of its members". 
In addition Section 719 provides that : 
(i)--The powers of-a company include (if-they do 
not otherwise do so apart from this section) power 
to make the following provisions for the benefit 
of persons employed or formerly employed by the 
company or any of, its subsidiaries, 
'that 
is to 
say, provision in connection with the cessation 
85 Ibid at P. 963. See also L. C. B. Gower, The Principles of 
Modern CompanZ Law (London : Stevens an. 7 Sons, Third 
Edition, 1969). P. 522. 
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or transfer to any person of the. whole or part 
of the undertaking of the company or that 
subsidiary. 86 
These changes were the result, of the-new thinking-which 
was beginning to incorporate some of the Poddian ideas towards 
the late 1960s. This new thinking was that -the interests 'of 
employees, creditors and consumers ought toý be considered by 
boards and their companies in their, decisions and plans. Those 
interests however were considerable ýonly in so far as they 
coincided with those of the shareholders and did not conflict 
with them. 87 
In terms 'of -duties of care and 'skill-, ý there is still 
doubt as to the value of directorshipýas a mode of control. -As 
no judicial opinion has'been voiced in Zambia on the extent of 
the directors duties, recourse may be had to other-common law 
sources. In this regard, two positions' of'authority stand out. 
In Britain a "company" director, is" required to 'exercise his 
duties with reasonable care and' skill. '' He isý however, ' not 
required to exhibit a greater, degree of skill than may 'be 
reasonably expected of a 'person of his knowledge and 
experidnce. 88 
86 Companies Act, 1985 C-. 6. See also J. H. Farrar,, Company Law 
(London : Butterworths, 1985) P. 310 and(Ferguson v Wilson 
(1866) L. R. 2 Ch. 77. Per Cairns L. J. at P. 89. 
87 See e. g. Re W and M'Roith Ltd [19671 1 W. L. R. 432. 
88 Clive M Schmitthoff and James H. Thompson (Eds) Palmers' 
Company Law (London : Stevens and Sons Ltd, 1965T--P-. =5. 
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In America on the other hand, the standard is much 
higher. Thus in Kavanangh V. Commonwealth Trust CompanY89 it 
was said'that a director is required to know and give direction 
to the general affairs of the institution and its business 
policy and have a general knowledge of the manner in which the 
business is conducted, the'character of the investment, and the 
employment of resources. That case added that 
"no custom or practice can make directorship a 
mere position of honour void of responsibility 
or cause a name to become a substitute for 
care and attention". 
English courts, - on the other hand have not gone that far. The 
old, but as yet undisturbed holding, in Re Cardiff Savings Bank 
Marquis of Bute90 demonstrates the laxity in the English 
position. In that case, the Marquis of Bute was appointed as 
president of the Cardiff * Savings Bank when he was only six 
months old and in 38 years he attended only one meeting. Upon 
an action for losses resulting from irregularities in the 
bank's operation, the court, said that it was not' possible to 
expect all the trustees to take a very active part in the 
management or attend every meeting. 
Which ever position is adopted directorship as one of 
Zambia's modes of exerting control still falls far short'of theý 
desired goal. If the British position is adopted, then Zambian 
89 23 N. Y. 103,106,119 N. E. 237,238. 
90 [1892*1 2 Ch. 100. 
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directors must be treated as ordinary men and women expected 
only- to possess and display reasonable , care and 
knowledge. 
This means that the foreign companies who choose them still 
benefit as such people are unlikely to detect any conflict with 
government objectives, particularly when they do not know 
anything about banking. Furthermore, it is unlikely that these 
companies will appoint people who will question their practices 
and policies. But even if one or two Zambian directors went 
Out of their way to protect the government's interests, their 
actions' 'are likely to be' voided, ' as a direc , torts duty of 
loyalty under English law is to thecompany as awhole and*n-ot 
merely to a particular section of the membership. 91' 
If, on the other hand, the American position is adopted, 
then Zambian directors will be of no use to government 
objectives as directorship will involve not only the possession 
of a certain degree of knowledge and skill about the business 
concerned, but also a willingness and ability to serýe 'the 
company and its owners faithfully without a division of 
loyalty. - Furthermore, even if it was still possible for such 
directors to project Zambian interests while serving the 
interests of thei r companies, it would be extremely diff icult 
to find properly qualified Zambians to fill up all the 
positions on' the boards of various banks. ' The experience of 
parastatal*companies where boards are filled with po liiicians 
91 Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd. [19511 Ch 286, at 291. 
he case of the Zambian bank e government is not 
even an investor or shareholder. c. f. note 79 above [or: 
c. f. note 96 below]. 
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and civil servants justifies these doubts. In view of these 
doubts, it is difficult to see how significant the use of 
Zambian directors to achieve control ofl the Banks can be. 
Requirements like this one do not solve the problem of poor 
levels of bank lending in the national economy. They only 
ensure two things. First they ensure that a, few Africans get-, 
access to some of the prestigious positions which were -denied 
to them before. This as seen earlier is an uncertain'solution 
as in more cases than not such appointees bring inefficiency to 
their companies and a loss of competitiveness' in 'the' 
92 international markets. Secondly, they ensure that, save for 
a few more Africans, the same sectors as, before will obtain the 
loans. The vast majority of the people will continue to be 
afflicted by the same people, policies and practices, thus 
reinforcing the inherited. dualistic and dependent economy. 9.3 
Such a promotion or strengthening of an, elitist capitalist 
class is obviously contrary to., the government's professed_ 
goals, which means the. use of directorship in this way retards. 
them instead of promoting them. 
To the particular individuals concerned, directorship 
unde-r-"section 4 subjects them to the discomfort of having' to 
"wear two hats" at once. On the one hand they'must give their' 
full faith to the interests of their companies while on the- 
92 Anne Seidman Money, Banking and Public Finance in Africa 
(London : ZeA Books Ltd, 1986)9 P. = 
93 Ibid. 
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other hand they are required to be patriotic and push for 
different attitudes, policies and practices on lending, 
branching and recruitment of personnel in their respective 
banks, so as to be in accord with government objectives and 
plans. These policies no doubt may be seen by* some of the 
foreign owners to be a source of risk or inefficiency and 
therefore unwarranted. A resolution of such conflicts is 
definitely puzzling and can cause the individuals concerned to 
be ineffective. A somewhat similar situation, concerning 
cabinet ministers who also serve as chairpersons of statutory 
boards was lamented by the Mwanakatwe Commission, saying : 94 
"A more serious objection in principle is that 
the minister is required by law to regulate 
the very body of which he is himself the head 
and the wearing of two hats can be uncomfortable". 
These ministers are on occasions forced by collective 
cabinet responsibility or considerations of political 
expediency to countermand decisions reached under their 
chairmanship. Conversely they would force their organisations 
to accept propositions which had earlier on been adjudged 
undesirable or imprudent for business purposes by their boards. 
The dilemma of the Zambia director under section -4 and 
especially under government policy or expectations is also 
94 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the salaries, 
salary structure and conditions of service in the civil 
service and the parastatal bodies, Vol. l. (Lusaka 
Government Paper No. 1,1975), P. 132. 
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I 
similar to that of the nominee director'- a person appointed'as 
a director of a company on the understanding that he will 
represent the interests of some other person or group of 
persons. The appointment of such a -director 'appears to be 
inconsistent with the directorls'duties of loyalty and conflict 
avoidance. As Paul Redmond asks : 
"Is not the duty of loyalty to'general'-shareholder 
interests compromised where a nominee director is 
appointed for the very purpose of acting partially, 
whether by subordinating the interests of the 
general body of members to those of the appoinier, 
or by identifying company interests with those of 
the appointer? "95 
ýA 
The principal differente between the Zambian company 
director under section 4 and the nominee director is that the 
former is appointed not by the person whose interests he must 
promote but by the foreign companies themselves. The Zambian 
government itself does not even hold shares in the foreign 
banks involved. 96 
Judicial opinion however; - does'notý'see - the, position of 
the nominee director as"a dilemma,. Thusq, despite being"another 
person's repre-i-entative, such-'director is required to, observe 
the same duties of -loyalty as any-ýother , director. - 
95 Paul Redmond, "Nominee Directors" 10 University of New 
. 
South Wales Law Journal [1987], P. 194 at 197. 
96 It only holds shares in one Zambian bank the ZNCB. See 
chapter Two. 
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In Bennetts v Board of Fire Commissioners, of New South 
Wales, 97 Street, J. said that : 
"a board member must not allow himself to be 
compromised by looking to the interests of the 
group which appointed him". 
The only attempts to attenuate the standard of loyalty 
of the nominee director occurrm&in two Australian cases decided 
by the same judge. 98 Those decisions however, stand al one and 
have not been followed or considered in any reported judicial 
decision. 99 
In view of this legal situation, it is clear that what 
is needed is to get away from placing too much reliance on 
directorship as a mode of control, less still on testing the 
loyalty of individual directors* One way of doing this is by 
legislative coverage of the government's objectives, thereby 
imposing certain duties and obligations on the banks. These 
duties may be for the banks to sell some of their shares to 
local citizens. They may also be to oblige the banks to direct 
their lending towards certain sectors, preferably by a certain 
97 (1967) 87 WN (NSW) 307. See also Boulting V. Association 
of Cinematographp Telev sion and Allied Technicians, L19631 F-Q. B. 6062 lindgren. V. L&P Estates Limited L19 ]ch 572 
and Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Socig-t-yLimited V. 
g2yer r1959] A. C. 524. 
98 see Levin v Clark [19621 NSWR 686 and Re Broadcasting 
Station 2 GB Pty-Ltd. (1964-5] NSWR 148 Per Jacobs, 
99 Paul Redmond, op. cit., P. 200. 
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margin per year, as well as requiring them to set-uptin rural 
areas once certain conditions exist. 
100 To be successful this 
method must be accompanied by a proper system of enforcement 
which is based on defined criteria and supported by trained and 
competent staff. 
It has also been said that. to avoid conflicts of loyalty 
on the part of the board, an investor's interests are best 
accomplished by the investor exerting his influence to ensure 
that the members of the company as a whole appoint appropriate 
directors. 101 The government's attempt to luse 
this method 
unfortunately failed when negotiations for it to acquire some 
shares and become a member of the banks were abandoned. 102 
Individual banks are also at liberty to indicate in 
their articles that they will permit certain directors to act 
in a way which would otherwise offend their duties'of loyalty. 
But as the Zambian government is not a member of these 
companies it is difficult to see how it can take advantage 'of 
this method either. 
100 See PP V, 4-)4-6 above. 
101 Paul Redmond, op. cit-9 P. 201; citing Institute of 
Directors, Nominee Directors (Guide to Board'Room 
Practice No. 8,1985), Para. . 
102 See Chapter Four. 
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6: 4: 3. Other Short Comings of the Board Room Representation 
Requirements 
In addition to the foregoing observations about the 
requirement that Zambians or long-term residents should be 
represented on the boards of non-Zambian banks, at least one 
other assumption is detectable in that stipulation. This 
assumption is that a company's board of directors is seen as 
the real managing authority which the authorities"suppose they 
can use to shape up the banks' policies and terms of business. 
Several studies have, however, come to the conclusion that this 
is not the case, and that contrary to the legal norm, the 
function of managing the business of a company and making 
business policy generally lies with executive officers rather 
than the board. 103 Some* of the principal reasons given for 
this finding are that boards do not really have time to master 
the intricate details involved in, the functions of their 
companies or to shape up policies on their own. An average 
board puts in a few hours of work in a year on the business of 
its company; hardly enough to enable it to be assumed to be in 
103 M. A. Eisenberg, "Legal Models of Management Structure in 
the 
, 
Modern Corporation : Officers, Directors and 
Accountants", 13 California Law Review (1975), 375. 
See also Subramaniam, "Do OwnerW'Control Managers? " 
Enterprise Magazine, March 1973; A. J. Boyle, "Company 
Law and the Non-Executive Director : The U. S. A. and, 
Britain Compared" (1978) 27 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterlv, 487 at 491 anU -R. I. Tricker, "The 
Independent Director", a study of the Non-EZe--cutive -7 - Director and the Au; Tit Committee (Croydon : Tolley 
Publishing Company Limited, 1978). 
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full control of that business. Secondly boards depend on 
executives for all the information they need and are thus not 
in a position to know all the details of the business. Such 
limited access to information therefore, hinders their ability 
to shape policy and manage the companies they belong to even if 
they wanted to. 
Other factors inhibiting the board's ability to manage 
and control the affairs of the companv arise from the 
composition, selection and tenure of its members. Chief 
executives possess significant leverage on all these 
matters. 104 
As Tables 12 and 13, concerning two of the banks show, 
an indication of how little the requirement for board room 
representation can achieve may be grasped from the divisions of 
responsibilities between Zambians and foreigners. In most 
banks save for the Citibank and the Grindlays Banks where 
foreigners dominate all the important positions, the practice 
so far has been to appoint Zambians to the position of chairman 
of the board. The Chief Executiveship however, almost always 
goes to_non-Zambians. 105 ;ý 4' - 
104 See L. C. B. Gower, The Principles of Modern Company Law, 
op. cit. 
105 Other reports and entries at the companies Registry also 
reveal this tendencl. See also P. Ziuabove. 
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TABLE 12 
STANDARD CE[ARTERED BANK ZAMBIA LIMITED 
Directorate and Administration 
Chairman 
E. G. Kasonde 
Managing Director 
J. B. Gait 
Executive Director 
I. Fraser 
Directors 
J. Dare C. B. E., QC. 
W. Hastie 
V. I. Webber C. B. E. 
A. Wren 
Administration Manager 
K. W. Hobbs 
Secretary 
V. E. Saunders (Mrs) 
Registered Office/Registrarls-Office, 
_ Standard 110*uSe 
Cairo Road 
P. O. Box 32238 
LUSAKA 
Source Standard Chartered Bank Zambia Limiteds 
Annual Report, 1984. 
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'n A 'n T im 1 12 
BARCLAYS BANK OF ZAMBIA LIMITED 
Directors of the Bank 31-December 1983 
A. B. Munyama 
D. A. Mason 
D. M. Brookes 
S. H. Chileshe, G. C. D. S. 
P. T. S. Miller, O. B. E. 
J. M. Mwanakatwe 
F. X. Nkhoma 
D. Payne 
O. T. Phillips 
D. A. R. Phiri 
C. A. Stacey 
J. H. C. Whicker 
M. A. Meacham 
F. M. Howell 
CHAIRMAN (Zambian) 
MANAGING DIRECTOR (British) 
British 
Zambian 
Zambian 
Zambian 
Zambian 
British 
South African 
Zambian 
Zambian 
British 
British (alternate to D. Payne) 
British (alternate to J. H. C. 
Whicker) 
Source : Barclays Bank of Zambia Limited, Report and Accounts 
1983. 
Apart from the 'top executive' positions, ' many * other -- --- - -- 
important management' and technical positions are also largely 
held by people recruited or seconded by 'parent banks abroad. 
With the well known case of inadequate sufficiently qualified 
Zambians. to take over these positions it is difficult to see 
how boards alone can succeed in changing things. It is also 
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significant to realise that in some banks articles- and 
memoranda of association specifically --exclude 'board members 
from interfering in the performance of certain -functions. 
Thus, according to the memorandum of association of the Bank of 
Credit and Commerce 
"The general powers given by this article shall- 
not be limited or restricted by any special 
authority or power given to the Board by anyý 
other article, provided always that the Board 
of Directors shall not have the power to 
sanction any credit, loans and advances, which 
power shall always rest in the general manager 
and his professional staff (officers)". 106 
Given these facts it is difficult to see how section 41sý 
requirement of Zambian representation, on bank, boards will alter 
the day-to-day running of the banks., In a similar situation 
concerning workers' participation or indus. trial democracy, ý it 
has been debated from time to time whether- the election of 
workers to boards of 'their companies constitut. es an, effective 
way of achieving their control orAnfluence, in decision making. 
In general, the feeling is that without seeking a substantial' 
stake in their organisations or legally obliging- such- 
organisations to observe certain statutory -procedures and 
conditions regarding mobi-lisation, and allocation of capital 
board membership alone is ineffective as managers and 
107 108 executives can manipulate matters. The Bullock Committee 
106- See Article 80. 
107 See Eric Batstone, Anthony Ferner and Michael Terry, -Unions on the Board : An Experiment in Industrial Democracy 
(Oxford : Basil and Blackwood, 1983). P. 4. 
108 Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democrary 
Cmnd 6706 (HMSO 1977), P. 37, Para. 5. 
-319- 
reached a similar conclusion in 1977 in respect of - worker Is) 
representation. In its report it argued that participation 
below the board level is essential. In other words 
representation on the board should be supplementary to and 
should not in any way detract from the broad questions of 
identifying the interests of the company with those of its 
employees, customers and especially the community as a whole. 
6: 4: 4. Shortcomings of the Local Incorporation Requirement 
The requirement that foreign owned banks wishing to 
operate in Zambia must be incorporated in the country, as ,a 
means of extending control over ý their affairs, isý also - of 
dubious value. Many studies have revealed that multinational 
companies are able to control their subsidiaries in-developing 
countries and realise enormous profits, out of them by a host of 
devices. 109 These companies'control the technology and, other 
materials such as spare parts, - semi-processed components and 
raw materials which such subsidiaries depend on. This, means 
that when faced with regulations that they disapprove ý of or a 
nationalisation or semi-nationalisation of, their _sub-sidiaries, 
these companies can fall back on these devices 
109 See Thomas, J. Biersteker I Multinationals, The State and Control of The Nigerian Economv, (Princeton, New Jersey 
Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 16. See also Robert 
J. Ledogar, Hungry for Profits: US Food and Drug Multi- 
nationals in Latin America (New York : IDOC/North America 
1975). See also Donald Rothchild and Robert L Curry Jn. 
Scarcity, Choice and Public Policy in Middle Africa 
(Berkeley Los Angeles and LondoN : University of 
California Press, 1978), P. 158. 
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to continue shaping the direction of such subsidiares. Other 
devices include the use of fronts, or inflation of the takeover 
price. There is evidence of both methods being used in Zambia 
as seen in Chapter Four. 110 
Multinationals can also assume a supplier's role to 
their former subsidiaries. This and some of the methods 
mentioned above were identified as obstacles to the Nigerian 
first indigenization decree. "' Another problem in that case 
was however, the inability of the local people to purchase 
shares in the companies affected by the decree. 
The superior management skills of multinational 
companies also help them to have a leverage on the developing 
countries who are forced to conclude management and service 
agreements with them so as to retain efficiency and remain 
112 competitive. 
. 
Finally, these companies are able to use 
political as well as financial pressure on the host countries. 
In this regard it is important to remember that some of these 
companies command resources which are by far bigger than the 
GNP's of most third world countries. 113 In terms of banks many 
-See P. 187-for fronting, and-see also Mwanakatwe's 
allegation that banks were extortionate in their demands 
during take-over negotiations, chapter four P. 192. 
111 Thomas, J. Biersteker, op. cit., P. 52. 
112 See P. 318. above. 
113 Thomas, J. Biersteker, op. cit., P. 15. See also Stephen 
Robock, Kenneth Simmonds and Jack Zwick, International 
Business and Multinational Enterprises (Ho_rn__e`woo_U_ 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 1977)-, P. 277. 
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them also-enjoy an added advantage of being bigIenders to some 
114 third world governments. 
The conclusion of lucrative management, and consultanýy 
contracts has been one of the most popular and useful ways 
employed, by. international companies to -controll things 
in 
developing countries. They also use the well known. device of, 
over invoicing their subsidiaries 'for services and use of 
facilities. -Within Zambia itself many foreign companies whose 
businesses were taken over after the reforms managed to secure 
management contracts and continued to rule the businesses in 
the same way as bef ore. In, the retail business,, for example, _ 
an agreement, was concluded between the Zambia Consumer Buying, 
Corporation Limited (ZCBC) and., -, Booker - (Zambia) Limited after 
the take-over of 51 per cent interest, by the -state in the,. 
Consumer-- Buying , Corporation t (Zambia) - Limited - (CBC) 1A 
subsidiary 'of Booker McConnell Limited of 'London, ', whichý had 
previously owned and operated the 'CBC was- retained to'mahage'" 
the venture'. 115- Although the contract specific . ally res erved' 
certain matters as the responsibility of the Board of ZCBC or 
its chairman, the exercise of Booker's powers of management was 
114 A U. S. study on foreign lending, confirms this. See Robert 
Morris Associates, Domestic and International Commerce 
Change-Offs, (Philadelphia, 1977) Cited in R. Z. Aliber, - 
et. al., KeZ Issues in International Bankinp,, Conference 
Series No. 18 (Sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston, October 1977), P. 24. 
115 See Management Agreement between the Zambia Consumer 
Buying Corporation Limited and Booker (Zambia) Limited, 
30th June 1968, cited in J. M. Mulwila, op. cit., P. 75. 
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almost unfettered. The managing company, 'had "full-power and 
authority . to do everything -necessary or expedient 
for - the 
management and control of the , whole business affairs and 
-trading operations of 
ZCBC". The extent . 
to which Booker 
(Zambia) Limited, was, accountable to ZCBC was limited to 
submitting quarterly summaries of accounts showing trading 
results, and financial position of' ZCBC, and half yearly 
written repbrts on the activities, results'and financial 
position of ZCBC. - 
The service, management and other contracts which were 
signed by the Zambian Government (through ZIMCO) with the 
mining companies following the take-over of *the- 'Mines' also 
indicate the extent to, which- Zambian -measures could hav'e' been 
defused. -Under those"- agreements', ZIMCO, for' instance,, agreed 
that' the mining companies , which, had become ýminority 
shareholders would approve all expansion and investment plans. 
They were also empowered to., supply, -all the managerial, 
financial, commercial and other services. ZIMCO, therefore was 
excluded -f rom looking elsewhere f or cheaper or _, 
better of f ers. 
The services concerned included project consUltancy, 
preparation -of reports and financial statements, work study 
computers, industrial relations, recruitment of expatriate 
staff, external purchasing, production scheduling and research 
and development. ZIMCO-also agreed that mining companies would 
pay their parent companies, in foreign exchangep . 75 per cent 
of the gross turn over for these services. They would also pay 
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2 per cent as engineering service fees with all operational 
costs reimbursed to the parent companies. With respect to the 
sales and marketing agreements it was agreed that the parent 
companies alone will act as sole agents in every country for 
116 the purposes of finding purchasers. 
In the case of the banks, the fact that most of their 
key positions are still held by expatriates seconded from 
parent companies is an indication of how strong the grip of 
those companies is and of how. important the management strategy 
is considered to be. 117 The use of over-invoicing for other 
services and business transactions cannot also be ruled out. 
One indication of this is that the authorities are always 
detecting anoimalies in the externalisation system of profits, 
customers' payments and other applications of foreign exchange 
and are ever devising new' rules to seal the loopholes. R. A. 
Sowelem has reported that during the federal era the banks used 
116 See M. L. O. Faber and J. G. Potter I Towards Economic Independence, Papers on the natiOnallisa-Hion--5Y -the copper 
industry in Zambia, University of Cambridge, Department of 
Applied Economics, Occas,.,, ional Papers, No. 23 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1971). 
117 A review of the reports of all the foreign owned banks in 
Zambia shows that all the senior management positions are 
occupied by expatriate staff. Those positions are 
Managing Directors, General Managers, Chief Accountants, 
Credit Controllers,, Company Secretaries, etc. The only 
positions usually given to Zambians include public 
relations, security, branch management, assistant 
accountants or auditors, etc. See Tables 12 and 13 
above. 
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relatively higher rates for international transactions and were 
able to externalise larger sums of money as a result. 118 
Foreign banks have also been able to retain control in 
developing countries though the power of lending money to 
governments and parastatal or other companies doing business 
there. In addition to being a useful source of profits, such 
activities also endow them with authority to make demands on 
the management of national economies, which includes the 
regulation of banks. Some of the banks which have made loans to 
Zambia are also parent companies to Zambian banks. 119 
The duties of loyalty expected from a company director, 
coupled with the inability of a board of directors to exercise 
independent and unaided management in most cases, obviously 
indicate that section 4 of the, Banking Act, 1971 is ineffective 
as a means of controlling banks in Zambia. Other problems as 
seen are the use of devices like management contracts, supplies 
of foreign goods and technology which Zambian subsidiaries -of 
the affected companies have no control-over. In the face of 
such odds, it can only be said that this provision appears to 
be one of those third world regulations which are hast; ly con- 
118 R. A. Sowelem, Towards' Financial Independence in"a 
Developing Economy, (London : George Allen-a3l -Unwin, 
1967), PP. 60-63.. I 
119 Citicorp, a leading'international lender has a branch in 
Zambia Standard Chartered and Merchant Bank Limited, a 
member of the Standard Chartered Group has also been a 
lending leader to Zambia. See Standard Bank Zambia 
Limited, Annual Report and Accounts, 31st December 1971 
P. 22 and Standard Chartered PLC, Annual Report, 1985, 
P. 21. 
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ceived and created to satisfy mainly political objectives. It 
was created in desperation bordering on vengeana. following the 
break-up of negotiations to acquire some of the shares of the 
leading banks in 1970. According to J. W.. Garmanyl20 such 
hasty and impulsive reactions are generally harmful to the 
cause of the host nations. They constitute "a clear evidence 
of the absence of patience which is a common characteristic of 
many African leaders who seek to achieve maximum economic 
I development in the shortest possible time and end up with their 
strategies and priorities mixed up". This view is shared by 
Professor Yash Ghai who asserts that the Tanzanian 
nationalisation programme was betrayed by that government's 
impatience. 121 
6: 5. Prudential and Fiscal Regulations 
As seen in Chapter Three, prudential and fiscal 
regulations are used for credit and monetary management as well 
as to ensure safe banking, They are most commonly used in the 
areas of balance of payments, especially in respect of foreign 
exchange externalisatio. n. - 
They are_-also used to. control 
120 J. W. Garmany, "Enterprise, Management and Organisation in 
Africa :A Plea for Research", 9 Journal of Modern African 
Studies No. 4 (1971), P. 634. 
121 Yash Ghai, "Law and Public Enterprise in Tanzania" in Yash 
Ghai(ed)Law in the Political Economy of Public Enterprise; 
African perspectives (ScTndinavian Institute of African 
Studies, Uppsala, 1977). P. 244. 
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commercial bank liquidity by regulating lending and 'the money 
supply. In particular fiscal regulations are an anti- 
inflationary weapon which monetary authorities employ to 
prevent declines in industrial output and employment. 
Prudential regulations on the other hand are employed to ensure 
prudent and safe banking and customer satisfaction., 
In Zambia the Bank of Zambia has been empowered by its 
statute to act as the sole monetary authority. 122 In exercise 
of this, power, it, is obvious that the. bank. will take advice 
from other sources. The government in particular, can set or 
Z issue guidelines and directives about its existing and new 
economic policies. From time to time however, the government 
issues directives which in reality amount to an exercise of the 
bank's functions. 
_ 
Some of its direcItives 
, 
have, already 
I 
been 
referred to and, they, include, the imposition of restrictions. on, 
the borrowing ability, of foreigners 
, 
and the requirement that_,,, 
all such borrowing be approved , 
by,,,. the,, exchange , control,. 
authorities. They also, include restrictions on remittances and 
the creation of a pipe-line. 123 In, addition, the, omission of_, 
the right to treat balances and assets held, abroad,. especially,,, 
in U. K. as part of. the liquidity ratio, of , commercial,,. 
banks,: is 
also a government idea. 
Such occasioýnallassumptions of the Bank of Zambia's. 
122 See Bank of Zambia Act. 
123 See Chapter Five. 
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functions by the government is contrary to law. It also 
creates problems and contradictions. . First government 
directives or operations are more often than not based not on 
economic or monetary considerations, but on political 
expediency. Where economic considerations are applied they 
tend to be isolated and adhoc depending on the pressures of the 
day. The bank's role on the other hand is to apply government 
policy using professionals and technically feasible methods to 
produce the desired objectives. When Civil Servants or 
politicians take it upon themselves to short circuit the 
system, the result usually tends to be confusion. 
The other problem , is the multiplication of 
contradictions as some of the directives are not co-ordinated. 
The most common example of. such contradictions is in the area 
of foreign exchange where not only the Bank of Zambia is 
involved but the Ministries of Commerce and Industry. on the one 
hand and Finance and Development on the other. All three 
authorities are free to issue instructions and set conditions 
for commercial banks and their customers to observe. The 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry is responsible for, promoting 
industrial and commercial activities. That responsibility also 
involves the formulation of guidelines for importers for which 
the Ministry processes import applications and licences. Those 
import licences are also a pre-r'equisite condition before any 
foreign exchange can be remitted outside the country as payment 
f or goods. Clashes with the functions of the Ministry of 
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Finance and Development, which is responsible for the 
management of the country's financial resources, are always 
detectable in the area of guidelines f or f oreign exchange; 
where its conditions sometimes contradict those of the Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry. 
Thus, although all three authorities are supposed to co- 
ordinate their responsibilities I sometimes due to,,, delays or 
over zealousness on the part of certain officials break downs 
do occur with conflicting and sometimes numerous or unnecessary 
conditions being issued. On October 7th, 1985, for instance, 
the Bank of Zambia announced that the value of the Kwacha was 
in future going to be determined by market forces in a weekly 
auction. 124 But only a few months later, some measures were 
announced at State House to override the role of market forces 
in fixing the rate of the Kwacha. 
125 According to those new 
measures commercial banks were prohibited from giving 
overdrafts to clients for the purposes of bidding at auctions 
as such extra funds were seen as being responsible for the huge 
rise in the auction bids which 'drove the Kwachals value" even 
lower. Old bidders were also required to show evidence'of 
expenditure of previously acquired, foreign exchange before 
fresh bids could be considered. 
Another ground for conflict is 
124 Zambanker, No. 20, October 19=, 
125 Although the measures were annouý 
the Bank of Zambia, -it was clear influenced by government concern 
Times of Zambia, Monday July 14, 
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the fact that these three 
P-. 4. 
need by the Governor of 
that he was heavily 
and pressure. See 
1986. 
a 
authorities do not necessarily share the same list of 
priorities at all times. For this reason customers who are 
considered to belong to a priority group by one authority are 
sometimes not considered to be so by the other two. -ýThis means 
that customers who have been issued with tax clearances by the 
Ministry of Finance, 126 may nevertheless fail'to obtain import 
licences from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. This 
multiplication of priorities in fact tends to 'increase as each 
authority creates and observes its own procedures. In respect 
of import licences, for example, it is known that the normal 
procedure, is that a person must first apply to the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry for registration as an importer. When 
their application has been approved and registered, the 
importer will then be required to obtain forms from his bank 
or the Bank of Zambia to apply for foreign exchange. He must 
also comply with the Ministry of Finance's tax clearance 
requirements. All the documents will thereafter be ferried by 
the applicant himself or by post to the Bank of Zambia, which 
also has to satisfy itself that he has complied with many other 
conditions. Clearly this process is lengthy and can sometimeS' 
_. 
pmdýýr_ a customer's plý! np obsolete as costs and rates of 
interests go up. Other events such as border closures, 
sanctions, etc can set in and override the plans while the 
applications are still being processed. The fact that such 
126 In accordance with 7th October 1985, directives. ý The fact that they were issued by the governor but. requiring 
people to be answerable to the Ministry of Finance is a 
further indication that the Government and not the bank 
was responsible for them. 
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contradictions are allowed to exist in -the face of strong 
government objectives therefore raises some questions, about the 
effectiveness of its regulations. With regard to requirements 
like tax clearances which the Bank of Zambia has begun to 
demand, it is obvious that these were not really designed for 
its functions as regulator of the financial system. They are a 
government instrument which is merely going to entangle it in a 
bureaucratic process which is undesirable for the world of 
business. 
It is also notable that many other legal provisions are 
a source of potential conflict or contradiction, particularly 
with regard to the power to regulate liquid assets and 
reserves. According to section 42 of the Bank of Zambia Act, 
the bank alone may prescribe the minimum liquid assets and 
reserves which each bank and financial institution may be 
required to hold. 127 But under the Banking Act, 1971 not only 
the Bank of Zambia, but also the Registrar of banks and the 
Minister have power to regulate or give directives, regarding 
the regulation of these matters. In particular section 21 (5) 
provides that the registrar may waive the payment of or refund 
the whole or part of the penalty imposed in-conniection-with any 
bank's failure to maintain the minimum holding ., of liquid 
assets, where he is satisfie. d that that failure was not due to 
an intent to evade the provisions of the Act or to the want of 
reasonable care. Sub-section (6) of the same section, on the 
127 This also applied under section 29 of the old Act - The 
Bank of Zambia Act, CAP 699. 
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other hand, stipulates that the''Minister may at his di , scretion 
impose limitations which he'thinks fit upon'the'per ceniage'of 
liquid assets which may be held-by banks. " Such 'a' combination' 
of sources of authority in one statute'is undoubtedly a recipe 
for paralysis -in the 'system of managing, ''the fiscal and 
financial sector, 'Even more"the permission of a'discretionary 
use of power to a politician in respect of economic functions, 
given their tendency'to"'change swiftly, is a mistake'. ' 
With regard to selective credit controls, the ones most 
commonly used in Zambia are liquidity ratios, reserves and 
interest rates. There is however a tendency among the banks to 
maintain higher amounts of money for purposes of the liquidity 
ratio or reserves than demanded-by t, he authorities., 128 , Such 
actions affect the"outflow-of credit'as they amount to' hoading 
of cash instead of releasing it for investment. One 
consequence of this practice which is overlooked, especially in 
the case of reserves, is that, they'do notýearn interest at the, 
Bank of Zambia, but merely increase the administrative costs of 
the banks. 129 ',, ýEven though the'actions of commercial banks in 
engaging in this, kind of hoWing. is largely voluntary it. is. 
significant 'to- point out'that the use of liquidity ratios and 
reserves to regulate the credit market in a country whose 
128 See Chapter Five. 
129 See T. R. G. Bingham, Banking and Monetary Policy Trends' 
in Banking, Structure and Regulations in OECD countries, 
OECD 1985, P. 104. 
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income depends on-seasonal crop sales and an imperfect mineral 
market obviously imposes a heavy burden on the banks. In other 
words, the fluctuation in crop and -mineral sales and their 
consequent effect on the money supply would seem, to be , 
sufficient forms of control in a small economy. 
130 It would 
seem that one of the reasons for hoarAing cash, in excess of the 
statutory requirements is to feed the lucrative treasury bills 
market. The exclusion of all -external balances , from the 
category of liquid'assets while including long-term government 
securities was, as, the Bank of Zambia report indicates, aimed 
at achieving the same purpose*131 
Turning now to interest and other rates, these have been 
employed quite freqently by the Bank of Zambia. For example, 
from 1966 to 1972 interest rates on deposits with commercial 
banks ranged from 3 to 5 per cent. Those on loans on the'other 
hand were between 6 and 10 per cent. 
132 By 1984 these had 
changed to between 7 and 8 per cent for deposits and 12 and 14 
per cent for loans respectively. 133 The Commercial banks 
themselves however had no control in the fixing of these 
130 See for this view E. E. Jucker--Fleetwood, 14oney'ah'd Finance 
in Africa, The Experience of ' 
GhanapMorocco, The Rho-Te-sias 
and Ny land, The Sudan and Tunisia (London : George 
Allen and Unwin, 1964), P. 106. I 
131 Bank 
year 
132 Bank 
year 
133 Bank 
year 
of Zambia Report and 
ended December 31st 
of Zambia Report and 
ended December 31st, 
of Zambia Report and 
ended December 31st, 
Statement of Accounts for the 
1972, P. 57. 
Statement of Accounts for the 
1972, P. 82. 
Statement of Accounts for the 
1984, P. 106. 
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rates. It was not until 1985 that they acquired the power to 
do 80.134 When changing the law to introduce the right for 
banks to fix their own rates, th& authorities virtually 
conceded that the previous system was repressive- in the 
McKinnonian sensel35,, as it prevented banks from increasing 
their lending levels. The fact that virtually every bank 
raised its rates soon after the power -, to do so was granted 
indeed confirms that there, was widespread disaffection with the 
previous rates. Table 14 belows shows some of the new ranges 
which have been imposed. 
TABLE 14, 
COMMERCIAL BANKS INTEREST RATE STRUCTURES 
DATE : 6TH JUNE 1986 
BANK TIME 
MIN. 
DEPOSITS 
MAX. 
ý 
LENDING 
MIN. 
RATES 
MAX. 
I 
SAVINGS 
DEPOSITS 
Meriden 9.0 25.5 25.0 30.0 11-12.50 
Standard Chartered Bank 15.0 ' 19.8 25.0 33.0 15.0 
Indo-Zambia 17.0 21.0 25.5 28.0 15.0 
Zambia Nat. Comm. Bank 21.0 22.5 20.0 30.0 16.0 
Bank of Credit & Comm. 11.0 23.0 21.5 28.0 15.0 
Barclays Bank 14.0 18.0 18.0 28.0 " 16.0 
Grindlays Bank Int. - 24.0 29.0 29.0 17.0 
Citibank 6.5 21.0 26.0 30.0 Nil 
African Commercial Bank 19.0 24.24 27.5 30.0 16.0-18.0 
--Source .: 
Bank of Zambia & Commercial banks - weekly returns 
See also J. L. Muchinga, De puty General Man ager Credit Guara ntee 
department, Bank of Zambia, in Banking in the Current Econo mic 
environment; with specific reference-to Zambia in a Paper 
presented to the Workshop in Management sk ills at Managemen t 
Services Board (MSB), Lusa ka, 1986. 
See Chapter Three. 
135 See Ronald McKinnon, Financial Policies, in John Cody, 
Helen and David Wall (eds) Financial Policies for 
Industrial Progress in Develoýing Countries (World Bank 
Oxford university Press, 1980) P. 98. See also Chapter One. 
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In, addition, although there is no evidence to support 
this, it can also be said that the response of the members of 
the public in respect of opening deposit accounts with 
commercial banks might have'been higher had the banks been free 
to fix their own rates earlier-on. It is important to note in 
this respect that during the same period of operation as, the 
banks the Post Office Savings Bank (now the National Savings 
and Credit Bank) and the building society enjoyed the right to 
fix their own rates. 136 This, plus an extensive network 
throughout the country, in respect of the post office savings 
bank, might have enabled it to lure some of the depositors who 
would otherwise have gone to the banks. In addition, the 
absence of a strict regime of regulations such as that imposed 
on commercial banks, also created further advantages to the 
Post Office Savings Bank over its competitors. In this-respect 
it is notable that the only comparable system of regulation on 
the PostýOffice Savings Bank is that only its loans are subject 
to a lengthy and bureaucratic form of approval by a government 
minister. 137 
Finally, it is significant to note that although the 
Zambian government's d6velopment plans do recognise the need to 
use borrowing both from international and local banks for 
136 See also Mphanza P. Mvunga, "Zambia", In Neville Rubin and" 
Eugene Cot, ran, Annual Survey of African Law, Vol. VII, 
London 1973. 
137 The National Savings and Credit Act, No. 24 of 1972 
Section 19. 
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investment and other social requirements, none of these plans 
gives any specific indications as to the amounts each bank or 
the banking sector as a whole must make. The plans also fail 
to make any adequate classifications of the priority sectors to 
be benefited or the mode of allocation to be used in supplying 
such sectors. These omissions seem to confirm McKinnon's 
assertion that : 
"most developing countries have formal plans for 
industrial development, public infrastructure 
such as roads, utilities, the future course of 
education, foreign trade, agriculture, and so 
on. Yet planners typically do not set targets 
for, or even assess achievements in the financial 
sector. Unfortunately, regulation rather than 
development is the usual emphasis". 138 
In Tanzania however, although no "essential sectorls" 
list or specific credit allocation targets have been decreed, 
the commercial banks have been instructed as to the sectors to 
which they should give priority in their loans distribution. 
Thus, when outlining. the operational guidelines of his bank, 
the chairman of the National Bank of Commerce (Tanzania) said 
that although the usual commercial lending principles, such as 
analysis of the borrower's resources and liabilities and- the 
purpo. se of the loan are to be applied, the bank will go beyond 
the orthodox type of lending to be guided by the country's 
plan. 139 He added that 
138 Ronald McKinnon, op. cit. P. 93. 
139 National Bank of Commerce, "Chairman's Statement, Annual 
Report and Accounts", June 1971. PP. 17-18. Cited in 
Ali Issa Abdi, Commercial Bank and Economic DeveloRment 
The Experience of Eastern Africa (New Yor-W and London 
Praegar Publishers, 1977), P. 81. 
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"This shift of emphasis from the orthodox types of 
lending is also evident in the areas and sectors 
that we give priority to when lending. We seek to 
give priority where the criteria are met, to 
Tanzania's indigenous institutions, businesses 
promoting exports, industries providing employment, 
and import substituting industries. We'also give 
priority on rather premium terms to those 
geographical areas which are economically still 
1figging behind". 140 
In Kenya similar instructions have been made regarding 
sectors which are to be considered as priority sectors by 
commercial banks. Ali Issa Abdi, points to the Kenyan Central 
Bank's numerous policy statements requiring a shift from trade 
to productive sectors of the economy, including lending to 
Africans as proof of this situation. In 1971, commercial banks 
were instructed to switch credit from consumer durables and 
imported luxuries to the domestic production sectors such as 
agriculture and manufacturing. 
By failing to 'include the banking sector fully in ýthe 
planning process the authorities lost the use of one of the 
most effective tools for monitoring the responses of commercial 
banks to national needs. As one senior banker recently stated 
in a reaction to persistent critici-sms of the banking sector: 
"banks were beginning to lose patience with those 
who constantly attack them for allegedly lacking 
interest in national development while at the 
same time they remain denied of any form of 
cooperation or consultation with the planning 
authorities". 141 
140 Ibid. 
141 See Mr Friday Ndhlovu, Managing Director, ZNCB's comments 
in Times of Zambia, 3rd September 1987. 
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Perhaps the most fundamental consequence of the failure 
to include appropriate projections and targets for commercial 
banks in the planning system is that this has deprived the 
neediest sectors of a most appropriate mechanism for a 
nationwide calculation and satisfaction of their requirements. 
In this regard it is significant that that omission in the 
planning system is matched by an even larger but inevitable 
omission of the same by the legislators and monetary 
authorities. No legislation affecting banking operations in 
Zambia mentions any of the government's original aims and 
objectives outlined in the 1964 white paper. 
142 Even more 
serious than this, no piece of legislation outlines any 
targets, let alone criteria of any kind for the banks to abide 
by in their operations. What the banks do therefore is 
entirely discretionary and voluntary. 143 This also means that 
even though certain sectors, like the small scale enterprises, 
peasant farming, and other Zambian business ventures are 
142 White Paper on Industrial Development, 1964 (Revised in 
1966) Ministry of Commerce and Industry (Lusaka, 
Government Printer). See Chapter Four, PXTI 
143 In other countries which subscribe to socialism these 
things are done. See John N. Hazard, Isaac Shapiro and 
Peter B Moggs, The Soviet LeRal System, Contemporary 
Documentation and Historical Commentary (New York; 
Oceania Publications, 1969) P. 229. See also Ann Seidman 
op. cit., P. 278-280. Compared to such socialist systems 
the Zambian National Development Planning System is in- 
appropriate. It tends merely to outline policy rather 
than targets or projections. Thus, it is not unusual to 
see the Housing sector being required to work through the 
banks and other financial institutions to provide 
resources to the government and the private sector without 
any mention of the guidelines. See e. g. Third National 
Development Plan (Lusaka, National Commission for 
Development Planning; Government Printer, 1979), P. 38. 
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regarded as vital national priority sectors, they are 
nevertheless subjected to the same interest rates and charges 
and the same treatment and conditions as the parastatal and 
foreign owned companies. 
With regard to controls imposed by the Bank of Zambia in 
exercise of its statutory functions, these admittedly allow for 
exemptions from credit restrictions on agriculture and small 
scale enterprises from time to time. 144 It is important 
however, to realise that such exemptions, especially in 
relation to agriculture, are made for the purposes of 
facilitating crop buying by NAMBOARD and the co-operative 
unions which require large sums of money during the buying 
season. Applying the same restrictions, to them would therefore 
hamper that task. 
While these om, issions are clearly regrettable, any 
inclusion of banking operations in the planning system would, 
by itself make very little difference. As far as existing 
statutes are concerned there are no appropriate ways of 
ensuring that banks comply with national objectives. They act 
largely on voluntary lines. 145 This means that individual 
banks may easily decide to freeze all credit during the period 
of restriction. They may also decide to divert their lending 
from the exempted sectors to the sectors of their own choice 
without hindrance. As seen in Chapter Three the only existing 
144 See Chapter Five. 
145 Supra note 103. 
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agency to -, enforce regulations - The Inspectorate Department of 
the Bank of Zambia - has been constantly supplied with low 
caliber personel and limited powers. 
146 At the moment it is 
only allowed to ensure compli"ce with the procedures and 
requirements relating to exchange control, reserves, liquidity 
ratios, registration and annual as well as seasonal and monthly 
returns. For some of these functions it applies simple methods 
like document reading and passport checks to prove complimbcý2, - 
with procedural 'requirements and endorsement. of all received 
foreign exchange, respectively. None of the Bank's reports on 
the operation of the department refers to efforts to prove 
sector, bt. ]. credit flows and other ways of ensuring complilrý'ce_ 
with the government's original objectives, for example. 
6: 6. Securities Regulations 
These include the Agricultural Creditl Act. , The Trade 
Charges Act and some aspects of the Companies Act relating to 
the creation and registration of charges and other securities. 
They also include the Lands and Deeds Registry Act, The Land 
Conversion of Titles Act and The Bank of Zambia Act's Loan 
Guarantee Scheme. 
146 See Chapter Three. 
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6: 7. The Agricultural Credits Act 
In Chapter Three, it has been phown that a holder of a 
fixed agricultural charge has priority over cther creditors. 
According to section 4(5) : 
"Where-any proceeds of sale which, in pursuance of 
the obligation imposed by sub-section (2); ought 
to be paid to the holder are paid to some other 
person, nothing in this Act shall confer on the 
holder a right to recover such proceeds from that 
other person unless the holder proves that such 
other person knew that such proceeds were paid to 
him in breach of such obligation, but such other 
person shall not be deemed to have such knowledge 
by reason only that he has notice of the charge". 
What this means is that although priority is accorded to 
the creditor who holds a charge, such priority however, only 
applies where the other creditor has actual knowledge that a 
particular payment to him is in breach of the debtor's 
(farmer's) obligation to the first creditor. The Act further 
provides that'provided the farmer pays the proceeds of the sale 
to the charge holder, he is free to sell any of the charged 
property. It is however not the responsibility of the 
purchaser or the auctioneer to ensure that the proceeds of such 
a sale are paid to the charge holder even if they may be aware 
of the'existence of the-cliarge, 
These provisions clearly raise questions about the 
adequacy of the protection provided by the charge. It has been 
said that the charge's principal task is to make the farmer 
accountable to the charge holder. 147 In addition, the Act 
147 Anthony C. Mulimbwa, The Law and Agric-7-tu-ral Develument 
in Zambia, (Ph. D. Dissertation, London University, 1987). 
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makes it :, i a criminal offence for any farmer fraudulently to 
fail to pay the holder the proceeds from. the sale of property 
which is the subject of the charge. 148 Similarly, a farmer, 
who fraudulently removes or suffers to be removed from his land 
any property subject to a charge is guilty of an offence. In 
both situatipn5the offending farmer is liable to imprisonment 
for a period not exceeding three years. Another remedy is an 
action for a breach of contract. 
It is with respect to the involvement of third parties 
-however, that the protection of a charge appears to be most 
questionable. As seen a mere knowledge of the fact that the 
farmer has charged some property is not sufficient to avoid 
sale or payment to a third party. , What is required is 
knowledge not only of the charge itself but also of its breach 
by way of sale or payment 'to the third party concerned. This 
puts the onus on the charge holder to prove that the third 
party knew of the breach of the charge. Undoubtedly, this 
places the charge holder in a very difficult situation. It is 
not easy to prove that a third party's knowledge went beyond 
the existence of the charge itself to include the actual 
process of breach or of the expenditure of the proceeds from 
the sale. It is significant to note in this regard that notice 
of the charge may be obtained from the farmer only in very 
limited circumstances. Indeed it is unlawful for the farmer 
to print for publication or publish any list of 
148 Section 10. 
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agricultural charges. It is also not permitted to publish 
names of farmers who have created agricultural charges. 149 
Given these difficulties, it is not easy to see how an 
agricultural charge can be an attractive inducement and 
security to banks, carrying as it does the mere existence of 
the right to sell. Gardner, A. D. C. J's assertion that this is 
irrelevant150 serves to emphasise doubts one must have about 
the seriousness and intentions of the legislature. Indeed 
lenders may ask why would a genuine farmer need a loan when he 
can sell one of his assets or stocks or intends to do 'so. On 
the issue of notice, it can be argued as Mulimbwa again does, 
that where there is notice, constructive, implied or express, 
it would have been fair to require third parties to bear the 
burden of proof. 151 In other words it should be the third 
party's duty to prove that the goods concerned were not' the 
subject of a charge. He would also have to prove that the 
proceeds paid to him were not the result of a breach of 
obligation. 
With regard to the floating charge, the effect of mere 
knowledge of the charge but not of its breach is the same as in 
a fixed charge. The same questions about the value of the 
charge therefore apply. Another cause for concern is the 
149 Section 9. 
150 Attorneý General v Zambia Sugar CompanX Limited and 
NaFambala Estate Limited L191IJ ZR 2/J. 
151 Anthony C. Mulimbwav op. cit. P. 405. 
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ambiguity surrounding the holder's power to ensure that the 
farmer complies with the agreement. The Act merely provides 
that a holder of a charge may take possession or dispose of the 
charged property only in the event of the happening of some 
agreed event. 
152 Presumably this includes a failure 'to 
discharge the debt. What constitutes failure however, is 
debatable. The Act does not specify whether the holder can 
take possession even after a few instalments have been paid. 
No doubt, the requirement that any seisure or disposition must 
be conditional on the express breach of agreement has 
been 
necessitated by the fact that most of the charged or chargeable 
items are the very items that a farmer requires to create the 
means of repaying his debts. The absence of any- specific 
rights enabling bankers to seize such property however, is 
capable of being viewed as a denial of power to intervene An 
the treatment of the property until there has been either a 
crystalisation of the debt, proof of fraud or failure to use 
the proceeds from the sale of charged items to discharge the 
debt. 
With regard to the sanction of imprisonmentg"this is no 
recovery for the holder as it does not amount to a repayment of 
the money. When the farmer is imprisoned, the loss to the bank 
is virtually absolute as Jt is not permitted to take any 
unilateral action against an imprisoned person's property. In 
Anort Sondoyi v The People153 where upon conviction of 
152 Section 4(l) (a). 
153 1978 2R 148. 
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accused on charges of theft and forgery, a bank seized the 
prisoner's private motor car in order to recover, the amount 
involved, the court- held that a complainant may not s. Oze the 
property of a convicted person without an order of the court. 
Obtaining such an order will obviously involve a bank in 
further expenses and delays. 
Finally, the value of the agricultural charge as 
security cannot be judged independently of the value of the 
farmer's agricultural assets - and/or farming stocks.;, For 
peasant and subsistence farmers whose stocks consist only of 
simple homes, axes, calabashes etc, these are unlikely to be 
acceptable to banks. The agricultural charge as a means of 
spreading credit, therefore, favours the big commercial farmers 
who have such assets as tractors, ploughs, healthy animals, 
etc. 
6: 8. The Trade Charges Act 
In this Act, registration of all trade charges is 
required as a form of guarantee against fraud. It is believed 
that as the register is open for public inspection, it ensures 
that financial institutions are not deceived by traders who 
offer one property as security to several financial 
institutions. One remarkable omission in the Act on this point 
is the absence of any indication astathe effect of non- 
registration. In other words it is not specified whether any 
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trade charge which has not been registered is of no effect 
whatsoever and whether a bank has no relief whatsoever against 
a delinquent debtor who gave it a trade charge which was 
subsequently unregistered. 
One of the most negative characteristics of the trade 
charge, as seen in Chapter Three is that it does not 
necessarily ensure that its holder will enjoy a superior, claim 
over all the claimants or subsequent purchasers for value of a 
stock-in-trade. This clearly makes a stock-in-trade the most 
insecure of secured properties and inappropriate as a means of 
security. I 
Perhaps it can be said that by allowing the provision 
which waters down the protection offered by a charge over a 
stock-in-trade to exist side by side with the one purporting to 
make it attractive and effective, the authorities depicted a 
situation of ambivalence. This in turn portrays a realisation 
on the part of the authorities, that their objectives were 
rather unrealistic. This is because by its very nature a 
stock-in-trade is an article of commerce for which there is a 
permanent invitation to treaty. 
_ 
Thus as the chargg_-doep not 
mean that such an item must automatically ceaSe to be available 
for sale, it would not be easy for any one to prove fraud by 
alleging that the purchaser knew about the charge or its 
violation. In addition, apart from possibly standing in 
conflict and even violation of a now established rule of market 
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overt, 154 it is also an impracticable form 
envisages that each time a person went into 
have to peruse a charge register to ensure 
trade in display has not been bonded to 
shopping and buying habits would have to be 
circumstances, but not without grave inconve 
of security which 
a shop, they would 
that the stock-'in- 
a bank. Clearly 
revised under such 
nience. 155 
Given such contradictions and impracticalities, it is 
not surprising that the trade charge has not been a very useful 
form of security. One researcher was told frankly that, " even 
if approaches are made to them under the terms of the Act, 
bankers would not be willing to lend as it does not provide 
adequate security". 156 Bankers believe that the Act offers no 
means of preventing fraudulent borrowers from disposing of 
property constituting the security. Thus, even though the 
creditor is entitled to take possession immediately after 
default of payment on perishables, and after five days in 
respect of other items, there is no guarantee that the items 
will be there when he moves to seize them. Besides bankers do 
not like property seizures as they present them with unique 
problems of dealingýfor which they are not trained. 
154 See Bishopsgate Motor Finance Corporation Ltd. v Transport 
Brak-e-s-LU. L1949J B. JZZ. See also F. a' Atlyah Sale ot' 
Goods (6th Ed. ) (London : Pitman, 1980). P: 242. See-aI-so 
Chapter Three above. 
155 Mphanza P. Mvunga, "Zambia", op. cit. 
156 D. E. Ndhlovu, Law of Securities in Zambia, An Obligatory 
Essay submitted in partial tulfilment of the LL. B. Degree 
University of Zambia, 1977 (unpublished). 
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6: 9. The Companies Act 
Under the terms of this Act, as in the other two already 
discussed, there is no stipulation to ensure that any loans 
guaranteed by means of a charge on a company's assets will be 
automatically recovered. Neither is there any guarantee that 
the company or its officials will not dispose of the property 
without the agreement of the bank. 
6: 9: 1. Common Characteristics of the Agricultural and Trade 
Charges 
As seen the principal objective of the authorities in 
introducing Agricultural and Trade charges in Zambia was to go 
around the obstacle of stringent security requirements imposed 
by the lending institutions, especially banks. In a country 
with a highly mobile subsistence farming community, these new 
securities however present a unique set of problems, which make 
them rather inappropriate. It is obvious that the legislators 
were oblivious to the actual conditions afflicting the farmers 
and traders for whom they were legislating. Many of them can 
only offer simple items which even if charged are commercially 
unviable as securities and are susceptible to such ravages as 
drought, disease in the 'case of animals, and poor storage in 
that of crops, 
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Another common characteristic running throughout the 
Acts which deal with the formation of charges of various types 
is the requirement for their registration. It is clear that 
the Acts create a proliferation of registration departments or 
offices. Obviously a lot of time and money would be saved if 
all the Acts referred to a single office of registration. At 
least in respect of bank lending and other lending by financial 
institutions, such a measure would not only create a cost 
saving incentive but it would also enhence security as records 
would not be scattered all over the country. 
A single but widely spread department would also serve 
to remove the confusion which the present system creates as 
some of the Acts do not even specify the premises or addresses 
of the designated registration office. Thus, it is not, clear 
for instance, whether the-Registrar of Trade Charges is at the 
Ministry of Finance or. is the same one as the registrar of 
companies, who is at the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. In 
all probability some people might assume that he or she is the 
same officer as the Registrar of Lands and Deeds who is at the 
Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources. Another factor about 
the registration--requirements--of the-Zambian Acts i-s that apart 
from creating confusion through a multiplication of 
departments, they also. pose a dilemma for the rural based. 
peasant farmers and entrepreneurs who have to endure long and 
expensive journeys to Lusaka where all the offices are based. 
While there they must endure further exhaustion through 
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searching for the right offices. Given that they will have 
made long journeys to bank offices before seeking registration, 
it is obvious that whatever advantage these securities may 
create are diminished. The use of postage as an alternative 
offers only a little relief as rural people would still have to 
travel to their district centres to mail their, papers. 
In addition, there is a requirement to pay duty on the 
deeds themselves and other registered securities. An average 
Zambian borrower has no idea about the location of the Stamp 
Duty Commissioner's Office. 
In respect of enforcing the lending institution's rights 
to repayment or in the charged property, it may be noted that 
in addition to the difficulties already noted in section 7: 1,2 
and3, the creditor's options are very limited. First, they 
have the option of following a lengthy action for breach of 
contract. If they succeed, they may also face a lengthy period 
of recovery as courts tend to give lenient repayment 
arrangements. 157 Indeed in a country with a largely 
illiterate population transactions between individuals and 
commercial banks - many of them powerful international 
institutions, may not be viewed impartially by the courts. 
There is a trend these days for courts to consider such 
transactions as products of unfair bargaining which must be 
handled in a way which offers protection to the weaker party. 
157 Private Interview with Mr C. Mabutwe, Legal Counsel, 
ZNCB. 
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Thus. in Lloyds Bank v Bundy. 158 which is pursuasive authority 
in Zambia Lord Denning MR said 
"The English law gives relief to one who, without 
independent advice, enters into a contract upon 
terms which are very unfair or transfers property 
for a consideration which is grossly inadequate, 
when his bargaining power is grievously impaired 
by reason of his own needs or desires, or by his 
own ignorance or infIrmity, coupled with undue 
influences or pressures brought to bear on him 
by or for the benefit of the other". 
In Bundy, a charge on an old man's house which he had signed in 
favour of a bank for the purposes of helping his son to secure 
a loan was declared null and void for among other reasons, the 
desperation and ignorance which overwhelmed the old man in 
signing it. 
Secondly, charge holders may let a criminal prosecution 
for fraud to proceed against the defendant. As seen already, 
this does not amount to a satisfaction of , the 
debt as the 
defendant merely gets a jail term upon conviction. In any case 
such prosecution is not automatic as a lengthy procedure to 
obtain the DPP's consent has to be fulfilled. 159 So far no 
case has been bought against a deVrAuent debtor in this way. 
Finally, it may be added that all the legislative 
enactments providing for the creation and administration 
158 [19751 Q. B. 326 at 339. See also National Westminster 
Bank plc v Morgan (19831 3 All. E. R. 8F. - 
159 Criminal Procedure Code CAP 160, Section 84. 
-351- 
of charges are only permissive measures. They do not compel 
bankers or other financial institutions to alter their lending 
attitudes and practices. To this extent, the'most significant 
achievement of these enactments has been merely to remove the 
customary excuse often raised by the banks for not giving 
credit; namely, that customers are not prepared' to provide 
security for the money advanced to them. 
6: 10. Land As Security 
In Chapter Three it was stated that land is one of the 
most prominent forms of collateral security for credit. An 
individual or institution may mortgage its land to a financial 
institution for purposes of obtaining credit. 
One of the basic weaknesses of this mode of security in 
rural Zambia however, is the uncertainty of people's tenure or 
title to the lands they live and work on. In many African 
societies land is held under customary tenure and the peasant 
has no exclusive title to his land which can sufficiently 
satisfy a bank or financial institution. 
160 
The principal cause of the uncertainty of tenure among 
rural people is the absence of registered title. Until the 
advent of colonial rule, most Africanskept no written records 
160 See Tijani v Secretary of South Africa [1921] A. C. 399 per 
Viscount Haldane. See also Margaret Rogers and A. N. 
Allott, "Introduction and Report of Proceedings", op. cit. 
P. 15. 
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of their lands or tenures thereto. In the absence of records 
those aspiring for credit from modern financial institutions 
were automatically excluded from consideration. As prudent 
business concerns banks require evidence of title to land. 
They are also compelled by the provisions of the Lands and 
Deeds Registry Actl6l to show evidence of their newly acquired 
interest in the borrower's land by registered documents. 
Without definite tenure and registered title banks cannot meet 
these requirements. 
It is important to mention, in addition to the foregoing 
that further difficulties about customary land holding are 
created by the absence of delimited boundaries for some of 
them. Registration demands a defined parcel of land over which 
registered rights are capable of being exercised. But in the 
case of lands held under customary tenure, even where it may be 
possible to determine the extent of the land holder's rights or 
borders, it may still be impossible to register them or the 
land as such lands may form part of family or lineage 
properties. In some cases lineage members may not even be 
ascertained or ascertainable - but present family members may 
neverthel: ess-s-till"'recoil at-ihe thought of parting with their 
heritage. 
Another problem hindering land registration is the 
absence of appropriate machinery and manpower. The land 
registration system under both the Lands and Deeds Registry Act 
161 CAP 287. 
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and The Housing (Statutory and Improvement Areas) Act are not 
suitable for the purposes of registering land held under 
customary tenure. This is because the surveying processes 
required by both Acts are extremely expensive and 
unneccessarily complicated for the purposes oIf the local 
people, namely to acquire certificates for borrowing purposes. 
According to these two Acts, each application for land 
registration must*be supported by a map or sketch produced by a 
technique called cadastral surveying. Due to^ the limited 
numbers of equipment and qualified personnel to do those 
surveys, only a few sketches can be produced, thus making the 
process slow and expensive. Another difficulty is that, even 
though section 14(l)(6) of the Lands and Deeds Registry Act 
empowers the Surveyor-General to waive the requirement to 
submit a more detailed diagram or sketch and replace it with a 
sufficiently detailed but simple diagram made by less technical 
means, this only entitles a land holder to a 14 year lease 
instead of the more economical 100 year lease which cadastral 
mapping offers. 
Admittedly it is possible as Mullimbwa asserts, for the 
banks and other financial institutions to base their loans on 
the cost of labour in terms of Section 3 which provides that 
"anything resulting from the expenditure of capital or labour or 
the making of any material change in the use of any building or 
land- is enough to constitute an unexhausted improvement for 
11162 the purposes of making a mortgage. Problems however, still 
162 A. C. Mulimbwa, op. cit. P. 395* 
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exist as far as land held under customary tenure is concerned. 
Thus, whereas it is possible in terms of Section 3 for a 
customary land holder to sell or mortgage improvements on his 
land, that possibility is watered down by the requirement that 
a person can only acquire rights in land under customary tenure 
if he or she is a member of the community in whose area that 
land falls. It is also important that that person must have 
the permission of the authorities in that community and be 
prepared to abide by its traditions. As a bank would be a 
"stranger" in most rural communities, it would have to secure 
the permission of the traditional authorities to acquire the 
land by way of a mortgage. "In the event of default and the 
bank wishing to realise its security, the requirement of 
residence would seriously limit the range of people it would 
sell to,,. 163 The value of the security under those 
circumstances is seriously diminished. 
The Credit Guarantee Scheme 
Having realised that the banks and other financial 
institutions were not going to drop their demand for adequate 
security for loans the government decided to introduce a 
guaranteeing scheme for the least able of the credit seekers, 
vis, the small scale industries, village industries and small 
scale farmers. Under the scheme the Bank of Zambia guarantees 
to re-imburse commercial banks for any losses arising from the 
163 Ibid. 
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failure of any members of these groups to repay their loans. 
But despite the authorities' --- 
intensions, some of the 
circumstances, conditions and piocedures of procuring 
guarantees still give rise to some doubts about the efficiency 
of the scheme. 
One of the main obstacles is the distance which 
separates most of the intended beneficiaries under the scheme 
from both the Bank of Zambia and the commercial banks. While 
the majority of the small scale and village entrepreneurs as 
well as small cash crop growers are in the rural areas, the 
credit guarantee department like the Bank of Zambia itself is 
in Lusaka. Although there is a small provincial branch of the 
bank in Ndola, its task is to deal with foreign exchange 
transactions of the copperbelt based businesses while the 
rest of the bank's functions continue to be performed in 
Lusaka. For most of the credit seekers therefore, not only are 
they faced with long distances to commercial banks, but they 
must also deal with an even more daunting prospect of sending 
or taking their papers to Lusaka for processing. As in most 
other cases involving long distances, this causes delays which 
may supersede the benefits of the credit itself. 
Another worrying aspect about the scheme is that it has 
no automatic coverage of all the losses that might arise from 
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inability to pay by debtors. According to Felix Kani164 the 
scheme is designed to cover only those losses suffered and not 
the entire amount that has been loaned out. This is an 
indication of the Bank of Zambia's own careful approach to the 
scheme. For as it stands the bank's approach suggests that it 
is prepared to reject claims by banks whose lending has not 
been adequately protected by careful assessments and 
securities. In addition, the scheme is not a free service as 
the banks are required'to pay a certain amount of money, being 
a per centage of each amount guaranteed to the Bank of 
Zambia. 165 Other costs are expected to arise from project 
assessments, supervision of borrowers and administration. 166 
As these conditions by the Bank of Zambia show a degree of 
wavering commitment to the scheme, it is difficult to see how 
far the banks will go to support it. It is perhaps too early 
to tell as to the success or failure of the scheme. 
164 "Credit Guarantee Scheme". in Zambanker, A House 
Magazine of the Bank of Zambia No. 15, Xpril 1984, P. 15. 
Felix Kani was one of the architects of the scheme. 
165 Felix Kani, op. cit. 
166 Only recently Dr. C. Nglandu, Director of the Small 
Industries Organisation expressed concern about the scheme. 
See Zambia Daily Mail, 10th September 1987. For other 
concerns before this see National Mirrow, March 24 to 
April 5,1986, P. 3. 
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6: 12. Conclusion 
Government regulations and measures aimed at controlling 
banking in Zambia and achieving an improvement in the supply of 
credit are unlikely to make much of a difference as a number of 
flc, Lws characterise their provisions and procedures. Some of 
the flaws are fundamental as they relate to the very objectives 
of the regulations. Here the most significant examples are the 
requirements for banks to be locally incorporated, with 
Zambians or long-term residents represented on their boards. 
The biggest defect of the regulations however has been their 
failure to alter the attitudes and outlook of both Zambian and 
foreign owned banks. By and large these banks have not 
deviated from their age old dependency on collateral or other 
forms of security for all their loans. They have also done 
little to moderate their negative outlook towards the 
indigenous people whomthey regard as generally risky borrowers 
with minimal business skills. They have not gone out of their 
way to redress the conditions afflicting such local people by 
devising new lending ways and imparting some business skills to 
them. 
The government itself has also failed to achieve any 
significant change in the business skills and outlook of its 
people. Many people-still regard loans as gifts which are not 
supposed to be repaid. The Government's sanctions against 
defaulters are very limited and unhelpful especially where they 
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involve the mere imprisonment of culprits without a further 
requirement to pay. These flaws seem to stem from the fact 
that the government's objectives are not co-ordinated with -its 
regulations, which tend to be ad hoc and unsystematic. 
With regard to the requirement for banks to be locally 
incorporated, this as a means of achieving control is 
insignificant as foreign banks sI till enjoy the power to 
determine the capital levels, which in turn decide the size of 
a bank or its deposit and lending levels. They also determine 
the management levels and fill, them, up with their own men. 
Other tools include the power to enter into management and 
consultancy agreements, over pricing their services and charges 
and their control of the needed funds which constitute a large 
part of the government debt. The same doubts can be said about 
the requirement for Zambian representatives on the boards of 
directors. In real life, boards are not the managing 
authorities of their companies as they have little time and 
information. They depend for their functions on the co- 
operation of the executives. As these continue to be largely 
foreign or foreign trained, the Zambian government's objective 
of achieving control via the mechanism is rather futile. 
The other problems are that the Zambian regulations are 
subjected to too much bureaucracy. In addition to the Bank of 
Zambia, both the Ministries of Commerce and Industry and 
Finance and Development have a say in the management of the 
economy and foreign exchange. There are also numerous 
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departments involved with the various registration 
requirements. All these procedures are time consuming and 
costly. The fact that the departments involved are far away 
from the neediest people in the rural areas also diminishes 
their value. 
With regard to particular legislative enactments, the 
Agricultural Credits Act is riddled with inadequacies in 
respect of ensuring that farmers are obliged to repay their 
debts. It does not adequately outline the rights of the banks 
and the circumstances in which they may act against delinquent 
farmers who either fraudulently fail to repay the loans or 
dispose of the charged properties. Similarly, the Trade 
Charges Act also fails to provide defined or definite rights of 
a lending institution. 
The use of land as security is also beset with legal and 
practical impedments. These include the inability of the local 
people to adduce title deeds or to register their land. Other 
problems are the cost of surveying and registration. 
The credit guarantee scheme which was introduced 
recently by the Ba: hk-Of"-Zambia, Act, 1985 has also emerged with 
certain problems. Aside from the problems of the bank's 
distance from the rural borrowers, the other problems are that 
collateral security is still a requirement and the recovery is 
not automatic as only actual loss is covered and the banks are 
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required to pay some money in advance to the Bank of Zambia for 
its protection. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. 
Commercial banks came to Zambia as part of the process 
of colonisation and westernisation of the central and Southern 
African region. Their participation in that process as in all 
colonial situations was promoted by what the colonial 
authorities saw as a vital need to generate and bolster a 
trading relationship between the colonies and the colonial 
powers. In particular, the banks were required to supply 
financial resources to various colonial conglomerates, so as 
to enable them to claim raw materials of various types from the 
colonies and for the movement of such raw materials to the 
processing and manufacturing industries of the colonial powers. 
The banks also provided a convenient service by. handling and 
channelling funds realised from the reverse trade, involving 
the sale of finished goods to the colonies to the various 
personal and dividend accounts of the groups concerned. In 
addition they also handled the emoluments and savings of 
colonial functionaries and settlers. 
In Zambia (or Northern Rhodesia as it was called . during 
the colonial era) the banking business formed part of the much 
larger English and South African banking units. This means that 
Zambian banks were branches of the South African and British 
banks which also operated in Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. 
The coming into being of the Federation of Rhodesia and 
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Nyasaland in 1953 appropriately cemented the relationship, both 
in political and business or banking terms. 
In all f ive banks operated in Rhodesia and Nyasaland. 
These were the Standard Bank of South Africa, the Bank of South 
Africa which-emerged as National Bank of South Africa and then 
became the Barclays Bank DCO. The other banks were the National 
and Grindlays Bank, the Netherlands Bank of South Africa and 
the Ottoman Bank. After independence in 1964 more banks began 
to set up in the country bringing the total number to 10 by 
1987. 
Alongside the increase in the number of banks in 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, as well as in Zambia, after 
independence, went a corrresponding rise in their asset 
holdings and services. At the end of the federation in 1963, 
the total assets of all the banks combined was E106.8 million. 
This represented an increase of nearly 30 per cent from a total 
of E86.6 million which was held in 1953 when the federation was 
created. By 1985,20 years after independencev an even bigger 
increase had occurra with the total amount of assets reaching 
K4 billion or E2 billion. 
On the liabilities side these had also grown from a 
modest E82.4 million in-1952 to E103.6 million by 1963; an 
increase of 25.7 per cent. By 1985 this had reached K3.6 
billion or nearly E1.3 billion. Of these liabilities, the 
biggest have been the long dated savings and fixed time 
-363- 
deposits. In recent years demand or current accounts have 
declined as entrepreneurs and companies which are unable to 
secure foreign exchange for their import requirements have 
resorted to saving their money in longer-term deposits. These 
deposits have the advantage of being interest bearing which 
makes them more attractive over the non-yielding current 
accounts. These last accounts are more suited for use as 
working accounts for the day to day requirements of the 
business. 
Aside from those assets and liabilities which Zambian 
banks hold in the form of advances to their customers, reserves 
and other deposits at the Bank of Zambia, and other physical 
items like buildings, etc., the rest of these banks' assets 
tend to be highly liquid. Thus, in December 1984, for instance, 
even though the total formal liquidity ratio was only 30.8 per 
cent of total liabilities, the actual ratio was 32.3 per cent. 
In 1985 the numbers were 23.6 for the formal ratio and 47.0 in 
actuality. Some of the causes of this excess liquidity are the 
vigorous credit and exchange controls which the Bank of Zambia 
has been implementing since the early 1970s. These have reduced 
the ability of the" various uses of primary liquidity to absorb 
some of the excess liquidity. The other cause is undoubtedly 
the huge amounts belongimg to outside sources which are still 
awaiting externalisation. A directive by the Bank of Zambia 
requiring all banks to transfer such funds into a pipeline 
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account held with it has, howevery minimised the significance 
of that factor as a source of liquidity. 
The attitudes, practices and policies of the banks 
themselves with respect to lending cannot on the other hand, 
be ruled out'when it comes to apportioning responsibility for 
the high levels of liquidity that continues to characterise the 
balance sheets of Zambian banks. There can be no doubt, for 
instance, that given the ever growing size of long-dated 
deposits and easily convertable liquid assets, the continued 
shortage of credit, owing ostensibly to the fear of lending 
long term, is now without basis. This is because the 
availability of such long dated liabilities should make it 
possible to increase credit and act as a cushion against sudden 
surges in demand which could overwhelm a large current account 
based banking system. It is'for this reason that it can be said 
that the present inactivity in the use of primary liquidity is 
partly generated by prevailing attitudesp policies and 
practices of commercial bankers. 
In a country which is seeking to establish a mixed 
and- where 
_ 
banks are the biggest deposit taking group 
amongst a number of other institutions, the role of banks in 
promoting economic growth ought to be very prominent indeed. In 
addition, given the potential control which the authorities can 
exercise over these institutions and on the money supply and 
the foreign exchange situation, including in either case the 
ability of the banks to respond swiftly to any directive, it is 
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clear that these institutions are in a 'unique position as 
development agents. Indeed there has been a growing amount of 
empirical research and theoretical commentar-i on the 
developmental authority of financial institutions and banks in 
particular. Starting with Joseph Schumpeter's work in 1934, a 
number of other works have come up with varied pieces of 
evidence. These include Raymond Goldsmith's work which involved 
35 developed and developing countries. He demonstrated in that 
work that a high financial structure tended to correspond to a 
high real development. Others like Rondo Cameronp Griggs, 
Greenberg, Milton Friedman and Hugh Patrick also see banks and 
financial institutions in general as a necessary condition for 
development. Even those like Gurley who emphasise the role of 
residual factors such as cultural and religious practices, 
political stability, raw materialsv climate etc or alternatives 
like taxation and planning, do nevertheless acknowledge the 
complementary role of financial intermediation to development 
and growth. 
In Zambia (including before independence) the 
authorities have always expected that banks and other sources 
of private capital -'will play a -'leading role in development. 
From the time the B. S. A. Company assumed control, the 
authorities have persistently stated' that they could not make 
certain investments because they lacked sufficient capital 
resources. They also stated that they wished to leave the task 
of investing in business and industry to private sources. The 
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government was only going to be involved when no private 
investors were available to initiate certain2 vital businesses 
or where a business contemplated was too important or too big 
to be left in the hands of private investors. 
After-independence, the Zambian government pursued much 
the same policies and outlined its objectives in a white paper 
entitled "policy for industrial development". During both eras 
however, private investment has never been able to satisfy 
national expectations. Some of the causes of this negative 
trend were the attitudes of colonialists who had no real 
interest in the territory. These people concentrated largely on 
the mines where they extracted enormous profits without 
ploughing some of them back for development. Other causes were 
social attitudes like racial prejudice which promoted active 
discrimination against Africans and a. suppression of their 
farming and entrepreneurial endeavours. In a4dition the creation 
of the federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland helped to drain out 
all of Zambia's surplus earnings to help develop Southern 
Rhodesia and left it (Zambia) with enormous debts in return. 
It was due to the continuation' of these same attitudes and 
-1iract'ices and a-realisation that sufficient investment was not 
going to occur that the government introduced the Mulungushi 
and other reforms after independence. Those reforms sought to 
make the government a partner in the commanding industries so 
that it could direct their investments to appropriate and 
desirable ends. Many of the reforms howevert were plagued from 
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the initial stage by capital and management problems and in the 
case of the banks, they were never even able to take off. Apart 
from restricting the borrowing rights of foreign enterprises 
and businessmen as well as a few other requirements relating 
registration, capital levels, board membership and supervision 
of banks, such important aspects as lending practices remained 
virtually unchanged. 
Although some increases in the level of lending occurred 
during federation; such as the rise in public sector borrowing 
from L25 million in 1952 to E53.2 million by 1963, the bulk of 
the banksloperations remained restricted around the handling of 
customerýzf profits and foreign exchange. During other isolated 
years higher but fluctuating increases did occur in respect of 
certain sectors and industries. The largest proportion of bank 
lending during federation went to distributiont which consisted 
of the retail or import and export trade. It was followed by 
manufacturing' and non-African agriculture. Lending to the 
mining'sector was small as this group was part of world wide 
conglomerates which were able to raise their credit 
requirements externally. They were also unable or unwilling to 
satisfy the str, 'ttgent requirements relating to the mainly short- 
term lending practices of the local banks. For the mining 
companies such practices* were impracticable as most of their 
investments take long to generate profits. Lending to the 
African sector, on the other hand was virtually non-existent 
during that time. It was for this reason that the Northern 
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Rhodesia government established the Industrial Loans Board, 
the Land Bank and INDECO to provide some credit to this and 
other neglected sectors. 
Af ter independence commercial bank lending behaved in 
much the same way as it did during colonial rule. Although it 
is impossible to establish the actual amounts lent out by banks 
before the reforms - owing to the absence of appropriate data, 
it has been agreed that the non-local or expatriate and 
immigrant dominated enterprises continued to be the biggest 
beneficiaries. 
By the time of the reforms, the economic climate in the 
country had begun to change. First the liquidity position of 
the banks moved from a surplus to a negative; although it 
recovered afterwards owing. to heavy deposits from importers who 
were unable to secure foreign exchange. Other problems have 
been the growing balance of payments problem, the poor 
commodity prices, poor agricultural out put and drought. There 
were also shortages of traditional securities and agreements 
with the IMF which introduced severe credit restrictions. As a 
. _result. of all 
these factors, the lending functions of ... 
commercial banks have since the reforms been very 
unsatisfactory in the eyes of the authorities. 1-hey have also 
been subjected to constant monitoring and controls. One notable 
characteristic of the controls that have been initiated is 
that, while they reduced the borrowing requirements of private 
enterprises, they also had the effect of raising lending to the 
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government which used it to finance its deficit and budgetary 
requirements. Thus between 1971 and 1972 for instance, 
government stocks held by commercial banks increased from K22.6 
million to K29.2 million. The holdings of treasury bills also 
increased. Between 1977 and 1978 bank lending generally 
declined from K893.9 million to K454 million. It was only with 
changes to the regulatory system that significant increases 
occurred in 1985 when credit levels reached k1,224.7 million. 
If the economic climate and changes to the policies and 
regulations could change the lending levels, the question then 
is what else determines the lending practices of Zambian banks? 
Part of the answer to this question has already been seen and 
it is that Zambian banks like many third world banks are highly 
dependent on policies 'and practices copied from external 
sources. The attitudes and ideas of their managers - who are in 
most cases expatriates themselves, . are also not appropriate as 
they tend to discriminate against the vital indigenous peoples 
and enterprises. 
With regard to the influence of external policies and 
practices it is common knowledge that demand following finance 
and the real bills principle are the two model policies and 
practices followed by Zambian banks. These doctrines prevent 
banks from venturing out in rural areas to initiate 
mobilisation or savings schemes and to lend towards simple 
production systems. They also fail to adopt new support 
practices like helping customers with their applications and 
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with record keeping, or by simplifying their office practices 
so that they become less cumbersomey less'intimidating and less 
expensive. Other practices like part ownership of their 
customers' businesses and the placing of less reliance on 
collateral security are also still shunned. Some of the factors 
aiding and abetting these practices and attitudes are the wide 
spread lack of business experience amongst the rural people. 
Other customs like the extended family system which has the 
effect of diverting funds from the intended use to support 
relatives are also widely resented by banks. There is also an 
ac,, ute shortage of appropriate amenities and facilities to 
attract bankers, many of whom are expatriates from advanced 
countries, to rural areas. The failure of the authorities to 
attend to these problems by educating people about savings, 
borrowingg accounting and. by providing amenities, has also 
greatly helped to continue these attitudes and practices. 
Another important determinant of the current banking 
practices is, of course the regulatory process itself. Although 
little has been written on the regulation of banks in Africa 
generally owing largely to the influence of positivist 
thinking, it is now known that these are crucial not only to 
the development process but also to banking itself. Where the 
regulatory system integrates banks in to the national plan 
either directly or by means of localising their capital base 
and management national objectives are more likely to be 
satisfied. Similarly if regulations are introduced to protect 
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bank lending, to enforce contracts and to provide secure tenure 
then banking is more likely to prosper. On the .. other hand, 
regulations may themselves hinder ý`anks from pursuing the 
necessary intermediation that promotes growth. As Mckinnon and 
others have asserted some regulations have the effect of 
repressing rather than rejuvenating appropriate mobilisation 
and allocative processes. 
In Zambia the regulation of banks falls into three 
categories. These are the administrative regulations which 
relate to the formation and structural framework of banks and 
the prudential and fiscal regulations which affect financial 
safety and national economic controls which are imposed on all 
financial institutions to avert inflation and other economic 
pressures. The other regulations are largely judicial and 
usually involve, " the enforcement of banker and customer 
relations, Bills of exchange, etc. 
With regard to administration, aside from the wide 
ranging and rather imprecise force of the pre-1911 English 
Statutes, the common law and doctrines of equity, all of which 
were extended to the country by__t4e Northern Rhodesia Order-in- 
Council (the country's reception , statute), the 
first 
significant form of regulation appeared in 1956 in the form of 
the Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Act. That Act created a 
central bank to regulate the formation of banks and the 
practice of banking in the federation. Having been amended 
several times, this Act was finally replaced by the Bank of 
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Zambia Act in 1964, which was itself afterwards replaced by the 
Bank of Zambia Act, 1985. other statutes were the Banking Act, 
1959 whose principal contribution was to separate the functions 
of registration of banks and related aspects from prudential 
and fiscal administration. The function of registration went to 
government departments; the Registrar of Companies and the 
Registrar of Banks. Prudential and fiscal regulations on the 
other hand remained the responsibility of the central bankq 
although it is known that from time to time some government 
ministries issue directives which have the same effect as 
fiscal control or of contradicting it. The Banking Act 1959 was 
replaced in Zambia by the Banking Actp 1965 which has itself 
since been replaced by the Banking Act, 1971. The Banking Act 
1971 and the Bank of Zambia Act, 1985 are therefore the main 
pillars of banking regulation in Zambia today. The Banking Act, 
1971 was a product of the failed attempt by the government of 
Zambia to acquire controlling interests in all the banks 
operating in the country. Its central provisions are: 
(a) the requirement that all banks must be incorporated and 
registered in Zambia. 
(b) that all banks must have Zambians or established 
residents occupying at least half of the seats an their 
boards of directors; and2 
(c) that banks in which the government holds some shares 
shall maintain equity capital of K500,000 while those in 
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which the government has no stake will require not less 
than K2 million to be registered. 
The Bank of Zambia Act, 1985 on the other hand is a 
product of the present economic crisis afflicting the country, 
Its main provisions include those requiring the governor of the 
Sank of Zambia and his deputy - or simply the principal figures 
in the management of the economy to possess recognised 
qualifications in financial management. The Act also replaced 
the old Currency Act and placed all the matters relating to 
currency under the Bank of Zambia. The Act also- reflects 
government concern about the inadequate credit situation in the 
country. It does this by introducing a credit guarantee scheme 
to be administered by the Bank of Zambia. This scheme has been 
designed to provide protection to Bankers and other financial 
institutions who make loans to small enterprises. This is 
intended to be a reaction to the high security demands of the 
banks which have kept'lending at a very low level. The Act also 
authorises the Bank to act as banker to parastatal 
organisations and other persons approved by the Minister. In 
terms of the Act the Bank of Zambia has been able to suspend 
its monopoly -in fixing interest on the deposits and lending. 
Accordingly, individual banks are now able to fix these rates 
in accordance with their-liquidity. 
Apart from these statutes other legislative enactments 
to which banks in Zambia are subjected are theCompanies Act, 
the Disposal of Uncollected Goods Act, the Debtors Acto the 
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Stamp Act and the Cheques Act. Banks are also required to 
comply with the terms of the Evidence (Banker's Books) Act. 
With regard to securities, the most important statutes 
are the Agricultural Credits Act which authorises farmers to 
use their farming stocks and other implements as security for 
loans. These items can be used as security in two ways. A 
farmer can create a floating charge on some of them. The second 
way is by creating a fixed charge on some of them. The main 
difference between them apart from the type of item involved is 
that a floating charge can only be created in favour of a bank. 
In either case however the charge holder is entitled to seize 
and sell the charged item if the farmer fraudulently or 
otherwise fails to discharge the debt. The farmer is also 
required to use any money realised from the sale or insurance 
of any charged items'to disch I arge the debt. The Trade Charges 
Act works in much the same way in respect of traders as the 
Agricultural Credits Act does for farmers. Traders may use 
their personal properties or stocks in trade to create charges 
in favour of financial institutions. 
Another important form of security is land. This can be 
mortgaged to banks as security for loans. In Zambia the 
provisions of the Lands and Deeds Registry Act must be complied 
with before any interest in land or title to land can be 
created. The Land (Conversion of Titles Act) abolishes all 
freehold and fee simple land in the country. This has been 
replaced by statutory lease. It also provides that all 
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transactions in land must be authorised or approved by the 
President. With regard to the Lands and Deeds Registry Act this 
provides for the registration of all interests in land. Despite 
these two Acts however, the bulk of the country's lands 
continues to be covered by customary tenure. 
As instruments for attaining the government's plans and 
objectives' these regulations have been found to be full of 
inadequacies .1 and in some respects repressive. Thust with regard 
to getting banks to change their attitudes and practicesp it 
has been seen that there is no legislative or planning attempt 
i-I thalc regard. The banks are not directly required to meet 
planned targets. Similarly, there is evidence that the 
government has surrendered on the matter of attaining control 
through shareholding, namely, Zambianisation of outlook and 
principal interests. This ý has left the bulk of the banking 
industry in the hands of foreigners who have other interests to 
serve. There is also no requirement for banks to devise -new 
debt collection methods or other ways of involving banks in the 
businesses of their customers. The concerns of bankers relating 
to defaults and fraud have equally not been adequately 
confronted. 
The authorities have instead, elected to concentrate on 
such aspects as registrationv management by board of directorsq 
capitalisation, Suarantees and charges. Even these however are 
not without defects. Registration as seen is overshadowed by 
potential interdepartmental conflicts or contradictions as 
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there is more than one registering office. This as seen also 
applies to some'securities and stamp duties'where all kinds of 
registration 'are required, -with the result that customers may 
experience delays and sometimes'even fail to get to the right 
office. With regard to management, it*has been seen that the 
authorities have chosen to use boards of directors rather than 
actual management. It is now common knowledge that boards are 
not the real managing authority'as they lack sufficient time 
and expertise 'to run the day to day operations of a company. 
Furthermore, individual members of the board are not supposed 
to represent the interests of one section or group of 
shareholders. Their duty is to the company. National interests 
theref ore may suffer where 
_they 
conflict with the immediate 
profit motives of the foreign owners of a company. By choosing 
to make board membership the legal requirement rather than 
management the Zambian government has therefore left banks free 
to use foreign, managers, management consultancies and to impose 
severe limitations relating to the supply of raw materials, 
technology-and services. -No measures have been taken to prevent 
over pricing and other charges whose sole purpose is to 
facilitate externalisations of profits. Although restrictions 
were placed 'on the borrowing requirements , of foreign 
enterprisesq, these were not sufficiently supported by law. They 
were-also'not accompanied by sufficient criteria to ensure that 
required levels are met or that proxies and other legal devices 
are not used. -ýIII 
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The capitalisation requirement on the other hand is 
diminished in significance by the fact that banks can not be 
forced to maintain higher capital levels than the statutory 
requirement. This situation in another sense is a defeat for 
the government, as it has entailed that contrary to original 
government objectives, the foreign banks continue to be the 
biggest and therefore retain the power to set policies and 
practices for their smaller competitors. 
The Credit Guarantee Scheme of the Bank of Zambia Actj 
1985's defects include the fact that it is administered by the 
Bank of Zambia, which makes it out of reach for people in the 
rural areas. Secondly, the protection it offers is not free. 
Banks are required to deposit a certain percentage of money in 
order for them to be covered. This clearly diminishes the 
intended aim of encouraging lending by getting rid of the 
problem of collateral security. 
Finally, such securities as land, agriculture and trade 
charges are characterised by cumbersome registration 
requirements. In the case of land the existence of a widespread 
customary tenure means that it is not possible for most people 
to take advantage of bank credits. Apart from the absence of 
proper title to the land, such tenure also means that a 
landholder may not be the only one entitled to it. He may also 
be unable to define the extent of his land. The only way such a 
holder may be able to use his land to obtain a loan if he has 
no unexhausted improvements on it is by showing proof of the 
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cost of labour. The ability of a bank to enforce its rights on 
customary land, may however, be hampered by the inability to 
secure permission from the local chief, This is because in some 
parts of the country a non-resident may-not acquire land or 
exercise any rights on it. Where these problems are of little 
significance people may nevertheless still fail to use their 
land as security because the mapping techniques and facilities 
required for registration are very scarce and expensive. What 
conclusions then can be drawn from the regulation and role of 
the banks in Zambia? 
Basically the conclusions are that the actions of the 
government particularly after independence demonstrate that the 
government is aware of the crucial role of law in economic 
development. It has demonstrated this by adopting legal 
mechanisms to try and implement all the new policies it has 
adopted. 
Another conclusion is that, despite such government 
regulations and efforts the role of the banks in meeting the 
government's development requirements remains unsat6factory. 
While this is partly du_e_to__the existing economic situation and 
the continued application of attitudes and practices which are 
not conducive to good lending in the country, the bulk of the 
blame goes to the defective nature 'of the very government 
regulations themselves. By and large these regulations do not 
address the important issues of identifying the country's 
interests with those of the banks. Thus, we see no requirement 
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in the Banking Act, - 1971 for the banks to sell their shares to 
Zambians or to appoint Zambians to management positions. On the 
contrary the regulations give the foreign banks a golden 
opportunity to set the pace and agenda for banking practice by 
restricting the capital requirements of Zambian owned banks but 
not those of the foreign owned banks. Another method has been 
board membership which in today's terms is a backward step as 
boards owe their duties to their companies and not to third 
parties. In any event boardsp as seen, are not the actual 
managers of a modern corporation. 
There has also been a failure on the part of the 
government to exercise its duty to te-ach thrift, improve 
amenities and to devise effective credit protection methods. 
All these are areas in which the legal system has enormous 
potential. 
With regard to the other regulations or securities, 
these too have been found to be defective. The regulation of 
banks in Zambia can therefore be termed as a surrender or 
failure to defeat multinational corporations. It is also a 
___demo_nstration 
of the effectiveness of and availability of the 
avenues that these corporations can use to avoid strangulation 
by host governments. In other words, it becomes impossible for 
these governments to seal all the loopholes. Conversely, these 
companies are able to force the authorities into ad hoe 
management, whereby they try to attack one loophole at a time 
and in the process leave a big breathing space for these 
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companies. The Zambian measures are an example of just such a 
situation. They are desperate measures aimed largely at minimal 
and selective control. They are also an example of a failure by 
the government to recover from its 1970 defeat at the hands of 
the foreign banks, to set clear and precise objectives. 'In 
subsequent measures therefore,. what. we have is a continuous 
conflict of objectives as evidenced by such objectives as 
spreading administrative responsibilities by means of a 
multiplication of registration offices, while at the same, time 
purporting to- generate credit for rural areas. The other 
examples are the attempt to keep both the market overt rule and 
the sanctity of the charge, the, attempt to control land and 
other interests in land while maintaining customary land 
holding and expensive mapping requirements at the same time. In 
short, there is ample evidence that the government. of Zambia 
needs to set its priorities straight. 
IýI 
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